Here, we carry-over an ongoing topic on "Getting to Know Ancient Egyptian Art". This section will deal with certain codes which artists appear to have adhered to. These are recurring themes that appear to have then been timeless, in that they spanned several Dynasties despite new artistic styles sanctioned by succeeding rulers.
Tuesday, December 21, 2010
Monday, November 29, 2010
Understanding Keita's "Coastal Northern African"
Keita's term of "coastal northern African" in his earlier publications has been a repeat subject of inquiry over the years. Indeed Keita's terms can be confusing, thanks in no small measure to his blanket terms of "coastal northern African pattern" vs. "southern"/"Africoid" pattern, in lieu of old racial constructs, which he rejects as being restrictive such that they overlook the true variability of populations under assessment, since they rely on highly idealized archetypes. However Keita's terms, perhaps while not as restrictive, can also be misleading if details of his analysis are not examined carefully.
Saturday, September 25, 2010
Trivia on the Natufians
In 1928, Charles Lambert had uncovered, during a preliminary investigation at el- Wad, the first prehistoric art object discovered in the Near East, a finely carved bone animal head. He had also discovered human, later identified as Natufian, burials. - Courtesy of the University of Cambridge, the department of archeology.
The "Natufians", the reputed "first farmers" of the Neolithic "Near East", had gone from being regarded as mere "cannibals" by observers of the day shortly after being uncovered in the late 1920s to becoming widely recognized as "pioneers" of the farming economy that took hold in the Neolithic era and was subsequently swept into Europe.
Saturday, September 18, 2010
Akhenaten's Face!
When we hear the name "Akhenaten", more than likely for many of us, the first image of the pharaoh that comes to mind is one similar to those displayed on the statues below:
The consistency with which each of the sculptures above portray the Pharaoh's face, like for example, the way the statues display a personality with a rather long slender face, obviously plays a role in image stamped into folks' minds about the pharaoh. The images are consistent in the way the Pharaoh's cheek bones manifest, the aforementioned long and slender face, the eye-shapes, the nose and lips. Such artistic consistency has even enticed anthropologists to link the Pharaoh to skeletal remains that they feel conforms to the long facial profile seen the New Kingdom statues. Such consistency may even suggest that the images are capturing the pharaoh when he was alive, and in light of such matters, it may be seen as a dismissive one but the question is: Is this what the living Pharaoh would have really looked like?
The consistency with which each of the sculptures above portray the Pharaoh's face, like for example, the way the statues display a personality with a rather long slender face, obviously plays a role in image stamped into folks' minds about the pharaoh. The images are consistent in the way the Pharaoh's cheek bones manifest, the aforementioned long and slender face, the eye-shapes, the nose and lips. Such artistic consistency has even enticed anthropologists to link the Pharaoh to skeletal remains that they feel conforms to the long facial profile seen the New Kingdom statues. Such consistency may even suggest that the images are capturing the pharaoh when he was alive, and in light of such matters, it may be seen as a dismissive one but the question is: Is this what the living Pharaoh would have really looked like?
Thursday, July 22, 2010
The Role of Chin
Image caption: Homo Erectus, Homo Floresiensis and Homo Sapiens skulls on display. Note the chin structures of the two most visible and complete skulls of the three.
The well-known ideas circling out there about the human chin are pretty much in general agreement about its potential adaptive nature, they are just not in unison about what that adaptive nature is. To get a glimpse of what these ideas entail, we'll take a preliminary look at a recently published journal by Zaneta M. Thayer and Seth D. Dobson, titled Sexual dimorphism in chin shape: Implications for adaptive hypotheses.
Sunday, July 18, 2010
Knowledge-base Tool Kit: More on Social Positioning
Just another motoring report of an exclusive car, or is there more to it than meets the eye? As an illustrative example of how the aforementioned manipulation of the wage workforce by corporations and the plutocrats is at work, i.e. mass lay-offs so as to bring down wages and raise productivity with slimmer workforces [see the topic: Knowledge-base Tool Kit: Social Bargaining positions], the following came to attention...
High (volume) Roller — Rolls-Royce is on something of a...roll, with remarkable growth in many markets and all its designated models sold out until September.
High (volume) Roller — Rolls-Royce is on something of a...roll, with remarkable growth in many markets and all its designated models sold out until September.
Friday, June 25, 2010
Knowledge-base Tool Kit: Social Bargaining positions
In the existing interconnected global social complex, there are two main types of business entities: 1) Owners and/or overseers of profit-driven concerns that supply commodities of various forms, and 2) suppliers of labor. The former group ranges from financiers to the management of manufacturing, service and retail concerns, while the latter essentially comprises of the wage-worker. The global social setup is of course complex enough to obscure the obviousness of its interconnected business relations in all its facets to an ordinary observer, beyond that observer's own immediate role in society and relations directly linked to that, e.g. employer-employee social relations....so, where does that leave an ordinary wage-worker?
Saturday, June 19, 2010
KhoiSan: As the "Oldest" Surviving "Tribes"
The reader may recall having heard the claim that the KhoiSan are the "oldest living human populations" at some point or another. The saying may well have taken the character of something of a religious faith within some circles. When the whereabouts of the source for this "understanding" is inquired, common references have been to the National Geographic human genome project web-page and Semino et al.'s (2001) study regarding the "deepest clades" for instance. The former bases this on rather flimsy material that KhoiSan male gene pools comprises of deep root clades like hg A, while the latter has every now and then fallen victim to misunderstanding or misinterpretation of what is being related in the authors' findings within the contexts that they were made. Fact is the KhoiSan are no more representative of the oldest anatomical modern human beings any more than other living populations.
Friday, May 21, 2010
ATI one-stop referential page for notes on DNA studies
Reviews on mtDNA studies:
Haplogroups L0, L1, L2 & L3
Mitochondrial DNA M1 haplogroup: A Response To Ana M. Gonzalez et al. 2007
L1, L2 & L3 haplogroups: mtDNA Analysis of Nile River Valley Populations
"Ethno-specific" markers?
Haplogroups L0, L1, L2 & L3
Mitochondrial DNA M1 haplogroup: A Response To Ana M. Gonzalez et al. 2007
L1, L2 & L3 haplogroups: mtDNA Analysis of Nile River Valley Populations
"Ethno-specific" markers?
Monday, May 17, 2010
Side-lock of Youth
While the ancient Egyptian side-lock is a familiar sight, it is also a somewhat understudied feature—that appears on mainly adolescent figures of wall murals. Perhaps the curious feature about this cultural expression, is that the youth side-lock is strictly an African custom, and the fact that the ancient Egyptians shared [with Africans south of the Sahara] this custom, is significant to this end. Like the practice of circumcision was at one point in antiquity, the youth side-lock was foreign to Europeans, as well as to populations in the Levant. Interestingly enough, with regards to the latter, a question has in fact come up about a possible remote link between the "Jewish side-locks" and the subject of this topic—the Kemetic side-lock.
Wednesday, May 5, 2010
An Investigation into the "Mysterious" Mesolithic Maghrebi populations
The present discussion takes off from the trail of a previous one posted here on the examination of the "Mechta-Afalou" and the European "Cro-Magnons" as elements of a monophyletic unit constituting a taxonomic "type". That previous discussion had put a spotlight on the futility of such a thesis, which varied quite widely in its specifics as one went from the subjective taxonomic regime of one researcher to the next. In that same discussion, the following was noted: "the Mechtoid concept and its supposed relationship with Cro-Magnon, is nothing more than another Eurocentric way of trying to relate North Africa to Europe...essentially a *wishful* desire to see north Africa as more an extension of Europe than the actual continent [Africa] its attached to".
Indeed, there has been a long indirectly-stated desire to make the coastal northern piece of the African continent an extension of Europe, and territory which has traditionally been THE domain of European-descended peoples than of autochthonous Africans, which are generally treated as "newcomers" to the region. In other words, some sort of a "natural" apartheid was put in place in the late Upper Paleolithic until some time in the early Holocene, preventing autochthonous Africans from inhabiting the place, while the same region was supposedly hospitable to "European immigrants". This theme blatantly makes its reappearance in another study that has fairly recently enjoyed elevated circulation and has become a citation-favorite within online 'white' supremacist cult gatherings, undoubtedly attributable to the French-published study becoming more accessible as English-translated versions became more available on the net. The study in question comes from Kefi et al., under the heading: Mitochondrial Diversity of the Population of Taforalt (12,000 years b.p. - Morocco): A Genetic Study Approach to the Peopling of North Africa, 2005.
Indeed, there has been a long indirectly-stated desire to make the coastal northern piece of the African continent an extension of Europe, and territory which has traditionally been THE domain of European-descended peoples than of autochthonous Africans, which are generally treated as "newcomers" to the region. In other words, some sort of a "natural" apartheid was put in place in the late Upper Paleolithic until some time in the early Holocene, preventing autochthonous Africans from inhabiting the place, while the same region was supposedly hospitable to "European immigrants". This theme blatantly makes its reappearance in another study that has fairly recently enjoyed elevated circulation and has become a citation-favorite within online 'white' supremacist cult gatherings, undoubtedly attributable to the French-published study becoming more accessible as English-translated versions became more available on the net. The study in question comes from Kefi et al., under the heading: Mitochondrial Diversity of the Population of Taforalt (12,000 years b.p. - Morocco): A Genetic Study Approach to the Peopling of North Africa, 2005.
Sunday, April 18, 2010
Knowledge-base Tool Kit: Extraterrestrial Projection
On the surface, what is being discussed here may seem lighthearted and all, but we've all seen sensationalism around extraterrestrial beings at one point or another, be it from fringe cult groups who advocate personal UFO encounters or sightings, or entertainment mass media concerns. It seems that people are fascinated by the desire to find out, and some are even obsessed with the notion of 'we are not alone' in the universe, i.e., life outside planet earth, perhaps higher forms of life such as those typified by various depictions of the often 'big-headed" and "bulgy-eyed" extraterrestrial creatures generally identified with manned UFOs.The question then becomes, how much do humans project themselves onto these "beings", directly or indirectly? What paradoxes can one glean from such projections?
On the last point about the fascination around exotic "beings" beyond planet earth and the feeling of "not being alone in the universe", one can't help but get a sense of hypocrisy about the whole affair to the extent that humans cannot even get along amongst themselves within their very own species and show tolerance to that some .1% genomic differences—if not even less when taking just the superficial outwardly-manifested physiological differences into account—between humans. Nationalistic and xenophobic backwardness abound human societies, creating a situation wherein a person's very "being" can become an "illegal" entity just for "being" somewhere other than his/her place of birth. Such is the attitude of humans towards fellow humans. With such animosity and intellectual backwardness of humans towards their very own kind, usually justified on the account of cultural and bio-physical differences that presumably come with birth rights to social privileges over "others", can one not objectively admit that there is a tad bit hypocrisy in human eagerness to encounter even more exotic "beings" of vastly distinct species, from outside planet earth, and to confirm their beliefs of "not being alone" in the vast universe? Why can't the same eagerness be applied to the differences that already exist within humanity itself, right here on planet earth? The paradox here is obvious: "You can't handle differences among yourselves right here on the same planet, yet you yearn and lust for even more different folks, presumably from somewhere else in the universe, where one from earth is bound to get lost".
It is hard to pass up, when one comes across extraterrestrial themes in movies and games, that these exotic "beings" are generally humanoid in character. Is that accidental, or is it yet another reflection of human projection onto would-be extraterrestrial beings? Take Sci-fi shows like say, Star Trek, The Forbidden Planet, Space Odyssey, Space 1999, etc; in each of these shows, exotic beings are endowed with humanoid characteristics in some fashion or another. In Star Trek for one, the majority of their encounters are with "exotic" beings from planets afar, if not galaxies afar, which are of human physiques and generally like what some would call, "white people", on planet earth. Furthermore, what's wonderful about most of these exotic beings, is that they readily speak human language rather fluently, particularly in English! Even with the small biological differences amongst humans on this planet alone, humans don't all speak, or importantly, readily speak the same singular language without first integrating into a group, community or society different from their own, and learning a language different from their own primary one. Nor do all humans even speak English with the same accent like say, some Anglo-Saxon personality.Yet, exotic beings of vastly different species, notwithstanding their remarkable physical resemblances to planet earth humans, are supposed to be able to instantly speak some singular human language form fluently, usually in English—which is no longer just a language of planet earth itself, but somehow promoted to the language of the universe and spoken by virtually all the discrete extraterrestrial beings—not just from planets afar, but also possibly from different galaxies, and thereby able to speak with their "foreign" earthling counterparts—the humans! Much of the time these humanoid extraterrestrial beings invariably speak with the very same English accent(s) as some "Anglo-Saxon" space crew, it should be noted. Even supposing there are chances, within different galaxies, for a situation akin to our own galaxy, wherein the environment is ripe for the sustenance of life, is one to take it for granted that in literally across discrete countless galaxies, that one would run into the very same path to evolution as that which occurred on planet earth in our own galaxy, with little to no deviation, thereby culminating in planets respective to each galaxy eventually being inhabited by vastly distinct species but ones which display the very same physique or body plans as humans, who can even possibly get lost among humans? In viewing shows like Star Trek, this is the impression that one is bound to get, if he/she is to take time to think about it for a moment. One would have to assume that in some distant galaxy, to which an 'exotic' being—who is virtually physically indistinguishable from say, a "white" male or female of planet earth—belongs, as is often the case in the aforementioned show, there lies a planet of origin which essentially resembled that of planet earth, hosting evolutionary paths that is virtually indistinguishable from that of planet earth, including the evolution of anatomically modern human-like "beings" from ape-like creatures—again just like planet earth, wherein some interplay between glacialization and solar radiation environment culminated in the evolution of beings that look no different from planet earth's own "white" people of European descent. Of course, this is not to say that one does not comes across humanoid-beings of "color" [complexion] in the said TV show, but these are generally on occasional basis. Even more remarkable perhaps, is that these vastly distinct species and the human space crews mutually find each other sexually-appealing, to going as far as even becoming love interests, in various occasions; but of course, none of this should be taken seriously, because after all, these theatrics are just fiction, which need not make any sense at all, right?! Whatever the case may be, it is hard to pass up the significance of the popular portrayal of extra-terrestrial beings—generally purported to be of "high intellect"—in the guise of the humanoid form, i.e. the anatomically modern human physique in particular, as a reflection of human projection onto would-be extraterrestrial beings.
Revisiting the issue of nationalism and associated chauvinism, one is hard-pressed to take no notice of the condition of the earlier Star Trek releases of having had regular space crews or casts that bespoke a certain socio-ethnic variety; one had for example, a "Black" female regular (Uhura), an "East Asian" male regular (Sulu), an "East European" male regular (Chekov), an "extraterrestrial"—or at least part "extraterrestrial—regular (Spock), and "Western or West European" regulars (Scott & Kirk). One can suppose that such an ensemble of space crew is not all that out of character of the real world or that far-fetched, especially if they were to have been recruited largely from the same nation-state; however, could such a diverse crew—who, for those who are familiar with the TV series, are generally portrayed as working in harmony, wherein no regard is given to "racialist" and/or nationalist differences—be equally cohesive, were the crews recruited from different nation states with competing national interests? It is certainly a question worth pondering, but to take note of the status quo of the real world, while joint "international" space programs had been mounted, such as the fairly modest existing International Space Station (the so-called ISS), these have been plagued by competing national interests of individual member states, and the interplay between such interests and budgetary restrictions placed on member states for some reason or another. One need only look at the spacecraft models invoked in the likes of Star Trek Sci-fi concerns, and realize that such massive space vehicles are likely to entail not only great technological leap from that currently in place, but also likely to be prohibitively expensive crafts to put together by today's political standards, and one that would require unwavering international cooperation and consistent joint funding, spanning years upon years, if not decades upon decades; can today's competing or antagonistic nation-states pull something of that feat off? Questionable, at the very least! The very notion of nation-states is itself outmoded and can only find expression in the form of competing polities, each pushing for respective "national interests" of not so much as ordinary citizens, but largely those of the generally smaller ruling and business layers of society.
Hypothetically speaking [obviously], i.e. from experience on earth, if extraterrestrial beings indeed exist elsewhere, it would perhaps be in their best interest not to be 'discovered' by those "Humans" from earth. For if they do exist in a certain planet "discovered" by "humans", then those humans are going to deduce one thing from this, without wasting much time on the thought: availability of resources on the newly "discovered" planet. From experience on earth, such a development would likely soon translate into GENOCIDE, unless the new found inhabitants are many more times technologically superior to the "earthlings".
Is it any wonder that most science fiction movies about extraterrestrial invaders, interestingly seem to depict said extraterrestrials in a negative light, usually as resource-driven genocidal maniacs? However, when a movie storyline involves a "human" intrusion into a foreign planet, it almost always depicts that person as the saint on the planet, who just so happens to have gotten off on the wrong foot, generating unwarranted hostility from the natives. Such antagonistic depictions of the extraterrestrial beings vs. human characters are in fact reflections of paradoxes that exist in human behavior and attitudes. If one didn't know any better, one would say that these reflect [including all the above-mentioned] the unconscious (though sometimes conscious) desire of storytellers and movie producers to paint extraterrestrial creatures in "human" image. As mentioned earlier, i.e., from experience on earth, it is quite plain to see the relationship: history has shown on various occasions, that when certain human groups "discover" (so they claim) new territories on earth, the next thing that comes into the picture, is the step towards genocide, i.e., ruthless efforts to wipe out pre-existing inhabitants, so that the invaders can have all the resources in their “new found” territory(s) to themselves. The funny thing about this (if it weren't so tragic), is that these invaders often paint themselves as the righteous ones, while depicting the hostility towards their blatantly unsavory presence as being unwarranted; yet still, when this very same behavior is ascribed to extraterrestrial beings, it no longer becomes righteous, but evil and out to do humanity harm, while the hostility towards such invasion is interpreted as fully justified. Henceforth, the paradox in the matter of an action being righteous on one hand, and then that very same action becoming evil on another, is part and parcel of human projection of itself onto extraterrestrial beings, and the propaganda value of such caricaturization depends on who is telling the story, and when & where; i.e. perception from the oppressor's angle, or from the lens of the oppressed!
It may sound silly, but if the present author were an extraterrestrial creature residing somewhere in the mysterious universe, the last thing that this author would probably want, is to meet ‘discoverers’ from planet earth.
___________________________________________________________________
*References:
—Insights based on personal notes from 2005 (clickable link).
On the last point about the fascination around exotic "beings" beyond planet earth and the feeling of "not being alone in the universe", one can't help but get a sense of hypocrisy about the whole affair to the extent that humans cannot even get along amongst themselves within their very own species and show tolerance to that some .1% genomic differences—if not even less when taking just the superficial outwardly-manifested physiological differences into account—between humans. Nationalistic and xenophobic backwardness abound human societies, creating a situation wherein a person's very "being" can become an "illegal" entity just for "being" somewhere other than his/her place of birth. Such is the attitude of humans towards fellow humans. With such animosity and intellectual backwardness of humans towards their very own kind, usually justified on the account of cultural and bio-physical differences that presumably come with birth rights to social privileges over "others", can one not objectively admit that there is a tad bit hypocrisy in human eagerness to encounter even more exotic "beings" of vastly distinct species, from outside planet earth, and to confirm their beliefs of "not being alone" in the vast universe? Why can't the same eagerness be applied to the differences that already exist within humanity itself, right here on planet earth? The paradox here is obvious: "You can't handle differences among yourselves right here on the same planet, yet you yearn and lust for even more different folks, presumably from somewhere else in the universe, where one from earth is bound to get lost".
It is hard to pass up, when one comes across extraterrestrial themes in movies and games, that these exotic "beings" are generally humanoid in character. Is that accidental, or is it yet another reflection of human projection onto would-be extraterrestrial beings? Take Sci-fi shows like say, Star Trek, The Forbidden Planet, Space Odyssey, Space 1999, etc; in each of these shows, exotic beings are endowed with humanoid characteristics in some fashion or another. In Star Trek for one, the majority of their encounters are with "exotic" beings from planets afar, if not galaxies afar, which are of human physiques and generally like what some would call, "white people", on planet earth. Furthermore, what's wonderful about most of these exotic beings, is that they readily speak human language rather fluently, particularly in English! Even with the small biological differences amongst humans on this planet alone, humans don't all speak, or importantly, readily speak the same singular language without first integrating into a group, community or society different from their own, and learning a language different from their own primary one. Nor do all humans even speak English with the same accent like say, some Anglo-Saxon personality.Yet, exotic beings of vastly different species, notwithstanding their remarkable physical resemblances to planet earth humans, are supposed to be able to instantly speak some singular human language form fluently, usually in English—which is no longer just a language of planet earth itself, but somehow promoted to the language of the universe and spoken by virtually all the discrete extraterrestrial beings—not just from planets afar, but also possibly from different galaxies, and thereby able to speak with their "foreign" earthling counterparts—the humans! Much of the time these humanoid extraterrestrial beings invariably speak with the very same English accent(s) as some "Anglo-Saxon" space crew, it should be noted. Even supposing there are chances, within different galaxies, for a situation akin to our own galaxy, wherein the environment is ripe for the sustenance of life, is one to take it for granted that in literally across discrete countless galaxies, that one would run into the very same path to evolution as that which occurred on planet earth in our own galaxy, with little to no deviation, thereby culminating in planets respective to each galaxy eventually being inhabited by vastly distinct species but ones which display the very same physique or body plans as humans, who can even possibly get lost among humans? In viewing shows like Star Trek, this is the impression that one is bound to get, if he/she is to take time to think about it for a moment. One would have to assume that in some distant galaxy, to which an 'exotic' being—who is virtually physically indistinguishable from say, a "white" male or female of planet earth—belongs, as is often the case in the aforementioned show, there lies a planet of origin which essentially resembled that of planet earth, hosting evolutionary paths that is virtually indistinguishable from that of planet earth, including the evolution of anatomically modern human-like "beings" from ape-like creatures—again just like planet earth, wherein some interplay between glacialization and solar radiation environment culminated in the evolution of beings that look no different from planet earth's own "white" people of European descent. Of course, this is not to say that one does not comes across humanoid-beings of "color" [complexion] in the said TV show, but these are generally on occasional basis. Even more remarkable perhaps, is that these vastly distinct species and the human space crews mutually find each other sexually-appealing, to going as far as even becoming love interests, in various occasions; but of course, none of this should be taken seriously, because after all, these theatrics are just fiction, which need not make any sense at all, right?! Whatever the case may be, it is hard to pass up the significance of the popular portrayal of extra-terrestrial beings—generally purported to be of "high intellect"—in the guise of the humanoid form, i.e. the anatomically modern human physique in particular, as a reflection of human projection onto would-be extraterrestrial beings.
Revisiting the issue of nationalism and associated chauvinism, one is hard-pressed to take no notice of the condition of the earlier Star Trek releases of having had regular space crews or casts that bespoke a certain socio-ethnic variety; one had for example, a "Black" female regular (Uhura), an "East Asian" male regular (Sulu), an "East European" male regular (Chekov), an "extraterrestrial"—or at least part "extraterrestrial—regular (Spock), and "Western or West European" regulars (Scott & Kirk). One can suppose that such an ensemble of space crew is not all that out of character of the real world or that far-fetched, especially if they were to have been recruited largely from the same nation-state; however, could such a diverse crew—who, for those who are familiar with the TV series, are generally portrayed as working in harmony, wherein no regard is given to "racialist" and/or nationalist differences—be equally cohesive, were the crews recruited from different nation states with competing national interests? It is certainly a question worth pondering, but to take note of the status quo of the real world, while joint "international" space programs had been mounted, such as the fairly modest existing International Space Station (the so-called ISS), these have been plagued by competing national interests of individual member states, and the interplay between such interests and budgetary restrictions placed on member states for some reason or another. One need only look at the spacecraft models invoked in the likes of Star Trek Sci-fi concerns, and realize that such massive space vehicles are likely to entail not only great technological leap from that currently in place, but also likely to be prohibitively expensive crafts to put together by today's political standards, and one that would require unwavering international cooperation and consistent joint funding, spanning years upon years, if not decades upon decades; can today's competing or antagonistic nation-states pull something of that feat off? Questionable, at the very least! The very notion of nation-states is itself outmoded and can only find expression in the form of competing polities, each pushing for respective "national interests" of not so much as ordinary citizens, but largely those of the generally smaller ruling and business layers of society.
Hypothetically speaking [obviously], i.e. from experience on earth, if extraterrestrial beings indeed exist elsewhere, it would perhaps be in their best interest not to be 'discovered' by those "Humans" from earth. For if they do exist in a certain planet "discovered" by "humans", then those humans are going to deduce one thing from this, without wasting much time on the thought: availability of resources on the newly "discovered" planet. From experience on earth, such a development would likely soon translate into GENOCIDE, unless the new found inhabitants are many more times technologically superior to the "earthlings".
Is it any wonder that most science fiction movies about extraterrestrial invaders, interestingly seem to depict said extraterrestrials in a negative light, usually as resource-driven genocidal maniacs? However, when a movie storyline involves a "human" intrusion into a foreign planet, it almost always depicts that person as the saint on the planet, who just so happens to have gotten off on the wrong foot, generating unwarranted hostility from the natives. Such antagonistic depictions of the extraterrestrial beings vs. human characters are in fact reflections of paradoxes that exist in human behavior and attitudes. If one didn't know any better, one would say that these reflect [including all the above-mentioned] the unconscious (though sometimes conscious) desire of storytellers and movie producers to paint extraterrestrial creatures in "human" image. As mentioned earlier, i.e., from experience on earth, it is quite plain to see the relationship: history has shown on various occasions, that when certain human groups "discover" (so they claim) new territories on earth, the next thing that comes into the picture, is the step towards genocide, i.e., ruthless efforts to wipe out pre-existing inhabitants, so that the invaders can have all the resources in their “new found” territory(s) to themselves. The funny thing about this (if it weren't so tragic), is that these invaders often paint themselves as the righteous ones, while depicting the hostility towards their blatantly unsavory presence as being unwarranted; yet still, when this very same behavior is ascribed to extraterrestrial beings, it no longer becomes righteous, but evil and out to do humanity harm, while the hostility towards such invasion is interpreted as fully justified. Henceforth, the paradox in the matter of an action being righteous on one hand, and then that very same action becoming evil on another, is part and parcel of human projection of itself onto extraterrestrial beings, and the propaganda value of such caricaturization depends on who is telling the story, and when & where; i.e. perception from the oppressor's angle, or from the lens of the oppressed!
It may sound silly, but if the present author were an extraterrestrial creature residing somewhere in the mysterious universe, the last thing that this author would probably want, is to meet ‘discoverers’ from planet earth.
___________________________________________________________________
*References:
—Insights based on personal notes from 2005 (clickable link).
Friday, April 16, 2010
Review — "Linking the sub-Saharan and West Eurasian gene pools: maternal and paternal heritage of the Tuareg nomads from the African Sahel"
As it has become customary on this site, we will hereby examine the material specifics of work that recently came out, by Pereira et al., giving us an idea of what aspects of the journal withstands scrutiny and what doesn't. Below, is the extract, to give an indication of what we are working with:
Linking the sub-Saharan and West Eurasian gene pools: maternal and paternal heritage of the Tuareg nomads from the African Sahel
DISCUSSION
The Tuareg have a nomadic lifestyle and according to some demographic reports they show reduced fertility in comparison with their neighbours.47, 48, 49 The data observed here for mtDNA and Y-SNP diversities are concordant with those independent reports, especially for the Tuareg living within the bend of the Niger.
The overall West Eurasian mtDNA gene pool in the Tuareg population as a whole (H1, H3 and V) seems to favour a North African heritage.50 The only exception is the absence of the otherwise rare U5b that might have rather come to Africa through the Near East, and then drifted to higher frequencies only in some isolated populations such as in the Egyptian oasis Siwa.51 The absence of U6 can further be explained by genetic drift during the expansion of this haplogroup within North Africa.51 Note that U6 was observed at low frequencies in several population groups from the Chad Basin, such as in the Nilo-Saharan Kanuri and the Afro-Asiatic Masa.35
Relationships with the peoples of Eastern Sudan (the Beja) as pointed to by the study of classical genetic markers2 cannot yet be disregarded here as there is still no mtDNA of the Beja people available for study. However, according to historical reports, the origin of the Beja is more likely to be traceable to the Arabian Peninsula52 and the West Eurasian mtDNA lineages seen in the Tuareg have a rather Iberian affiliation in the post-LGM, and probably expanded to North Africa first.30, 31 The weak Eastern African influence in Tuareg is further supported by the M1 haplotypes belonging to the lineages characteristic of the later Mediterranean expansion (M1b and M1a2a) and the presence of very few matches for sub-Saharan L haplotypes with East Africa. The main post-LGM Eurasian and M1a2a lineages found in the Tuareg favour North African origin with migration to its southern location in the Sahel between ~9000 and ~3000 years ago. The upper time limit is defined by the age of the M1a2a, (estimated here from the coding region diversity observed in the three Tuareg, two North and two south Mediterranean individuals at 8000±2400), and by the upper 95% confidence interval for the Tuareg V lineages having polymorphism 16 234 (8800 years ago); the lower limit is defined by the age of the Tuareg V lineages having polymorphism 16 234 (3600 years ago).
The dates obtained from the genetic data coincide well with climatic changes in the Sahara, which resulted in repopulation during the first half of the Holocene when by ~10 000 YBP (the Holocene climatic optimum) humid conditions and greening were established. The climatic optimum lasted until ~6000 YBP, when the shift towards more permanent aridity occurred, culminating with the formation of the current Sahara desert. This desertification could have entrapped Tuareg populations coming from North Africa to the Sahel belt together with other pastoralists such as the Chadic speaking peoples41 coming from East Africa and Fulani nomads6 coming from West Africa. In fact, by performing complete mtDNA sequencing of the L3f3 lineage, specific for Chadic-speaking groups of the Chad Basin, Černý et al41 estimated a local demographic expansion during the Holocene period at about 8000±2500 YBP. No doubt all populations arriving to the Sahel were further enriched by various admixtures of many other sub-Saharan lineages, an effect even more pronounced in the Chadic groups who adopted a sedentary lifestyle soon after their arrival to the fertile Chad Basin than in the Tuareg who remain nomadic until present.
It is curious that, at least for the Tuareg maternal gene pool, there are no mtDNA lineages connected with the Neolithic expansion from the Near East despite being present in considerable frequencies in other North African populations. For example, the conservation of the high frequency and remarkable internal variability of T1 haplotypes within the distant and relatively isolated Egyptian oasis of el-Hayez led to an estimation of local expansion at around 5138±3633 YBP.37 There are no indications yet of the ages of local expansions in the more central and western regions of North Africa, which could contribute further insights for its absence in the Tuareg population as a whole.
Interestingly, for the Y chromosome, the dominant haplogroup in North Africa as well as the Tuareg is E1b1b1b. This haplogroup was associated with Neolithic diffusion in North Africa, with an age estimation of 2800–9800 YBP,45 but the lower resolution of the Y chromosome tree did not allow us to investigate this issue further. Nonetheless, disregarding whether they are in fact Neolithic, the ages for the mtDNA and Y chromosome lineages of North African origin observed in southern Tuareg are consistent with the same period, between 9000 and 3000 years ago. - Extract ends.
Let's start with a statement that Pereira et al. make in the abstract provided for the journal at hand:
As a simple matter of fact, neither the quadro-entity of hg E1b1b1b, Tamazights, Tamasheq (Tuareg) nomads, and Beja nomads are found in the Arabian peninsula, at least not as autochthonous groups. All are rare to absent in the Arabian peninsula. Hg E1b1b1b is generally absent in the Arabian peninsula, save for the few sporadic spots which became host to historic era immigrants from coastal northwestern Africa, like say the "Mizrachim" Sephardic Jews of coastal northwestern Africa, elements of which can be found in Israel. That is the only context in which any hg E1b1b1b subclade makes its presence in the so-called "Near East". The basal clades of the marker are restricted to Africa, not to leave out the haplogroup's diversity. Likewise, neither Tamazight nor Beja language are spoken in the Arabian peninsula.
Getting back to that matter of why Pereira et al. find it interesting that the "dominant" male haplogroup of coastal northwest Africans and the Tamasheq ("Tuaregs") happens to be of the characteristic "Berber" marker of hg E1b1b1b, when such an understanding is otherwise conventional wisdom and therefore, to be the expected turn of results; let's think about it for a moment: Getting an understanding of why these authors feel that way may also explain why they would even bother to entertain an Arabian peninsula origin of the Beja, even though no such group is native to that area. The invocation of the Beja has a role to play here: Since the Beja (Bedawi) have been claimed to show close relationship with the Tamasheq/"Tuareg" in one study [specifically by Sforza] that used select autosomal markers, the authors brought them up perhaps to support their idea of the supposed arrival of Tamasheq/"Tuaregs" first from coastal north Africa, and then their settlement in the Niger Bend areas upon the desertification of the Sahara in the mid-Holocene era.
They try to buttress this viewpoint, from what the present author can discern, by turning to what they call "Eurasian component" of Western African Tamasheq/"Tuaregs", again NOT the Libyan or northwestern Saharan Tamasheq/"Tuaregs", but the ones in the noted "sub-Saharan" African countries. The markers that they are leaning on are hgs H1, H3 and V.
Pereira et al. seem to be of the mindset that the Y-markers came to coastal north Africa via the "Near Eastern" Neolithic diffusion, and then in coastal northwest Africa, mtDNA from the Iberian peninsula were picked up, with some contribution from a "Near Eastern" Neolithic mtDNA gene pool [albeit not significant in the western African Tamasheq ("Tuareg"), according to the said authors' own observations], which they seem to identify with the expansions of M1, hence calling it a late "Mediterranean expansion".
Few other things to take into account:
Hg M1 markers...
The M1 markers implicated in the extract are actually of the Eastern African types, and not the typical coastal northwestern African examples. While the authors here do seem to entertain an ultimate eastern African origin for the M1 clades that they mentioned on the one hand, from the language in the extract provided, it appears that they were describing a coastal north African flow of the marker on the other hand, i.e. presumably before its heading for the Sahel in western Africa. In other words, notwithstanding the acknowledgment that their mentioned M1 sub-clades originate in eastern Africa, Pereira et al. are treating the M1 sub-clades here as "northern markers".
*More insight into hg M1 expansion across coastal northern Africa, eastern Africa and the so-called "Near East" had recently been posted here: Following Trails of the Cro-Magnon - II
The Beja...
While some genetic infiltration has taken place into the autochthonous gene pool of the Beja, the bulk of their Y-DNA lineage is of M78, BUT these are not the examples found in the Arabian peninsula; rather, these are the examples mainly found in the African Horn. The bulk of Beja M78 markers carry the V32 binary marker [see for example, Hassan et al. 2008].
The Beja language is considered to be a standalone sub-phylum of the Cushitic branch, and hence, not Semitic. The Arabian peninsula is dominated by Semitic languages.
The west African Tamasheq or "Tuaregs"...
The study that the present author posted on this site earlier about the largely west African component of west African Tuareg mtDNA related the following, to recall:
West African Tamasheq/"Tuaregs":
Even Pereira et al.'s own observations hint on the very real possibility that they are only seeing a snapshot of a bigger picture...
Hint on what these L types are, may be found in the authors' emphasis on Chadic speakers carrying L types.
They theorize that the Tuaregs could have started in the North, and then descended down, based on H and V markers, which they date to around 8000 YBP or so, but guess what? That specific L haplogroup (L3f3) that they do mention in the extract provided, also dates to about the same time frame, or falls within the same window of time frame!
What does all this mean at this point? Their theory has little basis to it. This may very well be hinted on by Pereira et al.'s own puzzlement in the following:
It puts them in a difficult position, because their mental attitude seems to be one of a demic diffusion from the "Near East" in the Neolithic times along the coastal areas of North Africa, whereupon in the far west Maghreb, they'd pick up European mtDNA marker types. This then will have been followed up with the mid-Holocene aridity of the Sahara, prompting the ancestors of Tuaregs to seek refuge in the Sahel, where they would mix with "sub-Saharan" Africans. This absence of "Neolithic" mtDNA markers in Sahel/"sub-Saharan" west African Tuaregs upsets that theory, in addition to the other little details just noted.
Additionally, they mistake an African-specific Y gene pool with "Near Eastern" Neolithic demic diffusion. Northwest African M78 markers cannot be from the "Near East", because northwest African M78 gene pool is actually more diverse than those in the Levant, where the "Neolithic farming" revolution is supposed to have started, i.e. if we are to go by data that Cruciani et al. (2007) give us. Not to leave it out here, but even E-M81 (E1b1b1b) is rare to absent in the "Near East". In this idea, Pereira et al. may well have drawn inspiration from Arredi et al. (2004):
Arredi et al.(2004) ran off with the theory that hg E1b1b1 markers first arrived in northern Africa in tandem with "Afro-Asiatic" speakers moving in from the "Near East", having citing outdated linguistic theories [like that of Diamond and Bellwood (2003)] of "Near Eastern" origins of "Afro-Asiatic" as their source of inspiration; this was the thesis of their study. They seemed to be tacitly implying that the characteristic E-M81 emerged along the path of this migration, with relative diversity of the clade decreasing as one moved to the far western corner of the continent. Of course, Arredi et al. (2004) did not account for the microsatellite distinctions in hg J clades, the other marker that is generally implicated in "Neolithic farming" subsistence for the so-called "Near East" aside from hg E1b1b1markers, that Semino et al. pointed out the same year. Much of northern African hg J clades appear to be more of post-Neolithic historic extraction, esp. during Arabic expansions, than Neolithic extraction, even though the coalescent age of the J1-M267 sub-clades when considered together point to initial dispersions within the vicinity of Neolithic time frames; this latter observation is true for the more recent "Near Eastern" chromosomes as well. The older clades were better preserved in European and Ethiopian samples, according to Semino et al., and hence, the most likely markers of Neolithic era expansions. Moreover, Arredi et al.'s hypothesis is contemptuous of the facts mentioned above, to reiterate, about the restriction of hg E1b1b1b markers to Africa, the absence of Tamazight as an autochthonous "Near Eastern" language and of any languages therein in the "Near East", that serves as the root stratum of Tamazight. Lastly, as pointed out here time and again, northern Africa did not adopt large scale farming subsistence at the same time or within the logical or expected time frame that it should have, in the event that one should entertain the idea of Neolithic demic diffusion in tandem with the spread of agricultural subsistence from the so-called "Near East".
What Pereira et al. may be seeing, if anything is to be made of it, is a portion of the "sub-Saharan" west African "Tuareg" gene pool that was attained from interactions between those Niger River bend "Tuaregs" and the more northern west Saharan groups. It is not inconceivable, since paternal and cultural relationship exists between these groups. The patterns seen in west African "Tuaregs" is obviously reflective of the Imazighen bio-history as nomads, and so, in order to get a fairly comprehensive picture of the uniparental DNA structuring in such groups, it is necessary to deal with large sample sizes that are not from just one or two spots, but spanning the general territories that are known for Tamasheq ("Tuaregs") communities. Rando et al. and Claudio et al. had done this to some degree or another, and hence, their relatively more consistent findings in DNA structuring. Pereira et al. may be suffering from what Cherni et al. described as "patchy" DNA sampling work. However, western African "Tuaregs" in the main, cluster with western Africans where mtDNA is concerned. As we've seen, two studies already attest to this, and as shown above, there are also hints in Pereira et al.'s own findings that this is the case.
Keep an eye on possible updates in future!
___________________________________________________________________
*References
—Pereira et al. (2010), Linking the sub-Saharan and West Eurasian gene pools: maternal and paternal heritage of the Tuareg nomads from the African Sahel.
—Rando et al. (1998), mtDNA analysis of Northwest African populations reveals genetic exchanges with European, Near Eastern and sub-Saharan populations.
—Claudio et al. (2009), First Genetic Insight into Libyan Tuaregs: A Maternal Perspective.
—Hassan et al. (2008), Y-Chromosome Variation Among Sudanese: Restricted Gene Flow, Concordance With Language, Geography, and History.
—Semino et al. (2004), Origin, diffusion, and differentiation of Y-chromosome haplogroups E and J: inferences on the neolithization of Europe and later migratory events in the Mediterranean area.
— Arredi et al. (2004), A Predominantly Neolithic Origin for Y-Chromosomal DNA Variation in North Africa.
—Personal notes; 2009, 2010.
Linking the sub-Saharan and West Eurasian gene pools: maternal and paternal heritage of the Tuareg nomads from the African Sahel
Pereira et. al.
European Journal of Human Genetics advance online publication 17 March 2010.
The Tuareg have a nomadic lifestyle and according to some demographic reports they show reduced fertility in comparison with their neighbours.47, 48, 49 The data observed here for mtDNA and Y-SNP diversities are concordant with those independent reports, especially for the Tuareg living within the bend of the Niger.
The overall West Eurasian mtDNA gene pool in the Tuareg population as a whole (H1, H3 and V) seems to favour a North African heritage.50 The only exception is the absence of the otherwise rare U5b that might have rather come to Africa through the Near East, and then drifted to higher frequencies only in some isolated populations such as in the Egyptian oasis Siwa.51 The absence of U6 can further be explained by genetic drift during the expansion of this haplogroup within North Africa.51 Note that U6 was observed at low frequencies in several population groups from the Chad Basin, such as in the Nilo-Saharan Kanuri and the Afro-Asiatic Masa.35
Relationships with the peoples of Eastern Sudan (the Beja) as pointed to by the study of classical genetic markers2 cannot yet be disregarded here as there is still no mtDNA of the Beja people available for study. However, according to historical reports, the origin of the Beja is more likely to be traceable to the Arabian Peninsula52 and the West Eurasian mtDNA lineages seen in the Tuareg have a rather Iberian affiliation in the post-LGM, and probably expanded to North Africa first.30, 31 The weak Eastern African influence in Tuareg is further supported by the M1 haplotypes belonging to the lineages characteristic of the later Mediterranean expansion (M1b and M1a2a) and the presence of very few matches for sub-Saharan L haplotypes with East Africa. The main post-LGM Eurasian and M1a2a lineages found in the Tuareg favour North African origin with migration to its southern location in the Sahel between ~9000 and ~3000 years ago. The upper time limit is defined by the age of the M1a2a, (estimated here from the coding region diversity observed in the three Tuareg, two North and two south Mediterranean individuals at 8000±2400), and by the upper 95% confidence interval for the Tuareg V lineages having polymorphism 16 234 (8800 years ago); the lower limit is defined by the age of the Tuareg V lineages having polymorphism 16 234 (3600 years ago).
The dates obtained from the genetic data coincide well with climatic changes in the Sahara, which resulted in repopulation during the first half of the Holocene when by ~10 000 YBP (the Holocene climatic optimum) humid conditions and greening were established. The climatic optimum lasted until ~6000 YBP, when the shift towards more permanent aridity occurred, culminating with the formation of the current Sahara desert. This desertification could have entrapped Tuareg populations coming from North Africa to the Sahel belt together with other pastoralists such as the Chadic speaking peoples41 coming from East Africa and Fulani nomads6 coming from West Africa. In fact, by performing complete mtDNA sequencing of the L3f3 lineage, specific for Chadic-speaking groups of the Chad Basin, Černý et al41 estimated a local demographic expansion during the Holocene period at about 8000±2500 YBP. No doubt all populations arriving to the Sahel were further enriched by various admixtures of many other sub-Saharan lineages, an effect even more pronounced in the Chadic groups who adopted a sedentary lifestyle soon after their arrival to the fertile Chad Basin than in the Tuareg who remain nomadic until present.
It is curious that, at least for the Tuareg maternal gene pool, there are no mtDNA lineages connected with the Neolithic expansion from the Near East despite being present in considerable frequencies in other North African populations. For example, the conservation of the high frequency and remarkable internal variability of T1 haplotypes within the distant and relatively isolated Egyptian oasis of el-Hayez led to an estimation of local expansion at around 5138±3633 YBP.37 There are no indications yet of the ages of local expansions in the more central and western regions of North Africa, which could contribute further insights for its absence in the Tuareg population as a whole.
Interestingly, for the Y chromosome, the dominant haplogroup in North Africa as well as the Tuareg is E1b1b1b. This haplogroup was associated with Neolithic diffusion in North Africa, with an age estimation of 2800–9800 YBP,45 but the lower resolution of the Y chromosome tree did not allow us to investigate this issue further. Nonetheless, disregarding whether they are in fact Neolithic, the ages for the mtDNA and Y chromosome lineages of North African origin observed in southern Tuareg are consistent with the same period, between 9000 and 3000 years ago. - Extract ends.
Let's start with a statement that Pereira et al. make in the abstract provided for the journal at hand:
"On the other hand, the Y chromosome SNPs data show that the paternal lineages can very probably be traced to the Near Eastern Neolithic demic expansion towards North Africa, a period that is otherwise concordant with the above-mentioned mtDNA expansion."What is one to make of the Pereira et al.'s (2010) reference to a "Near Eastern" origin above? The answer is that the said authors meant by it just as it sounds like: "Near Eastern". Obviously, the line of question at hand is not so much as a demand for learning the definition of the Euro-centered political/geopolitical construct of the so-called "Near East", but so much as a call to question, the far-fetched claim about "Near Eastern" origins of Tamazight speakers of western Africa, including Tamasheq (Tuaregs) nomads, whom they compare to the Beja, another group whose origins they dubiously trace to the Arabian peninsula. As ridiculous as it may sound, from the looks of it, the authors are interpreting the African haplogroup E1b1b1b (a.k.a. E3b2-M81) as a "Neolithic" marker of "Near Eastern" rather than the conventional understanding of its African origin. The present author of this blog supposes that this is the reason they find it "interesting". If so, conversely, the present author finds it interesting, how a typical African marker turned into a "Near Eastern" one.
As a simple matter of fact, neither the quadro-entity of hg E1b1b1b, Tamazights, Tamasheq (Tuareg) nomads, and Beja nomads are found in the Arabian peninsula, at least not as autochthonous groups. All are rare to absent in the Arabian peninsula. Hg E1b1b1b is generally absent in the Arabian peninsula, save for the few sporadic spots which became host to historic era immigrants from coastal northwestern Africa, like say the "Mizrachim" Sephardic Jews of coastal northwestern Africa, elements of which can be found in Israel. That is the only context in which any hg E1b1b1b subclade makes its presence in the so-called "Near East". The basal clades of the marker are restricted to Africa, not to leave out the haplogroup's diversity. Likewise, neither Tamazight nor Beja language are spoken in the Arabian peninsula.
Getting back to that matter of why Pereira et al. find it interesting that the "dominant" male haplogroup of coastal northwest Africans and the Tamasheq ("Tuaregs") happens to be of the characteristic "Berber" marker of hg E1b1b1b, when such an understanding is otherwise conventional wisdom and therefore, to be the expected turn of results; let's think about it for a moment: Getting an understanding of why these authors feel that way may also explain why they would even bother to entertain an Arabian peninsula origin of the Beja, even though no such group is native to that area. The invocation of the Beja has a role to play here: Since the Beja (Bedawi) have been claimed to show close relationship with the Tamasheq/"Tuareg" in one study [specifically by Sforza] that used select autosomal markers, the authors brought them up perhaps to support their idea of the supposed arrival of Tamasheq/"Tuaregs" first from coastal north Africa, and then their settlement in the Niger Bend areas upon the desertification of the Sahara in the mid-Holocene era.
They try to buttress this viewpoint, from what the present author can discern, by turning to what they call "Eurasian component" of Western African Tamasheq/"Tuaregs", again NOT the Libyan or northwestern Saharan Tamasheq/"Tuaregs", but the ones in the noted "sub-Saharan" African countries. The markers that they are leaning on are hgs H1, H3 and V.
Pereira et al. seem to be of the mindset that the Y-markers came to coastal north Africa via the "Near Eastern" Neolithic diffusion, and then in coastal northwest Africa, mtDNA from the Iberian peninsula were picked up, with some contribution from a "Near Eastern" Neolithic mtDNA gene pool [albeit not significant in the western African Tamasheq ("Tuareg"), according to the said authors' own observations], which they seem to identify with the expansions of M1, hence calling it a late "Mediterranean expansion".
Few other things to take into account:
Hg M1 markers...
*More insight into hg M1 expansion across coastal northern Africa, eastern Africa and the so-called "Near East" had recently been posted here: Following Trails of the Cro-Magnon - II
The Beja...
The west African Tamasheq or "Tuaregs"...
The study that the present author posted on this site earlier about the largely west African component of west African Tuareg mtDNA related the following, to recall:
West African Tamasheq/"Tuaregs":
The mitochondrial data of the Northwest African populations (Berber from Morocco and Algeria, Moroccans, West-Saharans, Mauritanians, Tuareg) show a mosaic composition of mtDNA types, with a pronounced gradient of sub-Saharan lineages from north to south: at the one extreme, the Berbers from Morocco have a predominantly European (Iberian) affinity, while at the other extreme, the Tuareg are closely related to sub-Saharan West Africans as represented by several Senegalese groups in this study, whereas the West-Saharans and Mauritanians are somewhat intermediate. It is remarkable that the Tuareg bear little mitochondrial resemblance to the Berber populations, although they speak a Berber language. - Rando et al. 1998 [mtDNA analysis of Northwest African populations reveals genetic exchanges with European, Near Eastern and sub-Saharan populations]One should not think for a moment that Rando et al. (1998) were alone in their findings about western African "Tuaregs"; the following from Claudio Ottoni et al. (2009) essentially tells the same story:
Of note is that the other Tuareg sample described in the literature (Watson et al., 1996) (Western Tuaregs) did not show a close genetic relationship with the Libyan Tuaregs, implying a genetic heterogeneity of the Tuaregs. This difference appears to be primarily caused by the low frequency (8%) of the European component in the Western Tuaregs, characteristic of northern African populations. After the removal of the H and V haplotypes, the Libyan Tuaregs showed a strong affiliation with the Eastern populations, while the Western Tuaregs associated more with the Central and Western African populations. - Claudio Ottoni et al. 2009, First Genetic Insight into Libyan Tuaregs: A Maternal Perspective.*While Claudio et al. have their own shortcomings—a matter that may be saved for another discussion, what is appealing about their findings is the fairly comprehensive range of their Tamasheq ("Tuareg") population samples, spanning western Africa to coastal central-north Africa, and thereby giving a noticeable mtDNA structuring that takes shape in the form west-to-east or vice versa gradients and south to north or vice versa gradients. In the west-to-east genetic structuring, western African "Tuaregs" more readily related to other western Africans and central Africans, while by removing the hgs H and V from the Libyan "Tuareg" sample, the Libyan-situated "Tuaregs" more readily related to eastern African populations. As noted here (click to the link) before, this pattern is suggestive of expansions of ancestors of contemporary Imazighen populations as a migrating group whose demography was likely biased towards male constituents; females of their destination points or from the vicinities thereof were then later integrated into the Imazighen nomads. So, we see distinctive patterns between Libyan "Tuaregs" and the western African "Tuaregs". The western African Tuaregs, just as Rando et al. found out, cluster with other western Africans. What does this then tell us? It tells us that the findings of authors in the intro post is the one that is out of character, if we are compelled to judge the results on such grounds.
The weak Eastern African influence in Tuareg is further supported by the M1 haplotypes belonging to the lineages characteristic of the later **Mediterranean** expansion (M1b and M1a2a) and the presence of very few matches for **sub-Saharan** L haplotypes with East Africa. - Pereira et. al.What else do these "sub-Saharan" L types match with then? Why, very likely the central and western African examples!
Hint on what these L types are, may be found in the authors' emphasis on Chadic speakers carrying L types.
What does all this mean at this point? Their theory has little basis to it. This may very well be hinted on by Pereira et al.'s own puzzlement in the following:
It is curious that, at least for the Tuareg maternal gene pool, there are no mtDNA lineages connected with the Neolithic expansion from the Near East despite being present in considerable frequencies in **other** North African populations. - Pereira et. al.
Arredi et al.(2004) ran off with the theory that hg E1b1b1 markers first arrived in northern Africa in tandem with "Afro-Asiatic" speakers moving in from the "Near East", having citing outdated linguistic theories [like that of Diamond and Bellwood (2003)] of "Near Eastern" origins of "Afro-Asiatic" as their source of inspiration; this was the thesis of their study. They seemed to be tacitly implying that the characteristic E-M81 emerged along the path of this migration, with relative diversity of the clade decreasing as one moved to the far western corner of the continent. Of course, Arredi et al. (2004) did not account for the microsatellite distinctions in hg J clades, the other marker that is generally implicated in "Neolithic farming" subsistence for the so-called "Near East" aside from hg E1b1b1markers, that Semino et al. pointed out the same year. Much of northern African hg J clades appear to be more of post-Neolithic historic extraction, esp. during Arabic expansions, than Neolithic extraction, even though the coalescent age of the J1-M267 sub-clades when considered together point to initial dispersions within the vicinity of Neolithic time frames; this latter observation is true for the more recent "Near Eastern" chromosomes as well. The older clades were better preserved in European and Ethiopian samples, according to Semino et al., and hence, the most likely markers of Neolithic era expansions. Moreover, Arredi et al.'s hypothesis is contemptuous of the facts mentioned above, to reiterate, about the restriction of hg E1b1b1b markers to Africa, the absence of Tamazight as an autochthonous "Near Eastern" language and of any languages therein in the "Near East", that serves as the root stratum of Tamazight. Lastly, as pointed out here time and again, northern Africa did not adopt large scale farming subsistence at the same time or within the logical or expected time frame that it should have, in the event that one should entertain the idea of Neolithic demic diffusion in tandem with the spread of agricultural subsistence from the so-called "Near East".
What Pereira et al. may be seeing, if anything is to be made of it, is a portion of the "sub-Saharan" west African "Tuareg" gene pool that was attained from interactions between those Niger River bend "Tuaregs" and the more northern west Saharan groups. It is not inconceivable, since paternal and cultural relationship exists between these groups. The patterns seen in west African "Tuaregs" is obviously reflective of the Imazighen bio-history as nomads, and so, in order to get a fairly comprehensive picture of the uniparental DNA structuring in such groups, it is necessary to deal with large sample sizes that are not from just one or two spots, but spanning the general territories that are known for Tamasheq ("Tuaregs") communities. Rando et al. and Claudio et al. had done this to some degree or another, and hence, their relatively more consistent findings in DNA structuring. Pereira et al. may be suffering from what Cherni et al. described as "patchy" DNA sampling work. However, western African "Tuaregs" in the main, cluster with western Africans where mtDNA is concerned. As we've seen, two studies already attest to this, and as shown above, there are also hints in Pereira et al.'s own findings that this is the case.
Keep an eye on possible updates in future!
___________________________________________________________________
*References
—Pereira et al. (2010), Linking the sub-Saharan and West Eurasian gene pools: maternal and paternal heritage of the Tuareg nomads from the African Sahel.
—Rando et al. (1998), mtDNA analysis of Northwest African populations reveals genetic exchanges with European, Near Eastern and sub-Saharan populations.
—Claudio et al. (2009), First Genetic Insight into Libyan Tuaregs: A Maternal Perspective.
—Hassan et al. (2008), Y-Chromosome Variation Among Sudanese: Restricted Gene Flow, Concordance With Language, Geography, and History.
—Semino et al. (2004), Origin, diffusion, and differentiation of Y-chromosome haplogroups E and J: inferences on the neolithization of Europe and later migratory events in the Mediterranean area.
— Arredi et al. (2004), A Predominantly Neolithic Origin for Y-Chromosomal DNA Variation in North Africa.
—Personal notes; 2009, 2010.
Wednesday, March 17, 2010
Timbuktu: The Stripping has Began - Conclusion
In this segment of the topic, we will examine the other school of Arabic ideologue demic-diffusion theories—this time, revolving around certain African oral traditions or legends. Since Timbuktu is the subject of our discourse here, analysis will mostly focus on allegations made around Malian traditions, with examples from elsewhere on the continent if need be.
We open the set of examples here with a matter that was the subject of an al-Jazeera, the English branch of the Qatar-based media concern, YouTube video posting of a program called "Witness". Al-Jazeera furnishes its YouTube video page with the following abstract, under "Category: News & Politics": Once Timbuktu was known as the intellectual centre for the propagation of Islamic teachings. Now the 'city of knowledge' is witnessing a renaissance. At any rate, at some point in the video clip, the following line was picked up by some correspondent, i.e. an ideological opponent of the present author, in a debate:
"This work is a protection of the manuscripts and our heritage—our Arab heritage. These manuscripts are our history and are very useful for us."
These words were uttered by a woman apparently restoring fragile pages of Timbuktu manuscripts using papyrus paper-technology [another African invention], in what could have been in the company of assistants sent in from Dubai, as she did openly make a note of Dubai's role in assisting with doing just that. There was obviously an English voice-over translation in the video clip, making the audibility of the woman's own words relatively hard to pick up, unless one attentively listened. So, she could well have been saying these things in Arabic. At any rate, the words above, could be an allusion to any number of things, since the words "our Arab heritage" was not clearly defined or elaborated on: It could simply be an allusion to Islamic culture, being that ancient Malian rulers embraced that religion, or even the fact that the manuscripts were written in a form of Arabic script. However, and importantly, nowhere therein, is it claimed that either the woman in the video, or Malians in general are Arabs; this though, is precisely the far-reaching conclusion that the aforementioned debate opponent sought to use the lines for—to essentially suggest that Malians see themselves as Arabs, or extensions of Arabs. And even assuming that this is what the woman in question meant, it goes back to the legends mentioned at the top of this page, passed down generations. Not to diminish the socio-cultural values of such legends, but in many cases, they are essentially tributes to the religious faith that the legend-bearers hold. Hence, certain element of mythology finds its way into these oral traditions, generally revolving around eponymous heroic ancestors, to which the community bearing the tradition ultimately trace their common ancestors.
The mere noting of this condition of culture was visited with sarcastic remarks along the lines of: "You need to go and teach that to those Malians on the clip who are telling you that they are Arabs and if only you could teach that to the writers of those manuscripts." Now, of course, that sarcastic proposition is ridiculous, because it will be like going to all people of different "Abrahamic" faiths, and telling them that biblical eponymous ancestors of say, "Adam and Even in the Garden of Eden", is not an accurate estimation of reality, based on the material findings of science, like for instance, what molecular genetics or human paleontology suggests. Likewise, it is not uncommon to find segments of African societies formulate legends that connect them to some religious eponymous ancestor in some holy land, which could necessarily place that ancestor elsewhere other than Africa. This is certainly true about Islamic African societies. Such undertaking, as that elicited by the aforementioned proposition, will predictably end in the undertaker being written off as "arrogant" and "insensitive". Theological or social constructs like this are best simply left understood as just that—i.e. as religion, nothing more or less, and hence, alleviating the need to bother with trying to convince the bearers of such beliefs to the contrary in one way or another.
Still, ideologues insist that to question legends which were repeated to medieval writers, whom in turn passed them on, is tantamount to charging the message-bearers with not knowing where they came from. For example, on the question of Timbuktu scholars who spoke of legends that place an eponymous ancestor of theirs some place outside of African territory, names like AbdurRahman As-Sa'ad or Mahmud Ka'ati is offered, wherein the former is reported to have said that the Sanhaja and Songhai originally came from Yemen, presumably in his work titled "Taarikh As-Sudan", while the latter is said to have professed that the Songhai, Wangara and the Wakore all came from Yemen, presumably in a work titled "Taarikh Al-Fattach". In what amounts to sloppiness, even something as materially shallow as the following, is offered, having been a product of copying and pasting from some internet site(s):
According to the manuscript number 43 of Ahmed Baba Center in Timbuktu, the Fulani trace their lineage back to the Koraysh of Mecca through Oqba ibn Yasir...
What these ideologues refuse to take into account, is that these legends serve a social purpose, which is why they exist in the first place. For instance, every element of society likes to think of itself as the "chosen people" of something that is higher than them or the torch-bearers of the most sacred—a sense of patriotism. Specific sacred or revered eponymous ancestors therefore serve as the bridging element to whatever "end" it is that makes people feel like that they are part of the "chosen ones" or the "sacred ones". These cosmological matters that inspire these myths [surrounding said eponymous ancestors] serve as the divine-sanctioned moral code or law that members of societies are expected to adhere to on their own initiative, in addition to any written out laws of the land written by leaders, which have to be abide by and enforced by law-enforcers. Ruling elites and elements are usually effective in fomenting, if not systematically sustaining, legends from fabricated and/or historical events, that helps them to secure their place in society in the long run. These are usually accounts that date to some remote time long before a group of people formed a distinctive identity for themselves, generally involving time frames unreachable to the target audience that the legends are fed to. As such, it is hard for the average cultural-bearer to test the veracity of the accounts described in the legends, and then, couple this with the systematic repetition of such legends through social conditioning right from childhood. There is generally a misconception among many, that if something is widely accepted, and has been "sanctified by time and repetition"*, then there must certainly be legitimacy to it. Furthermore, many folks fear being considered "outcasts", and so, steer clear from setting themselves up to questioning "conventional wisdom" that could possibly lead one to view the world from a different lens and possibly affect one's code of conduct thereof, which in turn could result in earning one the reputation of an outcast. Again, ideologues tend to take complexities out of issues, and instead look to the most superficial of explanations that could be used to support their preconceived notions.
It makes little sense to hold medieval writers accountable for information that was passed down generations and onto them; however, they can be tested and held accountable for narratives of a series of events in their own lifetime that they claim to have witnessed firsthand, albeit in consideration of the context of the political and philosophical atmosphere that the writers were working in.
At any rate, to test the veracity of legends, should one choose to avail oneself of such, comparative analysis between different segments of a society can be quite intuitive. To demonstrate this, consider the following, from Richard L. Smith of the Ferrum College, which has been cited here before:
[46 * - “Histoire I:168. In another place, Ibn Khaldun offers an alternate if similar explanation. According to this, a Yemenite king named Afriqus b. Qays b. Sayfi, who lived at the time of Moses, often raided North Africa and killed many Berbers: "He gave them the name of Berbers when he heard their jargon and asked what that barbarah was." Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History, trans. Franz Rosenthal, ed. N. J. Dawood (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 14.” - Richard L. Smith]
Richard goes onto say:
The unintelligible cries were the many local dialects Berber was divided into, by one modern count an astounding twelve hundred, although the situation at the time of Ibn Khaldun can only be guessed. And while Berber languages show relatively little internal differentiation in comparison to other branches of the Afro-Asiatic family, a detailed language map of Berber speakers would have the pattern of spilled vegetable soup.47* [47* - “For a background on the origin of Berber and its derivatives, see P. Behrens, "Wanderungsbewegungen und Sprache der früken saharanischen Viehzuchter," Sprache und Geschichte in Afrika6 (1984–85): 135–216.” - Richard Smith]
In the past scholars have tried to get a handle on this so-called "language of dialects" by recognizing two or three dialect clusters—Zanatiya, Sanhaja, and sometimes Masmuda (which, when not recognized as separate, is joined with Sanhaja)—based on phonetic and morphological variations and location. Zanata, Sanhaja, and Masmuda are not terms used in the writings of the ancients but do appear, full-blown, with Arab authors who draw a clear distinction between them. The Masmuda were concentrated in the High Atlas and surrounding areas while in the rest of North Africa the Zanata (those who speak Zanatiya) were more common in the north and east and the Sanhaja in the south and west. The word "Sanhaja" means those who speak Zenaga (Znaga), the major dialect of the western desert. - Richard L. Smith
Then there are legends of ‘Berber’ ancestry, one of which as already very briefly mentioned, is traced back to a personality(s) by the name of “Berr”:
According to the Arabian genealogies, all Berbers are descended from two men: Berr ibn Branes and Berr ibn Botr.79 These two Berrs, although possessing the same name, were not related. From them are descended the great families of Berbers such as the Masmuda, Senhaja, and Zenata. Of all these great families the earliest to spread seems to have been the Masmuda or Ghomara branch. This was followed traditionally by the Senhaja, who today include such varied peoples as the Siwans on the borderlands of Egypt, the Tuareg of the Sahara, and the Braber of the Middle Atlas in Morocco. The third great expansion was that of the Zenata, who were known in Roman times in Cyrenaica, but who did not reach Algeria and Morocco until the Middle Ages. In the thirteenth century these Zenata finally invaded Spain, conquering Arabs and earlier Berbers. One may compare the expansions of the Berber families to those of Kelts, Germans, Slavs, etc. in Europe. - Courtesy of snpa.nordish.net
The present author can only imagine that the website which posted this piece is basing this on Arabic-speaking writers cited in their reference, such as al Bakri and Ibn Khaldun
[More on these sort of legends, from Richard L Smiths analysis:
Unlike Herodotus, Ibn Abi Zar did recognize that his subjects lived in segmented societies,55 but the framework that he and other Arab writers imposed was genealogical rather than anthropological. Groups were defined as descendants of specific people, so exactly who the Berbers issued from was a much debated topic. The most popular starting place was the Holy Land, and first among the candidates was Goliath. After David killed Goliath, the Philistines, frequently confused with the Canaanites, were said to have left their homeland and migrated to North Africa, where they became the Berbers. Not everyone who wanted to keep the Berbers in the Old Testament was convinced of the Goliath connection. One of the most popular accounts goes back to Noah's children, Ham and Sem, among whom Satan was said to have sowed discord:
"Ham, having become black because of a curse pronounced against him by his father, fled to the Maghrib to hide in shame.... Berber, son of Kesloudjim [Casluhim], one of his descendants, left numerous posterity in the Maghrib."56* [56* - “Ibn Khaldun, Histoire I, 177–178. The Ham connection appears in al-Ya'qubi, Corpus, p. 21. The Goliath connection comes a little later in Ibn Hawqal, Corpus, p. 48. Much earlier, in the first century C.E., the Jewish historian Flavius Josephus claimed that the Gaetulians descended from Havilah, the son of Cush, grandson of Ham.” - Richard L. Smith]
Understandably, many of the Berbers did not want their family trees rooted in Goliath, Ham, or other Biblical ne'er-do-wells. Muslims all over the Islamic world often **tried to establish ancestral connections with the Prophet's homeland**, the Arabian peninsula, and the Berbers were no exception. A popular theory among them was that they were long-lost Yemenites.
Ibn Khaldun chronicled all the stories he could find concerning Berber origins and**demolished each in turn**. He characterized one story that featured an invasion by an ancient Yemenite king as an "example of silly statements by historians."57* [57* - “Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddimah, p. 14.” - Richard L. Smith] Nor did he mince words concerning another popular theory:
"The opinion which represents them as the children of Goliath or Amalecites, and which has them emigrate from Syria, willy-nilly, is so untenable that it merits classification as a fable."
But Ibn Khaldun proved more effective as a critic than in offering a viable alternative. In the end he, too, traced the Berbers back to Genesis:
"Now the real fact, the fact which dispenses with all hypothesis, is this: the Berbers are the children of Canaan, the son of Ham, son of Noah." Down this line came Berr who had two sons, Baranis and Madghis al-Abtar. All Berber tribes descended from one or the other of these brothers and were classified as either Baranes or Botr.58* [58* - “Histoire I, 173–185. Also see R. W. Bulliet, "Botr et Beranes: Hypotheses sur l'histoire des Berbes,"Annales Economies, Sociétés, Civilisations36 (1981): 104–116.” - Richard L. Smith]
Continuing…
The Sanhaja were Baranes, and the Zanata were Botr. Further up the tree on the Baranes side were the Mulaththamun, who, according to al-Idrisi, descended from two eponyms, Sanhaj andLamt. They lived in the Maghrib and were the sons of a mother named Tazakkat (Tizki), "the Lame." But Sanhaj and Lamt produced troublesome broods who tried to conquer the other Berbers and were finally driven into the desert, where they became nomads living in tents and surviving on the milk and meat of camels.59* [59* - “Corpus, p. 127.” - Richard L. Smith]
Arab-imposed, male-centered genealogy tells us more about contemporary Arab historiography than it does about Berber ethnography. This is not to dismiss the importance of perceived descent, which was matrilineal among most Berbers, particularly those of the desert. Etymological analysis seems to indicate that this tradition had its roots deep in the past: the words for brother and sister in proto-Berber, for example, are "son of my mother"and "daughter of my mother" respectively.60* [60* - “G. Marcy, "Les survivances juridiques de la parenté maternelle dans la coutume du Maroc Central," Actes du Congrès del'institut des Hautes Études Marocaines (Rabat, 1937), p. 33.” - Richard L. Smith]
More on legends, as cited by Richard:
One final aspect of Biblical-based genealogical history is worth noting: it did not start with the Arabs. About halfway through his work, Procopius suddenly announces that it is necessary to tell how the Maures came to Libya. He begins with Joshua and the Hebrews invading Palestine and thrashing everyone in sight. Several of the Canaanite tribes escaped by moving into Egypt, but finding it already crowded, continued on to Libya. Autochthonous people Procopius calls the "Children of the Soil" already lived there; Procopius does not say whether the Canaanites and the Children of the Soil fought or intermarried, only that the Canaanites became Maures.61* [67* - “.V. IV.10.12–24.” - Richard L. Smith] Procopius did not invent the tie between the peoples of North Africa and the Old Testament: for the Christians it goes back to St. Hippolyte in the early third century, but its origins can be seen even earlier in Flavius Josephus and Jewish tradition.62*[62* - “Yves Modéran, "Mythe et histoire aux derniers temps de l'Afrique antique: À propos d'un texte d'Ibn Khaldun," Review Historique CCCIII 2 (Avril–Juin 2001): 327–337.” - Richard Smith] However, Procopius's story does establish a link between portals two and three. It is one of the few strands of continuity, even though it concerns a perceived rather than a real relationship, which brings us back to our original problem: Why does there appear to be such a level of discontinuity?
Richard adds…
The almost complete break in nomenclature between the classical and Arab periods has toraise a few eyebrows. The names we use today come from the sources available to us. Some names originated with the people themselves, as in the case of the Mauri, at least according to Strabo.63* [63* - “Geography XVII.3.2. Later the transliteration became "Moors."“ - Richard L. Smith] Others came from neighbors, and some that ended up in Greek and Roman references were simply botched transliterations.64* [64* - “In the opening paragraph of his discussion on Libya, Pliny complains, "The names of its peoples and towns are absolutely unpronounceable except by the natives," N.H. V.1. See Gustave Mercier, "La langue libyenne et la toponymie antique de l'Afrique du Nord," Journal Asiatique 105 (1924): 189–320.” - Richard L. Smith] Authors confused names probably more often than we suspect. In his tour of the middle of the desert, Pliny notes that "the Blemmyae are reported to have no heads, their mouth and eyes being attached to their chests."65* [65* - “N.H. V.8.46.” - Richard L. Smith] Strabo and others describe a real people they referred to as the Blemmyae, who were nomads living below Egypt. Pliny's Blemmyae, minus the name, were borrowed from Herodotus's discussion of western Libya beyond the cultivated area: "There are enormous snakes there ... donkeys with horns, dog-headed creatures, headless creatures with eyes in their chests (at least, that is what the Libyans say), wild men and wild women...."66* [66* - Geography VIII.7; 135; Histories IV.191.” - Richard L. Smith] Still others were made up by the Greeks and Romans. Diodorus Siculus provides some egregious examples in his tour of peoples living south of Egypt, which includes the Ichthyophagi (fish eaters), Chelonophagi (turtle eaters), Rhizophagi (root eaters), Hylophagi (wood eaters), Spermatophagi (seed eaters), Stnithophagi (bird eaters), and Acnclophagi (locust eaters). Just to show his scheme was not entirely based on diet, he threw in the Simi (flat nosed). It is unlikely that people actually thought of themselves as being Hylophagi or Simi.67* [67* - “.H. III.15.1; 21.1; 23.1; 24.1–2; 28.1–2; 29.1. On names the Greeks gave to the Libyans, see Olivier Masson, "Grecs et Libyens en Cyrenaique,"Antiquités africaines 10 (1976): 49–62.” - Richard L. Smith]
Smith's piece provides with demonstrations of how legends, at least pertaining to one of the examples provided earlier—about Sanhaja and Tuareg origins in Yemen, can be quite questionable, since "Berber" legends vary in their accounts and eponymous ancestors from population to population of Tamazight ("Berber") speakers, if not from time to time. He even provides an example of a medieval writer, Ibn Khaldun in this case, who questioned the veracity of certain legends that he had heard during his lifetime. Of note, which reinforces what was already said about Islamic-inspired legends across Africa, Richard points out: Muslims all over the Islamic world often **tried to establish ancestral connections with the Prophet's homeland**, the Arabian peninsula, and the Berbers were no exception. A popular theory among them was that they were long-lost Yemenites.
Richard's piece also explains how political motives play into legends formulated, some of which even conflict with one another, depending on whom, where and when. Does that mean the historic value of early writers telling these legends should be dismissed altogether, simply because of some political viewpoint they might have held for one reason or another? Of course not; that is just simplistic thinking.
The questions that logically come to mind, for the sake of the subject of this topic--Timbuktu, are as follows:
Given that Islam was not particularly adopted during much of ancient Ghana and times prior in the western Sudan, one would expect that if there is any authenticity to them, that the legends of Muslim communities of Mali would be consistent with those of some of their non-Muslim counterparts. The questions are: Is that the case, and do the consistency of legends align with or structure along the theological-affiliations of the populations, as opposed to ethnic or genealogical connection?
If the eponymous ancestors in the legends of Mali's Muslim communities are authentic, then how come Islam only emerged as a meaningfully embraced tradition in western Sudan near the turn of the 11th century, if not more so in the 14th century. Why did people in ancient Ghana feel the need to convert to Islam only in the waning days of Ghana? If one recalls, we had already covered this question in the last segment, but its purpose here is different. Did Mali's Muslim communities only initially arrive as a genealogically-connected group as late as the 11th century? Even so, how does one distinguish the converts from the non-converts (those who are presumably progeny of the eponymous ancestor who arrived with his/her Muslim traditions), as we know that there were no Muslims communities in the area earlier, but that conversion only starts taking place in western Sudan some time in the 11th century...or are we to believe that *all* Malians were descendants of the eponymous Muslim or Arab ancestor, despite the available records of conversion to Islam? Or yet, could it simply be a *coincidence* that Mali's Muslim communities hold legends that trace an eponymous ancestor to the Arabian peninsula, i.e. if we assume that such an ancestor was not a Muslim but an Arab? Also, recalling one of the references provided by ideologue elements, in their overall effort to support the idea that "Malians ultimately came from Yemen", we were told: According to the manuscript number 43 of Ahmed Baba Center in Timbuktu, the Fulani trace their lineage back to the Koraysh of Mecca through Oqba ibn Yasir
With that genealogical background, one would think that Muslim or Arab traditions would have emerged in western Sudan before [or at least, the same time] as the very ethnic groups that claim to have eponymous Arab ancestry. For instance, if it is said that the Fulani derive from an eponymous Arab ancestor in the Arabian peninsula, then the ethnogenesis of Fulani in western Sudan should not predate the alleged arrival period of that ancestor in western Sudan, whether it be evidenced by their mentioning in primary texts of antiquity or through DNA sampling inferences. By extension, if the eponymous Fulani ancestor is said to be in the Arabian peninsula during so and so period before ever arriving in the western Sudan, then it should follow that there should be no historical traces of the Fulani in western Sudan during that same period. To demonstrate the importance of chronological consideration, let's take the following for example, which was brought to the present author's attention by one ideologue sloppily, without a source referenced:
"The Fulani trace their lineage back to the Koraysh of Mecca through Oqba ibn Yasir who married a Fulani princess of Futa Toro by the name of Madeumaa. From this marriage she had four boys. They are the ancestors of the Fulani tribes: these are the Diallo, Dicko, Sangare, Balde' or Ba, Barry and Diakite".
Well now, attentive reading should make it clear that the "Fulani princess" should not have existed at the time of this marriage event with Uqba ibn Yasir, if we are to assume that Uqba is the reason that such a thing as Fulani exists. In order for this Fulani princess to exist, she would have had to have descended from Fulani ancestry, right?! If she wasn't a Fulani, but just the other ancestor of recent Fulani, then the author ought to have been able to make a note of what her ethnicity was—its name, other than "Fulani", according to the legend.
The following has also been offered to account for the above's shortcomings, and once again we are compelled by its advocate to deal with unsourced references:
Tarikh el-Fettach claims that Askia Mohammed was descendant of the Sîlla, a Soninke clan from the Torodo (the Fouta Toro)
"The woman was a Turudi—the same tribe as Askia...Askia Muhammad claimed to have relatives in Gao and the Toro of Yemen as confirmed to him by the Egyptian scholar Suyuti."
Apparently this explanation does not do much to rehabilitate the one shown prior, for while it seeks to acknowledge the irrationality pointed out about the said one shown prior, i.e. that a Fulani being present at marriage event that was supposed to mark the first stage in the processes that lead to the creation of the Fulani as a people, it suggests that the Fulani derive from Soninke ancestry. This would mean that the Soninke were around before any such group of people as the Fula ever existed; if so, how true would that be? Furthermore, it would imply that Fula, which is generally considered to cluster in the Atlantic branch of the Niger-Congo super-family, evolved from a Soninke language. This has not been demonstrated to the knowledge of the present author. Both questions have been left unanswered by its advocate, for what it's worth.
Now let's examine what genealogical studies involving uniparental markers reveal about Malian folks:
From Woods et al. (2005), here is the rundown of marker frequencies, and we will focus on paternal ancestry, since "Arab" lineage is supposedly assessed through the paternal line, among the Dogon section of Mali's multi-ethnic landscape...
A-M31: 2%; B-M150: 7%; E-M33: 45%; E-M34: 2%; E-P1*: 38%; E-M191: 5%
Sample size: 55
Pretty much all of these are African-specific markers. Hg J, which is fairly frequent in the Arabian peninsula and the Levant is noticeably absent here.
The Dogon only make a segment of the Malian population, and so, these would serve as just a snapshot of Malian overall gene pool. However, given that the Mande-speaking segment makes up the majority, and given the modal markers that characterize such language-speakers elsewhere, it is very likely that these same lineages shown above, are the ones that dominate Malian paternal genealogical landscape, esp. hg E-M33 and hg E1b1a. Hg E1b1b is likely to feature as well, but even more so in segments like the Tamasheq (Tuareg) groups of Mali, whose mtDNA are consistent with those found elsewhere in western Africa. The following comes from Rosa et al. (2007), although it was rather difficult to track the precise source and which segments of Malian populations were involved:
"Haplogroup E1*-M33, of probable local radiation (5–7% in Senegal and Burkina-Faso [2,3,5,7], 40.4% in Mali and 52.9% in Fulbe of Cameroon [1,26]), is surprisingly frequent in Felupe-Djola and Papel (34.0% and 20.3%). Both ethnic groups exhibit the highest haplogroup diversity (0.5 < D < 0.6) and the deepest-rooting phylogenetic types in our dataset – haplogroups A-M91, E2-M75 and E3*-PN2 – some with occasional occurrences in Fulbe and Balanta (Figure 2)."
And...
"However, the Guinea-Bissau A-M91 lineages do not belong to the widespread A3-M32 but to the A1-M31 subcluster, with reported marginal presence in Mali (2.0% [2,7]), Gambia/Senegal Mandinka (5.1% [7]) and North African Berbers (3.1% [1,33-35])." - Rosa et al. Y-chromosomal diversity in the population of Guinea-Bissau: a multiethnic perspective, 2007
The A-M91 marker above implicated in Mali was reported in Underhill et al.'s (2000) study. That frequency does not seem to be inconsistent with that reported in the Dogon sample. Clearly, information is sparse on Malian paternal gene pool, but these nevertheless give us a taste of a larger picture.
As for language, our ideological supporter of "Arab" ancestry of Malians was not able to account for why their primary language is not Arab, but sub-phylums of the Niger-Congo super-family, non-Semitic Afrasan/Afro-Asiatic (Tamazight) and Nilo-Saharan, with the Niger Congo group of the Mande making up the largest segment of the population, comprising different sub-groups of Mande-speakers. We are not given the details of what happened to the Malians' original "Arabic" language, or when and how it got replaced by a Niger-Congo sub-phylum, like say Mande.
Ancient Mali was a cosmopolitan complex, and the area remains a fairly ethnically heterogeneous region, as many other African locations usually are; are we to believe that each of these ethnic entities derive from eponymous Arab ancestors, and at the same time, that each of them dropped their Arabic language in favor of all the different western African languages now spoken in Mali? And yet through all this, they can proudly "proclaim to be of Arab heritage" while having some other primary language? Highly dubious, but these are the lengths to which reactionary ideological are willing to take, to obfuscate African history to the extent that they can. As the namesake of this discussion says: The stripping off western Africa of another of its history has begun!
So, what has transpired here thus far? In the first segment of this topic, focus was mainly on the scholarship base of Timbuktu, a one-time intellectual hub in the Islamic world, with its many libraries and world renowned madrasas or universities. Ideological objections to the significance and the local development of this legacy had also been examined, with examples, and correspondingly discredited. With that cleared, we went onto the second segment of the topic, which focused entirely on the emergence of Islam in the region. Naturally, this segment of the discourse had to talk a lot more about Mali's predecessors wherein Islam first took hold, since Mali doesn't herald the beginning of the adoption of Islam in the Sudan of al-Maghribi. The predecessor of note here was ancient Ghana, for a number of reasons. It is during ancient Ghana's era that we first hear about conversion of the people of western Sudan to Islam, it was the regional power of the region and one that predated both the Arab and Islamic presence in the region. However, the historiography of the coming of Islam during Ghana's time had been heavily tainted by European imperialist aspirations for a long duration of time before things started to change during the era of rapid "decolonization" across Africa and possibly elsewhere in the 60s, and Masonen and Fisher elaborately pursue the genealogy, which they call the isnad, "in the European literature on the West African past, as story passed from scholar to scholar, altering a little each time the baton changed hands—how the [conquest] hypothesis can to be", using a comprehensive body of researchers—past and present—who have chimed in on this hypothesis through the ages, and hence, making their work ideal for analytical purposes herein. In setting "precedents" for "white domination over blacks" and/or "northerners' domination over blacks", in order to justify what would become Europeans' own expansionist desires, European-based writers built on the theme of Moroccan efforts to set precedents for Moroccan expansionist ambitions into Bilad al-Sudan to as far as the "mountains of gold" wherein they could control the trade of gold, as to put them in a better position to trade with Europeans other than just Portugal; setting those precedents was notoriously facilitated through the works of Moroccan historians, who concocted or at least, promoted North-Afrocentric stories or legends about Almoravid conquest of the Land of Blacks (Bilad al-Sudan), even though in this case, no specific mention to Ghana has been reported. However, while Europeans gradually built on this seed, starting with the likes of Leo Africanus, a Spanish Muslim who had spent some time in Morocco, and who then carried off these North-Afrocentric attitudes to Europe through their writing, the actual and full-blown "conquest hypothesis" involving the alleged conquest of Ghana was that of European creation. European "conquest hypothesis" took on new characters as time went by, and each was influenced by European experiences, be it in Europe or overseas, and it seemed that the more elaborate it became, the more racist or chauvinistic—and even fantastic in some cases—it became, particularly by the 19th century, the period in which much of Europe's colonial adventures in Africa take off in an explosive manner. Thus, the "conquest hypothesis" was characterized by underlying and overt themes of the aforementioned "white domination over blacks" and "northerners' domination over southerners", "Muslims civilizing the animists, and the Christian Europeans then civilizing the Muslims", "Muslims being brutes and savages vs. civilized Europeans as the saviors of Africans" and so on, all of which adhered to racial hierarchy that developed in European thought. The conquest hypothesis severely hampered the true historiography concerning the western Sudan during Ghana, and hence, also affecting objective accounts for how Islam came about there, such that it would be widely embraced in ancient Mali by both rulers and locals. By ignoring this bit of history predating ancient Malian complex, one is bound to suffer from the same thing that reactionary ideologues suffer from: fabricating myths about how Arabs taught ancient Malians how to read and write, and gave them their Islamic culture, which is ridiculous, as we have seen here, because ancient Malian elites simply carried on what was put in place before their emergence as a regional power, i.e. the embracing of Islam and the use of Arabic as a regional lingua franca, simply because western Sudanese's main trading partners were North Africans who adopted Arabic as a lingua franca. It therefore made sense to continue what was already set into motion before their prominence, and adopt Arabic as a lingua franca. And we have seen, the "conquest hypothesis" attempted to use the fabricated "forced conversion" as "civilizing" agent on the one hand, and as a "fanatical and brutish" endeavor on the other. Of course, aside from being fabrications, neither of them make sense and are just plainly ridiculous, for Ghana was a dominant power in the region before its decline and eventual demise, by not "northerners", "Arabs" or "Berbers" but by rival western Sudanese elements, namely the Susu. No less important, it was a centralized polity made up of tributary system of local complexes with their respective sub-governing systems, and a polity that attained regional prominence and wealth through gold trade that predates the arrival of Muslims. These are all features of a people who have attained a high state of social development, and hence, not people of lawlessness, lack of governance, husbandry or industry; a centralize polity means that every productivity going on in the tributary units will have had to have systematically been reported back to the central government or seat of rule, which is where writing comes in for recording, and if not, then some other viable alternative with similar effect would have to have been in place. In short: Complexes like Ghana did not wait for Muslims or "northerners" to come to achieve a self-sustaining, socially structured and highly organized society, and there were plenty more highly structured societies in the region before Ghana itself. Mali simply took on the mantle of prominence in the region, and carried over where Ghana left, and the fact that it is yet another western Sudanese complex run by western Sudanese people, not an "Arab" or "European" one, is testament to the fact that no "civilizing" from outsiders was in the cards at any point in time. It developed wealth sufficiently enough to provide a large base for scholars and intellectuals, both locally and from afar, hence contributing to the Islamic world, what would become one of the best-known learning centers of the medieval era. This legacy though, had been in danger of fading away from the limelight until recently, with the realization that the treasured manuscripts could well have been in danger of disappearing forever, and along with it, a good piece of humanity's history [which is not an option], and that something had to be done to save them and further unlock their secrets—building a museum specially for that, which could be a safe haven for these treasures, and hence relics of both ancient Mali's and western Sudanese legacy.
*Look for ongoing updates.
Also read, if not done so, the other segments of this topic; click below:
Link 1
Link 2
_______________________________________________________________
*References:
—Ray A. Kea (2004): Expansions And Contractions: World-Historical Change And The Western Sudan World-System (1200/1000 B.C.–1200/1250 A.D.)*
—http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/mali
—http://rs6.loc.gov/intldl/malihtml/islam.html
—http://www.library.cornell.edu/africana/Writing_Systems/Welcome.html
—http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7786361.stm
—Pekka Masonen and Humphrey J. Fisher (1996): Not Quite Venus from the Waves: The Almoravid Conquest of Ghana in the Modern Historiography of Western Africa.
—Richard L. Smith of the Ferrum College
—snpa.nordish.net
—Woods et al. (2005): Contrasting patterns of Y chromosome and mtDNA variation in Africa: evidence for sex-biased demographic processes.
—Rosa et al. (2007): Y-chromosomal diversity in the population of Guinea-Bissau: a multi-ethnic perspective.
—"Al-Jazeera: "Witness" YouTube posting, under "News & Politics" category.
*Retrieved personal notes, 2010.
"*" in the passage was reference to Masonen's and Fisher's text in the above-mentioned work.
We open the set of examples here with a matter that was the subject of an al-Jazeera, the English branch of the Qatar-based media concern, YouTube video posting of a program called "Witness". Al-Jazeera furnishes its YouTube video page with the following abstract, under "Category: News & Politics": Once Timbuktu was known as the intellectual centre for the propagation of Islamic teachings. Now the 'city of knowledge' is witnessing a renaissance. At any rate, at some point in the video clip, the following line was picked up by some correspondent, i.e. an ideological opponent of the present author, in a debate:
"This work is a protection of the manuscripts and our heritage—our Arab heritage. These manuscripts are our history and are very useful for us."
These words were uttered by a woman apparently restoring fragile pages of Timbuktu manuscripts using papyrus paper-technology [another African invention], in what could have been in the company of assistants sent in from Dubai, as she did openly make a note of Dubai's role in assisting with doing just that. There was obviously an English voice-over translation in the video clip, making the audibility of the woman's own words relatively hard to pick up, unless one attentively listened. So, she could well have been saying these things in Arabic. At any rate, the words above, could be an allusion to any number of things, since the words "our Arab heritage" was not clearly defined or elaborated on: It could simply be an allusion to Islamic culture, being that ancient Malian rulers embraced that religion, or even the fact that the manuscripts were written in a form of Arabic script. However, and importantly, nowhere therein, is it claimed that either the woman in the video, or Malians in general are Arabs; this though, is precisely the far-reaching conclusion that the aforementioned debate opponent sought to use the lines for—to essentially suggest that Malians see themselves as Arabs, or extensions of Arabs. And even assuming that this is what the woman in question meant, it goes back to the legends mentioned at the top of this page, passed down generations. Not to diminish the socio-cultural values of such legends, but in many cases, they are essentially tributes to the religious faith that the legend-bearers hold. Hence, certain element of mythology finds its way into these oral traditions, generally revolving around eponymous heroic ancestors, to which the community bearing the tradition ultimately trace their common ancestors.
The mere noting of this condition of culture was visited with sarcastic remarks along the lines of: "You need to go and teach that to those Malians on the clip who are telling you that they are Arabs and if only you could teach that to the writers of those manuscripts." Now, of course, that sarcastic proposition is ridiculous, because it will be like going to all people of different "Abrahamic" faiths, and telling them that biblical eponymous ancestors of say, "Adam and Even in the Garden of Eden", is not an accurate estimation of reality, based on the material findings of science, like for instance, what molecular genetics or human paleontology suggests. Likewise, it is not uncommon to find segments of African societies formulate legends that connect them to some religious eponymous ancestor in some holy land, which could necessarily place that ancestor elsewhere other than Africa. This is certainly true about Islamic African societies. Such undertaking, as that elicited by the aforementioned proposition, will predictably end in the undertaker being written off as "arrogant" and "insensitive". Theological or social constructs like this are best simply left understood as just that—i.e. as religion, nothing more or less, and hence, alleviating the need to bother with trying to convince the bearers of such beliefs to the contrary in one way or another.
Still, ideologues insist that to question legends which were repeated to medieval writers, whom in turn passed them on, is tantamount to charging the message-bearers with not knowing where they came from. For example, on the question of Timbuktu scholars who spoke of legends that place an eponymous ancestor of theirs some place outside of African territory, names like AbdurRahman As-Sa'ad or Mahmud Ka'ati is offered, wherein the former is reported to have said that the Sanhaja and Songhai originally came from Yemen, presumably in his work titled "Taarikh As-Sudan", while the latter is said to have professed that the Songhai, Wangara and the Wakore all came from Yemen, presumably in a work titled "Taarikh Al-Fattach". In what amounts to sloppiness, even something as materially shallow as the following, is offered, having been a product of copying and pasting from some internet site(s):
According to the manuscript number 43 of Ahmed Baba Center in Timbuktu, the Fulani trace their lineage back to the Koraysh of Mecca through Oqba ibn Yasir...
What these ideologues refuse to take into account, is that these legends serve a social purpose, which is why they exist in the first place. For instance, every element of society likes to think of itself as the "chosen people" of something that is higher than them or the torch-bearers of the most sacred—a sense of patriotism. Specific sacred or revered eponymous ancestors therefore serve as the bridging element to whatever "end" it is that makes people feel like that they are part of the "chosen ones" or the "sacred ones". These cosmological matters that inspire these myths [surrounding said eponymous ancestors] serve as the divine-sanctioned moral code or law that members of societies are expected to adhere to on their own initiative, in addition to any written out laws of the land written by leaders, which have to be abide by and enforced by law-enforcers. Ruling elites and elements are usually effective in fomenting, if not systematically sustaining, legends from fabricated and/or historical events, that helps them to secure their place in society in the long run. These are usually accounts that date to some remote time long before a group of people formed a distinctive identity for themselves, generally involving time frames unreachable to the target audience that the legends are fed to. As such, it is hard for the average cultural-bearer to test the veracity of the accounts described in the legends, and then, couple this with the systematic repetition of such legends through social conditioning right from childhood. There is generally a misconception among many, that if something is widely accepted, and has been "sanctified by time and repetition"*, then there must certainly be legitimacy to it. Furthermore, many folks fear being considered "outcasts", and so, steer clear from setting themselves up to questioning "conventional wisdom" that could possibly lead one to view the world from a different lens and possibly affect one's code of conduct thereof, which in turn could result in earning one the reputation of an outcast. Again, ideologues tend to take complexities out of issues, and instead look to the most superficial of explanations that could be used to support their preconceived notions.
It makes little sense to hold medieval writers accountable for information that was passed down generations and onto them; however, they can be tested and held accountable for narratives of a series of events in their own lifetime that they claim to have witnessed firsthand, albeit in consideration of the context of the political and philosophical atmosphere that the writers were working in.
At any rate, to test the veracity of legends, should one choose to avail oneself of such, comparative analysis between different segments of a society can be quite intuitive. To demonstrate this, consider the following, from Richard L. Smith of the Ferrum College, which has been cited here before:
Moving beyond race, language—one of the defining characteristics in the modern concept of ethnicity—is rarely mentioned by classical or Arab authors except to note that their subjects spoke some form of gibberish. This began with Herodotus's offhand remark about the Ethiopian troglodytes: "The language they speak is completely different from any other language, and sounds like bats squeaking,"43 and continues through the sixth-century poet Corippus, who, in referring to Berber tribes, notes that their "barbaric languages bark in savage terms."44 Authors don't usually distinguish gibberishes from each other, nor do they state categorically that language was a major criterion for dividing the peoples of North Africa. Perhaps, however, we should assume this. Tacitus, who falls into the Sallust school in his discussion of North Africa but whose study of the German tribes is unsurpassed in classical ethnography, does refer to the importance of language in his review of peoples to the north of the Roman Empire.45 In other regions of Africa, including nearby West Africa, language has often served as an insignia of ethnicity.
Ibn Khaldun does distinguish the Berbers from the Arabs and other peoples by their language.
According to him, the Arabs gave the Berbers their name, the origin of which meant something like gibberish: "The word berbera signifies, in Arabic, a jumble of unintelligible cries; from which one says in speaking of the lion that it berbère when it utters confused roars."46 *
Ibn Khaldun does distinguish the Berbers from the Arabs and other peoples by their language.
According to him, the Arabs gave the Berbers their name, the origin of which meant something like gibberish: "The word berbera signifies, in Arabic, a jumble of unintelligible cries; from which one says in speaking of the lion that it berbère when it utters confused roars."46 *
[46 * - “Histoire I:168. In another place, Ibn Khaldun offers an alternate if similar explanation. According to this, a Yemenite king named Afriqus b. Qays b. Sayfi, who lived at the time of Moses, often raided North Africa and killed many Berbers: "He gave them the name of Berbers when he heard their jargon and asked what that barbarah was." Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History, trans. Franz Rosenthal, ed. N. J. Dawood (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), p. 14.” - Richard L. Smith]
Richard goes onto say:
The unintelligible cries were the many local dialects Berber was divided into, by one modern count an astounding twelve hundred, although the situation at the time of Ibn Khaldun can only be guessed. And while Berber languages show relatively little internal differentiation in comparison to other branches of the Afro-Asiatic family, a detailed language map of Berber speakers would have the pattern of spilled vegetable soup.47* [47* - “For a background on the origin of Berber and its derivatives, see P. Behrens, "Wanderungsbewegungen und Sprache der früken saharanischen Viehzuchter," Sprache und Geschichte in Afrika6 (1984–85): 135–216.” - Richard Smith]
In the past scholars have tried to get a handle on this so-called "language of dialects" by recognizing two or three dialect clusters—Zanatiya, Sanhaja, and sometimes Masmuda (which, when not recognized as separate, is joined with Sanhaja)—based on phonetic and morphological variations and location. Zanata, Sanhaja, and Masmuda are not terms used in the writings of the ancients but do appear, full-blown, with Arab authors who draw a clear distinction between them. The Masmuda were concentrated in the High Atlas and surrounding areas while in the rest of North Africa the Zanata (those who speak Zanatiya) were more common in the north and east and the Sanhaja in the south and west. The word "Sanhaja" means those who speak Zenaga (Znaga), the major dialect of the western desert. - Richard L. Smith
Then there are legends of ‘Berber’ ancestry, one of which as already very briefly mentioned, is traced back to a personality(s) by the name of “Berr”:
According to the Arabian genealogies, all Berbers are descended from two men: Berr ibn Branes and Berr ibn Botr.79 These two Berrs, although possessing the same name, were not related. From them are descended the great families of Berbers such as the Masmuda, Senhaja, and Zenata. Of all these great families the earliest to spread seems to have been the Masmuda or Ghomara branch. This was followed traditionally by the Senhaja, who today include such varied peoples as the Siwans on the borderlands of Egypt, the Tuareg of the Sahara, and the Braber of the Middle Atlas in Morocco. The third great expansion was that of the Zenata, who were known in Roman times in Cyrenaica, but who did not reach Algeria and Morocco until the Middle Ages. In the thirteenth century these Zenata finally invaded Spain, conquering Arabs and earlier Berbers. One may compare the expansions of the Berber families to those of Kelts, Germans, Slavs, etc. in Europe. - Courtesy of snpa.nordish.net
The present author can only imagine that the website which posted this piece is basing this on Arabic-speaking writers cited in their reference, such as al Bakri and Ibn Khaldun
[More on these sort of legends, from Richard L Smiths analysis:
Unlike Herodotus, Ibn Abi Zar did recognize that his subjects lived in segmented societies,55 but the framework that he and other Arab writers imposed was genealogical rather than anthropological. Groups were defined as descendants of specific people, so exactly who the Berbers issued from was a much debated topic. The most popular starting place was the Holy Land, and first among the candidates was Goliath. After David killed Goliath, the Philistines, frequently confused with the Canaanites, were said to have left their homeland and migrated to North Africa, where they became the Berbers. Not everyone who wanted to keep the Berbers in the Old Testament was convinced of the Goliath connection. One of the most popular accounts goes back to Noah's children, Ham and Sem, among whom Satan was said to have sowed discord:
"Ham, having become black because of a curse pronounced against him by his father, fled to the Maghrib to hide in shame.... Berber, son of Kesloudjim [Casluhim], one of his descendants, left numerous posterity in the Maghrib."56* [56* - “Ibn Khaldun, Histoire I, 177–178. The Ham connection appears in al-Ya'qubi, Corpus, p. 21. The Goliath connection comes a little later in Ibn Hawqal, Corpus, p. 48. Much earlier, in the first century C.E., the Jewish historian Flavius Josephus claimed that the Gaetulians descended from Havilah, the son of Cush, grandson of Ham.” - Richard L. Smith]
Understandably, many of the Berbers did not want their family trees rooted in Goliath, Ham, or other Biblical ne'er-do-wells. Muslims all over the Islamic world often **tried to establish ancestral connections with the Prophet's homeland**, the Arabian peninsula, and the Berbers were no exception. A popular theory among them was that they were long-lost Yemenites.
Ibn Khaldun chronicled all the stories he could find concerning Berber origins and**demolished each in turn**. He characterized one story that featured an invasion by an ancient Yemenite king as an "example of silly statements by historians."57* [57* - “Ibn Khaldun, Muqaddimah, p. 14.” - Richard L. Smith] Nor did he mince words concerning another popular theory:
"The opinion which represents them as the children of Goliath or Amalecites, and which has them emigrate from Syria, willy-nilly, is so untenable that it merits classification as a fable."
But Ibn Khaldun proved more effective as a critic than in offering a viable alternative. In the end he, too, traced the Berbers back to Genesis:
"Now the real fact, the fact which dispenses with all hypothesis, is this: the Berbers are the children of Canaan, the son of Ham, son of Noah." Down this line came Berr who had two sons, Baranis and Madghis al-Abtar. All Berber tribes descended from one or the other of these brothers and were classified as either Baranes or Botr.58* [58* - “Histoire I, 173–185. Also see R. W. Bulliet, "Botr et Beranes: Hypotheses sur l'histoire des Berbes,"Annales Economies, Sociétés, Civilisations36 (1981): 104–116.” - Richard L. Smith]
Continuing…
The Sanhaja were Baranes, and the Zanata were Botr. Further up the tree on the Baranes side were the Mulaththamun, who, according to al-Idrisi, descended from two eponyms, Sanhaj andLamt. They lived in the Maghrib and were the sons of a mother named Tazakkat (Tizki), "the Lame." But Sanhaj and Lamt produced troublesome broods who tried to conquer the other Berbers and were finally driven into the desert, where they became nomads living in tents and surviving on the milk and meat of camels.59* [59* - “Corpus, p. 127.” - Richard L. Smith]
Arab-imposed, male-centered genealogy tells us more about contemporary Arab historiography than it does about Berber ethnography. This is not to dismiss the importance of perceived descent, which was matrilineal among most Berbers, particularly those of the desert. Etymological analysis seems to indicate that this tradition had its roots deep in the past: the words for brother and sister in proto-Berber, for example, are "son of my mother"and "daughter of my mother" respectively.60* [60* - “G. Marcy, "Les survivances juridiques de la parenté maternelle dans la coutume du Maroc Central," Actes du Congrès del'institut des Hautes Études Marocaines (Rabat, 1937), p. 33.” - Richard L. Smith]
The progenitor of Sanhaja and Tuareg alike was more often than not thought to be a woman, **Tin Hinan** of the Kel Ahaggar being the most well known. Whatever the real story behind the formation of a group like the Lamtuna, a large measure of their self-identity came from the commonly held belief that their eponymous ancestor was a woman named **Lamtuna**, and thus they were related "by blood" to each other.
More on legends, as cited by Richard:
One final aspect of Biblical-based genealogical history is worth noting: it did not start with the Arabs. About halfway through his work, Procopius suddenly announces that it is necessary to tell how the Maures came to Libya. He begins with Joshua and the Hebrews invading Palestine and thrashing everyone in sight. Several of the Canaanite tribes escaped by moving into Egypt, but finding it already crowded, continued on to Libya. Autochthonous people Procopius calls the "Children of the Soil" already lived there; Procopius does not say whether the Canaanites and the Children of the Soil fought or intermarried, only that the Canaanites became Maures.61* [67* - “.V. IV.10.12–24.” - Richard L. Smith] Procopius did not invent the tie between the peoples of North Africa and the Old Testament: for the Christians it goes back to St. Hippolyte in the early third century, but its origins can be seen even earlier in Flavius Josephus and Jewish tradition.62*[62* - “Yves Modéran, "Mythe et histoire aux derniers temps de l'Afrique antique: À propos d'un texte d'Ibn Khaldun," Review Historique CCCIII 2 (Avril–Juin 2001): 327–337.” - Richard Smith] However, Procopius's story does establish a link between portals two and three. It is one of the few strands of continuity, even though it concerns a perceived rather than a real relationship, which brings us back to our original problem: Why does there appear to be such a level of discontinuity?
Richard adds…
The almost complete break in nomenclature between the classical and Arab periods has toraise a few eyebrows. The names we use today come from the sources available to us. Some names originated with the people themselves, as in the case of the Mauri, at least according to Strabo.63* [63* - “Geography XVII.3.2. Later the transliteration became "Moors."“ - Richard L. Smith] Others came from neighbors, and some that ended up in Greek and Roman references were simply botched transliterations.64* [64* - “In the opening paragraph of his discussion on Libya, Pliny complains, "The names of its peoples and towns are absolutely unpronounceable except by the natives," N.H. V.1. See Gustave Mercier, "La langue libyenne et la toponymie antique de l'Afrique du Nord," Journal Asiatique 105 (1924): 189–320.” - Richard L. Smith] Authors confused names probably more often than we suspect. In his tour of the middle of the desert, Pliny notes that "the Blemmyae are reported to have no heads, their mouth and eyes being attached to their chests."65* [65* - “N.H. V.8.46.” - Richard L. Smith] Strabo and others describe a real people they referred to as the Blemmyae, who were nomads living below Egypt. Pliny's Blemmyae, minus the name, were borrowed from Herodotus's discussion of western Libya beyond the cultivated area: "There are enormous snakes there ... donkeys with horns, dog-headed creatures, headless creatures with eyes in their chests (at least, that is what the Libyans say), wild men and wild women...."66* [66* - Geography VIII.7; 135; Histories IV.191.” - Richard L. Smith] Still others were made up by the Greeks and Romans. Diodorus Siculus provides some egregious examples in his tour of peoples living south of Egypt, which includes the Ichthyophagi (fish eaters), Chelonophagi (turtle eaters), Rhizophagi (root eaters), Hylophagi (wood eaters), Spermatophagi (seed eaters), Stnithophagi (bird eaters), and Acnclophagi (locust eaters). Just to show his scheme was not entirely based on diet, he threw in the Simi (flat nosed). It is unlikely that people actually thought of themselves as being Hylophagi or Simi.67* [67* - “.H. III.15.1; 21.1; 23.1; 24.1–2; 28.1–2; 29.1. On names the Greeks gave to the Libyans, see Olivier Masson, "Grecs et Libyens en Cyrenaique,"Antiquités africaines 10 (1976): 49–62.” - Richard L. Smith]
Smith's piece provides with demonstrations of how legends, at least pertaining to one of the examples provided earlier—about Sanhaja and Tuareg origins in Yemen, can be quite questionable, since "Berber" legends vary in their accounts and eponymous ancestors from population to population of Tamazight ("Berber") speakers, if not from time to time. He even provides an example of a medieval writer, Ibn Khaldun in this case, who questioned the veracity of certain legends that he had heard during his lifetime. Of note, which reinforces what was already said about Islamic-inspired legends across Africa, Richard points out: Muslims all over the Islamic world often **tried to establish ancestral connections with the Prophet's homeland**, the Arabian peninsula, and the Berbers were no exception. A popular theory among them was that they were long-lost Yemenites.
Richard's piece also explains how political motives play into legends formulated, some of which even conflict with one another, depending on whom, where and when. Does that mean the historic value of early writers telling these legends should be dismissed altogether, simply because of some political viewpoint they might have held for one reason or another? Of course not; that is just simplistic thinking.
The questions that logically come to mind, for the sake of the subject of this topic--Timbuktu, are as follows:
Given that Islam was not particularly adopted during much of ancient Ghana and times prior in the western Sudan, one would expect that if there is any authenticity to them, that the legends of Muslim communities of Mali would be consistent with those of some of their non-Muslim counterparts. The questions are: Is that the case, and do the consistency of legends align with or structure along the theological-affiliations of the populations, as opposed to ethnic or genealogical connection?
If the eponymous ancestors in the legends of Mali's Muslim communities are authentic, then how come Islam only emerged as a meaningfully embraced tradition in western Sudan near the turn of the 11th century, if not more so in the 14th century. Why did people in ancient Ghana feel the need to convert to Islam only in the waning days of Ghana? If one recalls, we had already covered this question in the last segment, but its purpose here is different. Did Mali's Muslim communities only initially arrive as a genealogically-connected group as late as the 11th century? Even so, how does one distinguish the converts from the non-converts (those who are presumably progeny of the eponymous ancestor who arrived with his/her Muslim traditions), as we know that there were no Muslims communities in the area earlier, but that conversion only starts taking place in western Sudan some time in the 11th century...or are we to believe that *all* Malians were descendants of the eponymous Muslim or Arab ancestor, despite the available records of conversion to Islam? Or yet, could it simply be a *coincidence* that Mali's Muslim communities hold legends that trace an eponymous ancestor to the Arabian peninsula, i.e. if we assume that such an ancestor was not a Muslim but an Arab? Also, recalling one of the references provided by ideologue elements, in their overall effort to support the idea that "Malians ultimately came from Yemen", we were told: According to the manuscript number 43 of Ahmed Baba Center in Timbuktu, the Fulani trace their lineage back to the Koraysh of Mecca through Oqba ibn Yasir
With that genealogical background, one would think that Muslim or Arab traditions would have emerged in western Sudan before [or at least, the same time] as the very ethnic groups that claim to have eponymous Arab ancestry. For instance, if it is said that the Fulani derive from an eponymous Arab ancestor in the Arabian peninsula, then the ethnogenesis of Fulani in western Sudan should not predate the alleged arrival period of that ancestor in western Sudan, whether it be evidenced by their mentioning in primary texts of antiquity or through DNA sampling inferences. By extension, if the eponymous Fulani ancestor is said to be in the Arabian peninsula during so and so period before ever arriving in the western Sudan, then it should follow that there should be no historical traces of the Fulani in western Sudan during that same period. To demonstrate the importance of chronological consideration, let's take the following for example, which was brought to the present author's attention by one ideologue sloppily, without a source referenced:
"The Fulani trace their lineage back to the Koraysh of Mecca through Oqba ibn Yasir who married a Fulani princess of Futa Toro by the name of Madeumaa. From this marriage she had four boys. They are the ancestors of the Fulani tribes: these are the Diallo, Dicko, Sangare, Balde' or Ba, Barry and Diakite".
Well now, attentive reading should make it clear that the "Fulani princess" should not have existed at the time of this marriage event with Uqba ibn Yasir, if we are to assume that Uqba is the reason that such a thing as Fulani exists. In order for this Fulani princess to exist, she would have had to have descended from Fulani ancestry, right?! If she wasn't a Fulani, but just the other ancestor of recent Fulani, then the author ought to have been able to make a note of what her ethnicity was—its name, other than "Fulani", according to the legend.
The following has also been offered to account for the above's shortcomings, and once again we are compelled by its advocate to deal with unsourced references:
Tarikh el-Fettach claims that Askia Mohammed was descendant of the Sîlla, a Soninke clan from the Torodo (the Fouta Toro)
"The woman was a Turudi—the same tribe as Askia...Askia Muhammad claimed to have relatives in Gao and the Toro of Yemen as confirmed to him by the Egyptian scholar Suyuti."
Apparently this explanation does not do much to rehabilitate the one shown prior, for while it seeks to acknowledge the irrationality pointed out about the said one shown prior, i.e. that a Fulani being present at marriage event that was supposed to mark the first stage in the processes that lead to the creation of the Fulani as a people, it suggests that the Fulani derive from Soninke ancestry. This would mean that the Soninke were around before any such group of people as the Fula ever existed; if so, how true would that be? Furthermore, it would imply that Fula, which is generally considered to cluster in the Atlantic branch of the Niger-Congo super-family, evolved from a Soninke language. This has not been demonstrated to the knowledge of the present author. Both questions have been left unanswered by its advocate, for what it's worth.
Now let's examine what genealogical studies involving uniparental markers reveal about Malian folks:
From Woods et al. (2005), here is the rundown of marker frequencies, and we will focus on paternal ancestry, since "Arab" lineage is supposedly assessed through the paternal line, among the Dogon section of Mali's multi-ethnic landscape...
A-M31: 2%; B-M150: 7%; E-M33: 45%; E-M34: 2%; E-P1*: 38%; E-M191: 5%
Sample size: 55
Pretty much all of these are African-specific markers. Hg J, which is fairly frequent in the Arabian peninsula and the Levant is noticeably absent here.
The Dogon only make a segment of the Malian population, and so, these would serve as just a snapshot of Malian overall gene pool. However, given that the Mande-speaking segment makes up the majority, and given the modal markers that characterize such language-speakers elsewhere, it is very likely that these same lineages shown above, are the ones that dominate Malian paternal genealogical landscape, esp. hg E-M33 and hg E1b1a. Hg E1b1b is likely to feature as well, but even more so in segments like the Tamasheq (Tuareg) groups of Mali, whose mtDNA are consistent with those found elsewhere in western Africa. The following comes from Rosa et al. (2007), although it was rather difficult to track the precise source and which segments of Malian populations were involved:
And...
"However, the Guinea-Bissau A-M91 lineages do not belong to the widespread A3-M32 but to the A1-M31 subcluster, with reported marginal presence in Mali (2.0% [2,7]), Gambia/Senegal Mandinka (5.1% [7]) and North African Berbers (3.1% [1,33-35])." - Rosa et al. Y-chromosomal diversity in the population of Guinea-Bissau: a multiethnic perspective, 2007
The A-M91 marker above implicated in Mali was reported in Underhill et al.'s (2000) study. That frequency does not seem to be inconsistent with that reported in the Dogon sample. Clearly, information is sparse on Malian paternal gene pool, but these nevertheless give us a taste of a larger picture.
As for language, our ideological supporter of "Arab" ancestry of Malians was not able to account for why their primary language is not Arab, but sub-phylums of the Niger-Congo super-family, non-Semitic Afrasan/Afro-Asiatic (Tamazight) and Nilo-Saharan, with the Niger Congo group of the Mande making up the largest segment of the population, comprising different sub-groups of Mande-speakers. We are not given the details of what happened to the Malians' original "Arabic" language, or when and how it got replaced by a Niger-Congo sub-phylum, like say Mande.
Ancient Mali was a cosmopolitan complex, and the area remains a fairly ethnically heterogeneous region, as many other African locations usually are; are we to believe that each of these ethnic entities derive from eponymous Arab ancestors, and at the same time, that each of them dropped their Arabic language in favor of all the different western African languages now spoken in Mali? And yet through all this, they can proudly "proclaim to be of Arab heritage" while having some other primary language? Highly dubious, but these are the lengths to which reactionary ideological are willing to take, to obfuscate African history to the extent that they can. As the namesake of this discussion says: The stripping off western Africa of another of its history has begun!
So, what has transpired here thus far? In the first segment of this topic, focus was mainly on the scholarship base of Timbuktu, a one-time intellectual hub in the Islamic world, with its many libraries and world renowned madrasas or universities. Ideological objections to the significance and the local development of this legacy had also been examined, with examples, and correspondingly discredited. With that cleared, we went onto the second segment of the topic, which focused entirely on the emergence of Islam in the region. Naturally, this segment of the discourse had to talk a lot more about Mali's predecessors wherein Islam first took hold, since Mali doesn't herald the beginning of the adoption of Islam in the Sudan of al-Maghribi. The predecessor of note here was ancient Ghana, for a number of reasons. It is during ancient Ghana's era that we first hear about conversion of the people of western Sudan to Islam, it was the regional power of the region and one that predated both the Arab and Islamic presence in the region. However, the historiography of the coming of Islam during Ghana's time had been heavily tainted by European imperialist aspirations for a long duration of time before things started to change during the era of rapid "decolonization" across Africa and possibly elsewhere in the 60s, and Masonen and Fisher elaborately pursue the genealogy, which they call the isnad, "in the European literature on the West African past, as story passed from scholar to scholar, altering a little each time the baton changed hands—how the [conquest] hypothesis can to be", using a comprehensive body of researchers—past and present—who have chimed in on this hypothesis through the ages, and hence, making their work ideal for analytical purposes herein. In setting "precedents" for "white domination over blacks" and/or "northerners' domination over blacks", in order to justify what would become Europeans' own expansionist desires, European-based writers built on the theme of Moroccan efforts to set precedents for Moroccan expansionist ambitions into Bilad al-Sudan to as far as the "mountains of gold" wherein they could control the trade of gold, as to put them in a better position to trade with Europeans other than just Portugal; setting those precedents was notoriously facilitated through the works of Moroccan historians, who concocted or at least, promoted North-Afrocentric stories or legends about Almoravid conquest of the Land of Blacks (Bilad al-Sudan), even though in this case, no specific mention to Ghana has been reported. However, while Europeans gradually built on this seed, starting with the likes of Leo Africanus, a Spanish Muslim who had spent some time in Morocco, and who then carried off these North-Afrocentric attitudes to Europe through their writing, the actual and full-blown "conquest hypothesis" involving the alleged conquest of Ghana was that of European creation. European "conquest hypothesis" took on new characters as time went by, and each was influenced by European experiences, be it in Europe or overseas, and it seemed that the more elaborate it became, the more racist or chauvinistic—and even fantastic in some cases—it became, particularly by the 19th century, the period in which much of Europe's colonial adventures in Africa take off in an explosive manner. Thus, the "conquest hypothesis" was characterized by underlying and overt themes of the aforementioned "white domination over blacks" and "northerners' domination over southerners", "Muslims civilizing the animists, and the Christian Europeans then civilizing the Muslims", "Muslims being brutes and savages vs. civilized Europeans as the saviors of Africans" and so on, all of which adhered to racial hierarchy that developed in European thought. The conquest hypothesis severely hampered the true historiography concerning the western Sudan during Ghana, and hence, also affecting objective accounts for how Islam came about there, such that it would be widely embraced in ancient Mali by both rulers and locals. By ignoring this bit of history predating ancient Malian complex, one is bound to suffer from the same thing that reactionary ideologues suffer from: fabricating myths about how Arabs taught ancient Malians how to read and write, and gave them their Islamic culture, which is ridiculous, as we have seen here, because ancient Malian elites simply carried on what was put in place before their emergence as a regional power, i.e. the embracing of Islam and the use of Arabic as a regional lingua franca, simply because western Sudanese's main trading partners were North Africans who adopted Arabic as a lingua franca. It therefore made sense to continue what was already set into motion before their prominence, and adopt Arabic as a lingua franca. And we have seen, the "conquest hypothesis" attempted to use the fabricated "forced conversion" as "civilizing" agent on the one hand, and as a "fanatical and brutish" endeavor on the other. Of course, aside from being fabrications, neither of them make sense and are just plainly ridiculous, for Ghana was a dominant power in the region before its decline and eventual demise, by not "northerners", "Arabs" or "Berbers" but by rival western Sudanese elements, namely the Susu. No less important, it was a centralized polity made up of tributary system of local complexes with their respective sub-governing systems, and a polity that attained regional prominence and wealth through gold trade that predates the arrival of Muslims. These are all features of a people who have attained a high state of social development, and hence, not people of lawlessness, lack of governance, husbandry or industry; a centralize polity means that every productivity going on in the tributary units will have had to have systematically been reported back to the central government or seat of rule, which is where writing comes in for recording, and if not, then some other viable alternative with similar effect would have to have been in place. In short: Complexes like Ghana did not wait for Muslims or "northerners" to come to achieve a self-sustaining, socially structured and highly organized society, and there were plenty more highly structured societies in the region before Ghana itself. Mali simply took on the mantle of prominence in the region, and carried over where Ghana left, and the fact that it is yet another western Sudanese complex run by western Sudanese people, not an "Arab" or "European" one, is testament to the fact that no "civilizing" from outsiders was in the cards at any point in time. It developed wealth sufficiently enough to provide a large base for scholars and intellectuals, both locally and from afar, hence contributing to the Islamic world, what would become one of the best-known learning centers of the medieval era. This legacy though, had been in danger of fading away from the limelight until recently, with the realization that the treasured manuscripts could well have been in danger of disappearing forever, and along with it, a good piece of humanity's history [which is not an option], and that something had to be done to save them and further unlock their secrets—building a museum specially for that, which could be a safe haven for these treasures, and hence relics of both ancient Mali's and western Sudanese legacy.
*Look for ongoing updates.
Also read, if not done so, the other segments of this topic; click below:
Link 1
Link 2
_______________________________________________________________
*References:
—Ray A. Kea (2004): Expansions And Contractions: World-Historical Change And The Western Sudan World-System (1200/1000 B.C.–1200/1250 A.D.)*
—http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/mali
—http://rs6.loc.gov/intldl/malihtml/islam.html
—http://www.library.cornell.edu/africana/Writing_Systems/Welcome.html
—http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7786361.stm
—Pekka Masonen and Humphrey J. Fisher (1996): Not Quite Venus from the Waves: The Almoravid Conquest of Ghana in the Modern Historiography of Western Africa.
—Richard L. Smith of the Ferrum College
—snpa.nordish.net
—Woods et al. (2005): Contrasting patterns of Y chromosome and mtDNA variation in Africa: evidence for sex-biased demographic processes.
—Rosa et al. (2007): Y-chromosomal diversity in the population of Guinea-Bissau: a multi-ethnic perspective.
—"Al-Jazeera: "Witness" YouTube posting, under "News & Politics" category.
*Retrieved personal notes, 2010.
"*" in the passage was reference to Masonen's and Fisher's text in the above-mentioned work.
Timbuktu: The Stripping has Began - Pt2
This an ongoing topic, carried from the first posting wherein we came across a question in Masonen's and Fisher's piece, concerning the adoption of Islam in ancient Ghana. That question was, to reiterate:
Why did the ruler and people of Ghana adopt Islam in 1076?
It is a warranted one, since it is generally understood that the religion wasn't widely adapted in that area, and certainly not by the Ghanaian elites, until the waning period of that complex. Indeed, as that singular date seems to suggest, why would the Ghanaian residents adopt Islam all of a sudden, if we are to take away that element of violent confrontation as the vehicle for the conversion? This question elicits even more head-scratching, when the element of that aforementioned idea of "influence" is also ruled out. What does Masonen and Fisher have to say about this? See below:
There seems to us little reason to believe that the Almoravids exercised any kind of determining political influence over Ghana, be it by force or by insinuation. The story of a forceful intervention originated (though it was subsequently much embroidered and enlarged) from the unreliable, for Ghanaian affairs, Arabic chronicles of the fourteenth century and their modern interpretation in colonial historiography. Remove the element of force, and we are left with no reliable peaceful alternative: our sources, even after we have excised the use of force, remain as reliable, or unreliable, as they were before. Furthermore, the hypothesis of Almoravid "influence" or Almoravid support for some kind of Ghanaian coup-d'etat is linked to the existence of a strong Almoravid "southern wing" led by Abu Bakr after the division of the movement in early 1070s. There is, however, little evidence for this: Ibn Idhari and other sources mentioned Abu Bakr's return to the desert and his death there, but with very little additional detail indeed. In fact, the idea of "a southern wing" may itself be understood as a by-product of the conquest hypothesis, the historicity of which requires the presence of a considerable Almoravid force in the south.
It makes sense, in the scheme of things that we have just seen, that the concoction of "a southern wing" is itself a spin-off from the conquest hypothesis. The single-event-invoked date of conversion to Islam in 1076, without some element of overt driving force applied on the Ghanaian folks by the Almoravids, just doesn't seem to sit well by some observers, but the fact as it stands now, is that there is just little in way of actual evidence to support such turn of events. So, do we learn from Masonen and Fisher, of what else then could have triggered Ghanaian conversion to Islam in the waning period of its influence in the region, if not "conquest" or "influence" by the Almoravids? From the said authors:
Indeed, given the considerable interest and mention of these complexes—Ghana and the Almoravid movement, the total blackout of an armed conflict between the two in contemporary texts of the time simply cannot be ignored. As to last last question posed, we can very well see why Masonen and Fisher fall short of telling us here, what else then could have been taking place in western Africa to bring about Islamic conversion in Ghana; Fisher who is one of our two writers in the present citation, was also party to another "anti-conquest" of Ghana paper back in the early 80s. Therein, they layout what these processes could have been, but then, as noted in the above citation, they were criticized for their "suggestions". The fact of the matter is that there is just not enough in way of specific material that points to one singular event—i.e. non-confrontational—as the main underlying driver for this sectarian conversion, so as to render it unwarranted to extrapolate or speculate to as little degree as possible from what little information is available, of the chain of events that directly culminate into Islamic conversion in Ghana. What is clear from all tangible evidence however, is that violence or any sort of confrontational approach by the Almoravids was not responsible for this conversion. It is to this end, that the present author of this blog is of the mindset that the acculturation to Islam was instigated as political expediency on the part of later Ghanaian ruling elites, having been privy to their progressively declining influence in the region, with which comes the mindfulness of one's susceptibility to known or suspected rivals in the region—be they small or big, complementary to what would have appeared to the eyes of those within Ghanaian ruling circles, the rise of the Almoravids and their expansionist activities in coastal Maghreb and certain areas of the Sahara.
Not to be left out, naturally, is the question that arises out of all this, which is: What then could have instigated the conquest hypothesis? Again, Masonen and Fisher do a decent job of reconstructing the underlying circumstances that provided fodder for the ideology:
One of our principal reasons for surveying in such detail the gradual process of osmosis by which first the conquest hypothesis, and later the criticism of it, have become established in West African historiography was to test the extent to which these changes have been a response to the changing ideological conditions in European thought. We have described in this paper important periods of historiographical transformation which were more or less, we have suggested, ideologically inspired. First there was the Moroccan interpretation of Almoravid history, embedded within Arab and Berber attitudes towards the blacks; both this interpretation and the attitudes were carried over to the Renaissance European literature of Africa. Later there were Europeans' own experiences in early nineteenth-century Africa, which also affected their conceptions of African past. And finally there was the rise of a new science, and a new philosophy to go with it in Europe itself towards the end of the same century, contributing to the new politics of colonialism in Africa, and stimulating changes to the historical record of Almoravid days in particular, calling up the conquest of Ghana as part of this.
What we therefore see here, is Masonen and Fisher disproving the conquest hypothesis and then going onto detail both what triggered and sustained it until it fell out of favor for the more materially tenable position of the "anti-conquest" case. We see that while the conquest hypothesis is a European creation, as Masonen and Fisher admit, the fomenting of the conquest hypothesis is traceable to Morocco some time in the 14th century, as a means to the lay down the foundations for the political and moral justification for seizing strategically-placed territory under western Sudanese rulers, for control over gold trade. This seed was carried onto Europe, as noted above, with writers like Leo Africanus—the Spanish Muslim writer who spent some time in Morocco—being the main vehicle for this; below, note the mention of Ghana in the first paragraph, and then the "mountains of gold" (Jabal al-Dhahab) in the paragraph just prior to the last one of this batch:
According to Leo Africanus, the Land of the Blacks, including Guechet and Cano [Ghana] was first opened up in AH 380/1012 AD, after the arrival in North Africa of a certain Muslim. The Land of the Blacks was then "inhabited by people, who lived like brutes, without kings, lords, republics, government and any customs, and without knowing husbandry." Continuing with Leo's (very North African-centric) account, these blacks were dominated by "King Joseph, the founder of Morocco," referring here to Yusuf b. Tashfin (ruled 1087 - 1106), who established Almoravid power in the Maghreb and Andalusia, and by "the five nations of Libya," meaning the Berber confederacies of the Zenaga, Guenziga, Terga, Lemta and Berdeua. From their Berber rulers the blacks learned "the Islamic law and divers necessary skills, and many of them became Muslims."
Leo mentions the name Ghana only here, without elaboration, and he does not specify whether it was among the lands which were subjugated by King Joseph and the Libyan nations. Neither does the name of the alleged conqueror of Ghana, the Almoravid amir Abu Bakr b. Uma, whom Yusuf b. Tashfin was to supersede in Morocco in the early 1070s, appear anywhere in Leo's pages. There is thus nothing to suggest that Leo Africanus was in any sense a direct progenitor of the hypothesis of an Almoravid conquest of Ghana.
In this respect, Leo himself is more reliable as an indicator of the common negative attitude of Berbers and Arabs towards black Africans, than as a precise historical chronicler. In any case, it is not so much with regard to an explicit conquest hypothesis that the seeds were being sown, but rather in setting a scene of whites over blacks, northerners over southerners, a scene within which the southward penetration of Islam did take place and where such events as conquest might well be imagined.
Furthermore, below we see even more explicit indicators of Moroccan rulers' intentions to dominate Sudanese gold trade in the 16th century than we did from examining Leo Africanus' inspirations for the above-mentioned "domination of northerners over southerners" et al.:
...there is in Marmol's work one reference to southern military campaigning by the Almoravids, where he speaks of "Lumtunas" or the Lamtuna having conquered "Tumbuto" or Timbuktu, and other parts of the western Sudan in a more remote time. This is Marmol's own addition to Leo's description of Timbuktu, which he otherwise repeats as such. The exact source for this rather general campaigning information is difficult to trace; similar commentary was available—as we have already noticed in the context of Leo Africanus—in fourteenth-century Marinid historiography, which was certainly known to Moroccans (and probably to Marmol, too), and of course in the tale of King Joseph and the five Libyan nations.
But it is the context of Marmol's remark, rather than its source, which is of special interest to us—for Marmol was describing here the ambition of "el Xerife Mahamet," or Muhammad al-Mahdi (1544-57), founder of the sharifian Sa'did dynasty of Morocco, to extend his rule further into the Sahara and beyond, "as the Lamtuna had done in the past." Greater control over the Sudanese gold trade would have been important to the new rulers, giving them freer access to trade with Europeans other than the Portuguese, and thus enabling them to circumvent the understandable Portuguese reluctance to see gunpowder and firearms passing into the hands of their potential, and often actual, enemies.
Masonen and Fisher could not be any more explicit here about the developing theme of their paper under discussion; Europeans initially drew their inspirations from the politics that accommodated Moroccan expansionist designs and that found expression in the works of 14th century Moroccan-based historians, thereof laying down the foundations and early stages of the conquest hypothesis in the 16th century onwards, thus setting the stage for what was to become part of the politics and philosophy for justifying Europeans' own expansionist (colonial) designs in the future. Sure enough, by the 19th century the conquest hypothesis had taken shape, and it was during this same period that Europeans go on their colonial rampage across the African continent, following the infamous Berlin Conference (1884-85) to carve up the continent. The dubious, if not politically calculated, claims of 14th century Moroccan historians with regards to supposed Almoravid domination over bilad al-Sudan (the Land of Blacks) were readily mimicked by European writers, and then given a chauvinistic theme of "northerners' domination over southerners" for the just-mentioned reason—their own expansionist aspiration; Masonen and Fisher point out that this interpretation of events revolving around ancient Ghana and the Almoravids was directly contradicted by records from guess who? Why, none other than scholars from Timbuktu! Read on:
Yet evidence quite contradictory to the Moroccan claims comes from south of the Sahara, from the Muslim scholars of Timbuktu. Muhammad al-Mahdi's attempt to extend his rule into the Sahara and beyond is mentioned also by Abd al-Rhman al-Sa'di, the author of Ta'rikh al-Sudan, which is an invaluable source for Songhay history, and almost contemporary with Marmol. But al-Sa'di nowhere mentioned that the Moroccan claims over western Sudan were affirmed by any Almoravid precedent. Perhaps such justification was not used in this particular instance, or perhaps al-Sa'di edited it out—we can never know--but his silence rather suggests that such a precedent did not exist at all.
Moreover, there is another scholar, the celebrated Ahmad Baba, who denied without hesitation that any conquest of the Sudan by Muslims in the more remote past ever took place--in a document written in 1024/1616 entitled Al-Kashf wa'l-bayan li-asnaf majlub al-Sudan, ("Enslavable categories among the blacks revealed and explained").
Now of course, unflattering caricaturization and prejudice that accommodated the by-now "full-blown" conquest hypothesis in Europe, were increasingly taken to new levels as we approach 19th century colonial expansionist endeavors of European nations, with certain series of events in Europe or involving Europeans along the way chiming in on how some of these prejudices took on their character. For instance, as Masonen and Fisher show, in one case, Almoravids were equated with Saharan nomads—namely the Tuaregs, which came along with negative portrayals of the Almoravids in the Almoravid-west Sudanese historiography, wherein the Almoravids are now not merely part of the theme of "northerners domination over southerners", but also now a vicious, fanatical and savage bunch, to whom the helpless people of bilad al-Sudan had the misfortune of falling victim. No doubt, as we shall see, this had to do with European experiences in the Sahara during encounters with the nomads there:
Despite these less than flattering turns for the Almoravid image in European writings of the 19th and early 20th century, there was no let up on the racist typecasting of the people of western Sudan by Europeans, as it continued to serve their colonial designs in Africa. Hence, it is no wonder that what emerges during this period, are conflicting views of the conquest hypothesis; for instance:
On the other hand, the position of Saharan nomads was elevated by the increasingly popular idea of racial hierarchy in European thought. After the elaboration of the Hamitic hypothesis at the turn of the century, the Sahran nomads were counted among those advanced African peoples who had traces of civilizing "white" blood in their veins, being thus superior to the blacks. According to Le Chatelier, for example, the blacks of the Western Sudan owed their progress to contacts with the neighboring Berber race, "more elevated in the normal order of the development of humanity." The Almoravid conquest of Ghana fit well into this picture, according to which all cultural progress in sub-Saharan African had taken place after waves of conquest and cultural influence from the north: by Egyptians, Phoenicians, Greeks, Romans, Berbers, Arabs, and finally by Europeans. It is hardly sheer coincidence that the more destructive and complete the Almoravid conquest of Ghana became in western literature, the more fantastic the ideas the same writers had on the origins of Ghana. According to Delafosse, for example, Ghana was founded by Jews who had escaped from Roman revenge in Cyrenaica after their unsuccessful revolt in 116 AD.
Writers like Mungo Park and Rene Caillie spoke about "Tuaregs" striking fear in the "Negroes of their neighborhood", but Masonen and Fisher note that:
Furthermore, again despite holding negative perceptions, European writers sought to also give Islam a positive spin to the extent that in the end, it will lend moral justification to European colonial designs overseas:
Nevertheless, later writers went even further in stressing this confrontation. Rene Basset, for example, saw the entire history of Western Sudan as a continuous struggle between the Muslim "white" pastoralists and pagan "black" sedendaries. This view was shared by other French writers. Historiographically this idea meant that the Sudanese empires had been equally helpless against the Muslim invaders from the north, as the Almoravid conquest of Ghana in 1076 (in imagination), and the Moroccan attack on Songhay in 1591 (in reality), proved. Furthermore, emphasizing the historical and cultural passivity of the black Africans gave Europeans a moral justification for their own colonial conquests.
There! The keywords here are: "emphasizing the historical and cultural passivity of the black Africans gave Europeans a moral justification for their own colonial conquests."
Henceforth, recalling the conflicting perceptions of the role of Islam in the conquest hypothesis:
On the one hand Islam, and especially what appeared as Islamic fanaticism, was seen as a barbarous and backward force preventing all modern development—often tantamount to Europeanization—in Asia and Africa. Such a view seemed demonstrated by experiences in European colonies, like the so-called Indian mutiny (as the British called it) in 1857-58 which was attributed to Muslim conspiracy, the revolts in Algeria, and the strengthening in the Sahara of the Sanusiyya brotherhood which was believed to be extremely hostile to westerners. In Western Africa Islamic fanaticism was associated with the contemporary jihad movements which the French believed were opposed especially to their advance in Senegambia and Upper Niger.
From this point of view the conquest (and destruction) of Ghana by cruel Almoravids could be seen as an historical example of the negative impact of Islamic fanaticism, justifying European "protection" in sub-Saharan Africa. The French believed that part of their mission in Western Africa was to save the local black population from Muslim slavery and oppression: for instance, on the Upper Niger they deliberately sought the assistance of the animist Bambara in their fight against Ahmadu of Segu and Samory. We should also notice that historiography had an important role in the late nineteenth-century France in raising the national spirit, and the enemies of France, whether they were fanatic toucouleurs or bloodthirsty boches, could not expect to receive much sympathy from the pens of French writers.
On the other hand Islam was seen also as a positive force in African history. In "darkest" Africa Islam was believed to work as a kind of kindergarten training blacks to receive the blessings of European civilisation. This idea, which strengthened especially in the early twentieth century, after the active colonial conquest was over in Western Africa, was logical, for Islam is, after all, more understandable in European eyes than what passed for African animism. Thus conversion to Islam meant a step up on the ladder of progress: from oracy to literacy, from superstition to monotheism. In this context, the Almoravid conquest of Ghana could be seen as a civilizing act, painful but necessary, giving birth to the sophisticated Islamic civilization in Western Sudan which was admired by men like Delafosse and many other French colonial administrators.
And that "sophisticated Islamic civilization in Western Sudan" was supposed to have been what? Ancient Mali, perhaps? After all, it is the next major political power in Western Sudan, after the decline of Ghana, and one wherein Islam was embraced. That said, the last paragraph, right above, pretty much sums up the ideological framework of one arm of Arab diffusion theory dogmatists. In the European ideological framework on the other hand, in that it served the conquest hypothesis which was by now accommodated by racial hierarchy in European thought, it fictitiously gave European colonial designs a principled footing—this can't be emphasized enough!
A curious feature of Masonen's and Fisher's article though, is their own mention of "domination of whites over blacks" and "whites" in western Africa, when keeping in mind that the main subjects of the conquest hypothesis happens to be the Almoravids and ancient Ghana, even though much of what they cite in relation to the referenced writers does not explicitly put matters in those terms; for example in one instance, they write that the following about Cooley's questionable interpretation of al-Bakri:
For our purpose here, however, al-Bakri is a strange witness indeed, for he nowhere mentioned the "conquest" of Ghana by the Almoravids in 269/1076-77, nor could he, since he was writing in about 460/1067-68. Nevertheless, Cooley apparently believed that there was after all an account of the conquest of Ghana in al-Bakri.
The key is Awdaghust. An important trading terminum on the southern side of the Sahara, Awdaghust is elaborately described by al-Bakri. Inhabited by Arabs and Berbers, it was clearly in al-Bakri's time a white town, with some blacks among its slaves. But Awdaghust had recognized the authority of the black ruler of Ghana, and this, according to al-Bakri, was the reason why the Almoravids conquered the town in 446/1054-55, treating its inhabitants with considerable severity.
When Masonen and Fisher write that Awdaghust was "clearly in al-Bakri's time a white town, with some blacks among its slaves", on the account that it was "inhabited by Arabs and Berbers", were they making that estimation themselves for that very reason—the mention of Arabs and Berbers, or were they simply alluding to the mindset of Cooley?...for the few excerpts that they directly cite Cooley on, nowhere does he mention anything about "whites" in western Africa? Certainly, even to this day, there is hardly such a thing as Sahel or southern Saharan "white" nomads or local communities. Or else could that description have been used by al-Bakri; if so, does that sound like something that al-Bakri would write out explicitly? They make yet another reference to these "white" southern Saharans here, even though in the very quote that they are citing Ibn Abi Zar, he makes no mention of "white" southern Saharans:
The second was a Portuguese translation of Ibn Abi Zar's Rawd al-Qirtas. Ibn Abi Zar nowhere mentioned Ghana, but he presented a marvelously vivid canvas for the southern Sahara of white triumphalism over blacks and of swashbuckling Islamic adventurers, including the following information about the death of Almoravid amir Abu Bakr b 'Umar:
concluida esta exhortacao, despediu-se Abu-Bacar, e marchou para Sahara, na qual se conservou fazendo a guerra aos cafres de Ethiopia, aonde foi martyrizado em huma das suas gazuas, traspassado de huma seta hervada, de que morreu no mez ce Xaahan do anno 480 (1078), depois de haver subjucato ao seu Imperio o paiz de Sahara ate Iabaledahb (monte de ouro), paiz da Ethiopia, cujos estados revertao depois para Iussof, filho e Taxefin.
Note that above, "Ethiopia" had been translated into "Sudan" in English.
What's more, is that even Masonen and Fisher themselves tell us later in their article this, recalling a citation provided above:
On the other hand, the position of Saharan nomads was elevated by the increasingly popular idea of racial hierarchy in European thought. After the elaboration of the Hamitic hypothesis at the turn of the century, the Saharan nomads were counted among those advanced African peoples who had traces of civilizing "white" blood in their veins, being thus superior to the blacks.
Certainly, that description by way of implication, is presenting the likes of Almoravids as anything but "white", since the 19th century European writers were equating these nomads with Almoravids, as demonstrated just several posts ago. That being the case, what then to make of that reference to a "white town" in the Sahel? Perhaps, the following may provide answers to these questions, again from a citation already posted above:
Leo himself is more reliable as an indicator of the common negative attitude of Berbers and Arabs towards black Africans, than as a precise historical chronicler. In any case, it is not so much with regard to an explicit conquest hypothesis that the seeds were being sown, but rather in setting a scene of whites over blacks, northerners over southerners, a scene within which the southward penetration of Islam did take place and where such events as conquest might well be imagined.
From this piece, so it appears, that Masonen and Fisher may well be referring to the mindset of later European writers, in trying to portray the conquest hypothesis surrounding the Almoravids and ancient Ghana as a matter of "whites' domination over blacks" and "northerners over southerners", so as to adhere to the "racial hierarchy in European thought", and to justify later European expansionism into Africa. Be that as it may, it is not entirely certain what the authors' intentions may have been.
And of course, the authors go onto demonstrate how Cooley's interpretations of al-Bakri's work must have been off from their original contexts, and even then, they make note of the distinction between the Almoravids and Arabs; see:
Awdaghust had for centuries been a Berber city; this is confirmed by reports from the ninth and tenth centuries. Yet al-Bakri said that this town "used to be the residence of the king the Sudan who was called Ghana before the Arabs entered Ghana." Al-Bakri is our only witness for this royal black residency in Awdaghust. The Corpus editors, rightly observing that al-Bakri is here "far from being clear," and presumably calculating how far back one would have to go in order to predate the first mention of Awdaghust as the residence of a Berber ruler (this is al-Ya'qubi, in the ninth century), suggest that the first Arab entry into Ghana may have been at the time of the Arab conquest of North Africa, in the eighth and ninth centuries.
Already, inconsistencies between Cooley's equation of al-Bakri's "Arab entry into Ghana" by way of Awdaghust to an "Almoravid attack on Ghana" and taking "possession of their territory" thereof, are surfacing. As we shall see, al-Bakri's supposed Arabs could not have been Almoravids, as chronological details will reveal:
Perhaps, that long ago, Awdaghust had indeed been the capital of Ghana. But Cooley, repeatedly and clearly, implies that the Almoravid conquest of Awdaghust was in fact the conquest of the capital of Ghana. This must have been simply carelessness on Cooley's part, for al-Bakri gives us a date for the sack of Awdaghust (1054/55), and he tells us more than once when he himself was writing (1067/68), and both these dates are well before the date traditionally proposed for the fall of Ghana in the "conquest hypothesis," which is the same date (1076/77) that Cooley assigned to the alleged event. Not only are the dates askew, but the entry of the Arabs into Ghana is most unlikely to refer to the Almoravid conquest of Awdaghust, as the Almoravids are nowhere, to the best of our knowledge, referred to as Arabs, in spite of the belief in their Himyaritic origin.
This, the first misunderstanding, is Cooley's own: if his readers followed him in it.
From the above, even a supposed Arab entry to Awdaghust would have predated the supposed sack of Awdaghust in 1054/67, as it would have been traced back to the 8th or 9th century as noted—which is when the Ghanaian ruler would have had residency there, if we are to go by al-Bakri, our only available witness to this, and that 1054/67 event in turn could not have been associated with an Almoravid attack on Awdaghust under Ghanaian rule either, as it conflicts with the forced conversion of Ghana in 1076/77. It makes no sense for an Almoravid attack on Ghanaian capital to take place in 1054/67, cease its territory, and yet not finish the job of conquering, as Ghana continued to be around well into its supposed conquest and forced conversion to Islam in 1076/77 according to Cooley. To top this, Cooley also speaks of the final demise of Ghana by an attack from their western Sudanese neighbors, the Susu, which reportedly should have taken place some time after 1200 AD! Nor should it be forgotten, the fact that the Almoravids were not viewed as Arabs even as far back to their (Almoravid's) era. It is no wonder then, Masonen and Fisher refer to Ghana's fate, going by Cooley's interpretations of affairs, as Ghana's subjection to a "double whammy":
Yet the problem here is that the rulers of Ghana seem to be subject to a double whammy: first the Almoravids assail them, yet they seem to survive for a further century and more before finally succumbing to the Susu, customarily dated soon after 1200 AD. Probably influenced by Ibn Khaldun, Cooley frequently applied dramatic terms to the final demise of Ghana:
"...what were the revolutions, it may be asked, which caused Ghanah to disappear?" (43), "the extinction of Ghanah" (61), and so on. Such doomladen remarks, however, often refer more to the Susu conquest, than to the Almoravid conquest over a century earlier. Cooley himself clearly distinguished between these two events—the religious conquest by the Almoravids and the more political by the Susu--in his summary table...
Indeed, for Cooley was cited on writing this, reportedly through his own reading of Ibn Khaldun's work:
...Two contemporary German texts show how scholars, looking at the available original sources, but uninfluenced by Ibn Khaldun and Cooley's Negroland, could write about events of the eleventh-century Western Africa without mentioning either any Almoravid/Ghana confrontation, or any enforced conversion. In 1842 J. E. Wappaus mentioned the Almoravids and their conquests in the north, but he said nothing of their relationship with Ghana, save the conquest of Awdaghust, which he did not regard as the capital of Ghana. In 1853 Friedrich Kunstmann, citing al-Hulal as quoted in Quatremere's note to al-Bakri, said merely that the conversion of Ghana--from Christianity--occurred in 1075; he made no mention of forced conversion or conquest of Ghana by the Almoravids.
Masonen and Fisher proceed onto illustrate how the period of decolonization in Africa brought in new elements to the conquest hypothesis. It therefore seems that the conquest hypothesis was continuously shaped and modified by new developments and turn of events that filtered into the discourse of politics and philosophy in Europe. Whereas in the periods prior to moves towards relinquishing direct European colonial presence overseas, during which the conquest hypothesis had a firm footing without questioning or any serious challenge directed at it, in the 1960s a new attitude towards the same hypothesis starts to take shape, and it is one that is concerned with challenging the conventional wisdom of the conquest hypothesis, while not initially marginalizing this conventional wisdom in any considerable way. It is only when one gets into the 70s through to the 80s and 90s, does one begin to see challenges posed to the conventional wisdom that have the effect of making a dent in it, and hence, contributing to its marginalization in a serious way. By the mid-90s, the conventional wisdom had been effectively marginalized to a fringe status, but as Masonen and Fisher note, this is not merely attributable to change in the ideological and political climate that writers found themselves; see:
...the gradual and hidden infiltration of the various ideological elements—the identification of Almoravids with Tuaregs, the belief in nomadic superiority, racism, and the ambivalent image of Islam—into the body of research was possible because of the methodological decline of African historiography during the colonial period. The widely-accepted concept that Africa had no history of its own did not mean that interest in the African past completely ceased; it meant that African historiography was dominated, not by academic scholars (such as Cooley and Barth), but by ethnographers, self-taught amateurs, and colonial officers who often worked without any training for proper historical research and were thus more open to the ideological tendencies of their own age, and whose purpose was, after all, to serve the interests of colonial rule.
And in closing here with citing Masonen and Fisher, we have:
..It is, we confess, very hard to accept that the changed perception, in the specific cases with which we are concerned (was there an Almoravid conquest of Ghana? and if not, where did the notion come from?), is merely a result of evolving ideology. We believe rather that it is an expression of the methodological progress which has greatly accelerated in the historiography of Africa from the early 1960s, and which is now leading to a new situation in African historical research, with emancipation from the burden of colonial tradition. What is needed is to re-examine early West African history from the very beginning, not by picking out only such evidence as corresponds with the beliefs we have inherited from earlier researchers and which we consider justified as such since it has been repeated for a century, or as corresponds with the attitudes of our time towards the African past; but by using all the sources we have available to us now, textual and otherwise, and by interpreting them without any fixed presuppositions. In this task, we must, if necessary, dare to challenge all the previous hypothesis, even if they have been sanctified by time and repetition.
Yes, change in ideological atmosphere was accommodated by change in research methodology; methodological progress was possible, as the authors above put it, by the release of earlier constraints put on it by "colonial tradition". Furthermore, research is now largely conducted by personalities who have the appropriate credentials, and not left to just ideological sects, amateurs, or mouth pieces of colonial expansionism who are more prone to the "ideological tendencies of their own age".
So this is the bottom line:
Why was this elaborate citation and analysis necessary, surrounding the conquest hypothesis of Ghana? Firstly, Masonen and Fisher's work was well placed for this task, because it provided a rather comprehensive look at a good deal of earlier researchers who contributed to and supported the conquest hypothesis, along with later ones who raised doubts and/or challenged the once held conventional wisdom in European historiographical discourse of Africa. This was done with extensive references and analysis thereof. As we have learned through excerpts of this work, by ignoring the events surrounding the Ghanaian complex and the conquest hypothesis that plagued it for years, one is setting up oneself to being prone to the sort of ideological tendencies that have been ascribed to the Arabicentric and Eurocentric ideological concerns, which by extension taint the origins and the creative legacy of ancient Mali, as we've seen with several examples already. For instance, elements of the mentioned ideologues are predisposed to asking why ancient Malian residents adopted Islam and wrote in Arabic scripture, when they could very well have simply stuck to their very own home-grown counterparts. This sort of question is one that can of course be avoided, if the history of when and how Islam gained footing in Western Sudan took place in the first place, which apparently predates the emergence of the Malian complex in the region. Against this backdrop, it would have been understood that ancient Mali was serving as an outgrowth of the events that were taking place prior to its prominence in the region. Had the issues surrounding when and how acculturation in Ghana towards adopting Islam took off were sufficiently understood by them (ideologues), it would have occurred to elements of the aforementioned ideologues that the adoption of Islam does not herald the beginning of "civilization" in the region by any stretch of the imagination, and all the essential characteristics that are generally associated with the term. Ancient Ghana was politically prominent in the region as a centralized polity considerably long before any embrace of Islam gained ground, let alone the use of Arabic as a lingua franca, and it was wealthy even by the accounts of foreign witnesses. Ghana owed its wealth and growth to the preexisting gold trade with their coastal north African partners, which north African converts to Islam (rather than Arabian peninsula Arabs themselves) would later take advantage of, in addition to intra-western Sudanese trade. This sort of thing does not come about in some unorganized social setting, unbounded by law and order. The Ghanaians were apparently skillful in trade and geopolitical dealings with their rivals and business partners, and had the necessary checks and balances in place to keep internal order within the complex tributary system that made up the kingdom, as well as to secure national sovereignty, all of which in the end is what got them the political prominence that they enjoyed for years upon years before they declined. With such a complex tributary system united by a central administration, surely common sense elicits that there would have been necessary measures to keep an official tab on or record-keeping of productivity in each local, along with the slice of that which had to be turned over to the central administration. As a reminder, Ghana is itself preceded by a number of social organizations in the region; but from listening to Arab dogmatists speak of how ancient Malian adoption of Arabic as a regional lingua franca signals how much the complex owes its greatness—if not creation—to Arabs, one gets the impression that such a development was necessarily preceded by lack of order, social organization, commerce or trade, or urbanization, let alone political consolidation. It elicits the idea that without the Arab role as "goodwill teachers" sent out to teach a bunch of helpless primitive and disorganized "Negroes" of al-Sudan, about the trade of nation-building, a feat like ancient Mali could not have been pulled off by the "Negroes" of western Sudan on their own. Yet all facets of evidence points no role whatsoever on the part of "Arabs", let alone presence, in the lead up to the Mande-oriented Malian movement assuming power and gaining regional prominence, and subsequently onto earning international recognition; it was, quite simply, entirely the handy work from within, of those very "Negroes" just mentioned. It was the culmination of the power struggle that ensued, after the final demise of Ghana by a group that the contemporary texts of the time referred to as the Susu. The Arab ideologues mentioned here, however, want intelligent people to abandon reasoning and dismiss all this, and simply hand them the credit—"them" here, being a reference to "Arabs" as essentially a caste. Henceforth, Arab ideological cultism is no less damaging than the European colonial examples covered here. In fact, if one were to take an earlier citation here, and modify it a little bit, one would be able to sum up their ideological mindset, which quite frankly, is virtually indistinguishable from European colonial mindset:
Here is an earlier excerpt...
Thus conversion to Islam meant a step up on the ladder of progress: from oracy to literacy, from superstition to monotheism. In this context, the Almoravid conquest of Ghana could be seen as a civilizing act, painful but necessary, giving birth to the sophisticated Islamic civilization in Western Sudan which was admired by men like Delafosse and many other French colonial administrators.
In summing up this segment of the topic, here is the deal: Available pointers suggest that in the 11th century Ghana was on the decline; conversely, the newly emerged Almoravid movement of staunchly devout Muslim-followers was beginning to consolidate its influence in the region In its heyday, it would have been a considerable undertaking to bring that complex (Ghana) to its knees. But even in the periods during which the Almoravid (al-Murabitun) movement was just fomenting its political consolidation in the Maghreb (from al-Maghribi, general Arabic reference to Western Africa, of which bilad al-Sudan and bilad al-Barbar were sub-regional entities), only certain segments of Ghanaian society embraced the religion. Eager to not let the advantages of the trans-Saharan trade network slip by and in the face of Almoravid expansions gaining momentum, it only seemed natural for several Sudanic rulers [elements of which could have had a tributary relationship to the Ghanaian capital or seat of rule at some point or another] to expediently embrace Islam, and forge strong political relationships with this rising Muslim element in the region through the sectarian acculturation. This process had already been set into motion by the time ancient Mali came to prominence in the region, thereby eclipsing whatever remained of ancient Ghana. Therefore, it is no mystery as to why ancient Malian ruling elites embraced Islam from the very onset. Arabic in this period, was to be the lingua franca that facilitated trade and geopolitical ties between the Sudanic complexes and the coastal Maghrebian ones, and also as an anchor for inter-ethnic cohesion internally within the Malian complex. Internal stability is as much a prescription to political success, as is accumulation of wealth through trade. The Malian rulers had a handle on both, giving way to regional political consolidation and prosperity. This prosperity went along with a the growth of its intelligentsia base, as it happens in any other place of the world where economic and political growth is experienced. It is against this backdrop that Timbuktu, being well placed in the trade routes, blossomed into a cosmopolitan learning center.
The use of Arabic as a lingua franca in ancient Mali is of happenstance, for had their coastal north African trade partners not used that language, and instead used another form, then ancient Malians would more than likely not have used it as well. It was a matter of political expediency, that Arabic was adopted, not to replace indigenous languages of course, but for official purposes for reasons already stated above. The complexities of world dealings and what political expediency means are apparently matters that Arab diffusionist ideologues, like almost any cult group, are oblivious to.
With that said, we come to another school of Arabic diffusionist dogma; one that revolves around Islamic and other legends of African societies, cloaked with certain degree of mythology. This will be continued in the 3rd segment of this topic. Go here.
Why did the ruler and people of Ghana adopt Islam in 1076?
It is a warranted one, since it is generally understood that the religion wasn't widely adapted in that area, and certainly not by the Ghanaian elites, until the waning period of that complex. Indeed, as that singular date seems to suggest, why would the Ghanaian residents adopt Islam all of a sudden, if we are to take away that element of violent confrontation as the vehicle for the conversion? This question elicits even more head-scratching, when the element of that aforementioned idea of "influence" is also ruled out. What does Masonen and Fisher have to say about this? See below:
There seems to us little reason to believe that the Almoravids exercised any kind of determining political influence over Ghana, be it by force or by insinuation. The story of a forceful intervention originated (though it was subsequently much embroidered and enlarged) from the unreliable, for Ghanaian affairs, Arabic chronicles of the fourteenth century and their modern interpretation in colonial historiography. Remove the element of force, and we are left with no reliable peaceful alternative: our sources, even after we have excised the use of force, remain as reliable, or unreliable, as they were before. Furthermore, the hypothesis of Almoravid "influence" or Almoravid support for some kind of Ghanaian coup-d'etat is linked to the existence of a strong Almoravid "southern wing" led by Abu Bakr after the division of the movement in early 1070s. There is, however, little evidence for this: Ibn Idhari and other sources mentioned Abu Bakr's return to the desert and his death there, but with very little additional detail indeed. In fact, the idea of "a southern wing" may itself be understood as a by-product of the conquest hypothesis, the historicity of which requires the presence of a considerable Almoravid force in the south.
It makes sense, in the scheme of things that we have just seen, that the concoction of "a southern wing" is itself a spin-off from the conquest hypothesis. The single-event-invoked date of conversion to Islam in 1076, without some element of overt driving force applied on the Ghanaian folks by the Almoravids, just doesn't seem to sit well by some observers, but the fact as it stands now, is that there is just little in way of actual evidence to support such turn of events. So, do we learn from Masonen and Fisher, of what else then could have triggered Ghanaian conversion to Islam in the waning period of its influence in the region, if not "conquest" or "influence" by the Almoravids? From the said authors:
The reconsideration of the conquest theory received its most radical expression in 1982/83 in a pair of articles by Humphrey J. Fisher and David C. Conrad. They build a rather complex argument on a relatively basic premise: given that Ghana is by far the most often cited name in Arabic writing about western Africa from the beginning to ca. 1500; given that the Almoravids were also a popular topic in this writing, and that often both Ghana and the Almoravids are mentioned by the same author; and given that, despite this interest--sustained over centuries--there is nowhere even a single direct reference to any such destructive conquest of Ghana by the Almoravids as described in the western historiography on Africa, then the logical conclusion seems clearly to be that no such cataclysmic even occurred: in short, "there was no Almoravid conquest of ancient Ghana."
Reaction to this anti-conquest argument has, predictably, been mixed. There was no serious attempt to defend the conqest hypothesis in the 1980s, but the issue resurfaced with Sheryl Burkhalter's article. Burkhlaer strongly criticizes Conrad and Fisher, particularly for ignoring the contexts in which the Almoravids and Ghana are mentioned in the Arabic sources. A little surprisingly, Burkhalter nowhere affirms that the conquest actually took place. On the contrary, her phrasing seems sometimes quite compatible with the anti-conquest case as presented by Conrad and Fisher: for instance, she speaks of "more traditional interpretations of Almoravid history" and of "conventional wisdom concerning an Almoravid 'victory' over Ghana." Her principal objection to Conrad and Fisher seems to be methodological—the problem of individually contextualizing all the dozens of sources which might be expected to mention the conquest, but do not--with some additional condemnation of Conrad and Fisher's suggestions, very subsidiary in the context of their article, about what might actually have been happening between Ghana and the Almoravids if we eliminate the idea of a conquest. Nevertheless, it seems that in the most recent histories of Africa the sceptical attitude towards conquest and destruction of Ghana by Almoravids has achieved a permanent foothold.
Indeed, given the considerable interest and mention of these complexes—Ghana and the Almoravid movement, the total blackout of an armed conflict between the two in contemporary texts of the time simply cannot be ignored. As to last last question posed, we can very well see why Masonen and Fisher fall short of telling us here, what else then could have been taking place in western Africa to bring about Islamic conversion in Ghana; Fisher who is one of our two writers in the present citation, was also party to another "anti-conquest" of Ghana paper back in the early 80s. Therein, they layout what these processes could have been, but then, as noted in the above citation, they were criticized for their "suggestions". The fact of the matter is that there is just not enough in way of specific material that points to one singular event—i.e. non-confrontational—as the main underlying driver for this sectarian conversion, so as to render it unwarranted to extrapolate or speculate to as little degree as possible from what little information is available, of the chain of events that directly culminate into Islamic conversion in Ghana. What is clear from all tangible evidence however, is that violence or any sort of confrontational approach by the Almoravids was not responsible for this conversion. It is to this end, that the present author of this blog is of the mindset that the acculturation to Islam was instigated as political expediency on the part of later Ghanaian ruling elites, having been privy to their progressively declining influence in the region, with which comes the mindfulness of one's susceptibility to known or suspected rivals in the region—be they small or big, complementary to what would have appeared to the eyes of those within Ghanaian ruling circles, the rise of the Almoravids and their expansionist activities in coastal Maghreb and certain areas of the Sahara.
Not to be left out, naturally, is the question that arises out of all this, which is: What then could have instigated the conquest hypothesis? Again, Masonen and Fisher do a decent job of reconstructing the underlying circumstances that provided fodder for the ideology:
One of our principal reasons for surveying in such detail the gradual process of osmosis by which first the conquest hypothesis, and later the criticism of it, have become established in West African historiography was to test the extent to which these changes have been a response to the changing ideological conditions in European thought. We have described in this paper important periods of historiographical transformation which were more or less, we have suggested, ideologically inspired. First there was the Moroccan interpretation of Almoravid history, embedded within Arab and Berber attitudes towards the blacks; both this interpretation and the attitudes were carried over to the Renaissance European literature of Africa. Later there were Europeans' own experiences in early nineteenth-century Africa, which also affected their conceptions of African past. And finally there was the rise of a new science, and a new philosophy to go with it in Europe itself towards the end of the same century, contributing to the new politics of colonialism in Africa, and stimulating changes to the historical record of Almoravid days in particular, calling up the conquest of Ghana as part of this.
What we therefore see here, is Masonen and Fisher disproving the conquest hypothesis and then going onto detail both what triggered and sustained it until it fell out of favor for the more materially tenable position of the "anti-conquest" case. We see that while the conquest hypothesis is a European creation, as Masonen and Fisher admit, the fomenting of the conquest hypothesis is traceable to Morocco some time in the 14th century, as a means to the lay down the foundations for the political and moral justification for seizing strategically-placed territory under western Sudanese rulers, for control over gold trade. This seed was carried onto Europe, as noted above, with writers like Leo Africanus—the Spanish Muslim writer who spent some time in Morocco—being the main vehicle for this; below, note the mention of Ghana in the first paragraph, and then the "mountains of gold" (Jabal al-Dhahab) in the paragraph just prior to the last one of this batch:
According to Leo Africanus, the Land of the Blacks, including Guechet and Cano [Ghana] was first opened up in AH 380/1012 AD, after the arrival in North Africa of a certain Muslim. The Land of the Blacks was then "inhabited by people, who lived like brutes, without kings, lords, republics, government and any customs, and without knowing husbandry." Continuing with Leo's (very North African-centric) account, these blacks were dominated by "King Joseph, the founder of Morocco," referring here to Yusuf b. Tashfin (ruled 1087 - 1106), who established Almoravid power in the Maghreb and Andalusia, and by "the five nations of Libya," meaning the Berber confederacies of the Zenaga, Guenziga, Terga, Lemta and Berdeua. From their Berber rulers the blacks learned "the Islamic law and divers necessary skills, and many of them became Muslims."
Leo mentions the name Ghana only here, without elaboration, and he does not specify whether it was among the lands which were subjugated by King Joseph and the Libyan nations. Neither does the name of the alleged conqueror of Ghana, the Almoravid amir Abu Bakr b. Uma, whom Yusuf b. Tashfin was to supersede in Morocco in the early 1070s, appear anywhere in Leo's pages. There is thus nothing to suggest that Leo Africanus was in any sense a direct progenitor of the hypothesis of an Almoravid conquest of Ghana.
However, Leo's account, consistently placing the blacks under Almoravid rule, was very likely influenced by the far-reaching, and quite unpersuasive, claims of fourteenth-century Moroccan historians, such as that the Almoravids had once conquered the Land of the Blacks as far as the "mountains of gold."
Furthermore, below we see even more explicit indicators of Moroccan rulers' intentions to dominate Sudanese gold trade in the 16th century than we did from examining Leo Africanus' inspirations for the above-mentioned "domination of northerners over southerners" et al.:
But it is the context of Marmol's remark, rather than its source, which is of special interest to us—for Marmol was describing here the ambition of "el Xerife Mahamet," or Muhammad al-Mahdi (1544-57), founder of the sharifian Sa'did dynasty of Morocco, to extend his rule further into the Sahara and beyond, "as the Lamtuna had done in the past." Greater control over the Sudanese gold trade would have been important to the new rulers, giving them freer access to trade with Europeans other than the Portuguese, and thus enabling them to circumvent the understandable Portuguese reluctance to see gunpowder and firearms passing into the hands of their potential, and often actual, enemies.
Muhammad al-Mahdi eventually abandoned these plans, but the vital point for us is that once again the history of the Almoravids was being used to provide precedents for contemporary politics and philosophy, and being shaped to meet contemporary needs. Just as the internal requirements of the Marinid dynasty in Morocco promoted the fourteenth-century embellishment of the sub-Saharan Almoravid records, or just as the external needs of an expanding Europe contributed to the nineteenth- and twentieth-century evolution of the full-blown conquest hypothesis, so it seems possible, even likely, that the Marinid elaboration was being refurbished in the later sixteenth century to meet the expansionist needs of Sa'did Morocco, which eventually culminated in the Moroccan invasion of Songhay in 1591.
Masonen and Fisher could not be any more explicit here about the developing theme of their paper under discussion; Europeans initially drew their inspirations from the politics that accommodated Moroccan expansionist designs and that found expression in the works of 14th century Moroccan-based historians, thereof laying down the foundations and early stages of the conquest hypothesis in the 16th century onwards, thus setting the stage for what was to become part of the politics and philosophy for justifying Europeans' own expansionist (colonial) designs in the future. Sure enough, by the 19th century the conquest hypothesis had taken shape, and it was during this same period that Europeans go on their colonial rampage across the African continent, following the infamous Berlin Conference (1884-85) to carve up the continent. The dubious, if not politically calculated, claims of 14th century Moroccan historians with regards to supposed Almoravid domination over bilad al-Sudan (the Land of Blacks) were readily mimicked by European writers, and then given a chauvinistic theme of "northerners' domination over southerners" for the just-mentioned reason—their own expansionist aspiration; Masonen and Fisher point out that this interpretation of events revolving around ancient Ghana and the Almoravids was directly contradicted by records from guess who? Why, none other than scholars from Timbuktu! Read on:
Yet evidence quite contradictory to the Moroccan claims comes from south of the Sahara, from the Muslim scholars of Timbuktu. Muhammad al-Mahdi's attempt to extend his rule into the Sahara and beyond is mentioned also by Abd al-Rhman al-Sa'di, the author of Ta'rikh al-Sudan, which is an invaluable source for Songhay history, and almost contemporary with Marmol. But al-Sa'di nowhere mentioned that the Moroccan claims over western Sudan were affirmed by any Almoravid precedent. Perhaps such justification was not used in this particular instance, or perhaps al-Sa'di edited it out—we can never know--but his silence rather suggests that such a precedent did not exist at all.
Now of course, unflattering caricaturization and prejudice that accommodated the by-now "full-blown" conquest hypothesis in Europe, were increasingly taken to new levels as we approach 19th century colonial expansionist endeavors of European nations, with certain series of events in Europe or involving Europeans along the way chiming in on how some of these prejudices took on their character. For instance, as Masonen and Fisher show, in one case, Almoravids were equated with Saharan nomads—namely the Tuaregs, which came along with negative portrayals of the Almoravids in the Almoravid-west Sudanese historiography, wherein the Almoravids are now not merely part of the theme of "northerners domination over southerners", but also now a vicious, fanatical and savage bunch, to whom the helpless people of bilad al-Sudan had the misfortune of falling victim. No doubt, as we shall see, this had to do with European experiences in the Sahara during encounters with the nomads there:
Mungo Park had already reported that the "Moors"—referring hereto the Mauritanian nomads in general--were "at once the vainest and proudest, and perhaps the most bigotted, ferocious, and intolerant, of all the nations on earth; combining in their character the blind superstition of the Negro, with the savage cruelty and treachery of the Arab. Furthermore, the murders of European travelers in the Sahara—Daniel Houghton in 1791, Gordon Laing in 1881—reinforced the notion that the Saharan nomads considered it to be as "as lawful to murder a European as it would be to kill a dog." There were some travelers, like Henri Duveyrier, who tried to dispel the European mistrust of the Tuaregs, but these attempts were fruitless. On the other hand, the Tuaregs were also respected as brave and dangerous warriors, capable of causing considerable losses to the French army in the Sahara.
Transferred into historiography, this conception meant that the Almoravids of the past appeared quite as intolerant and aggressive as the Tuaregs of the present. In the works of Cooley and Barth this idea is not yet so visible, but it was manifested, especially by Reinhard Dozy in his classic work, Histoire des Musulmans d'Espagne, published in 1861. According to Dozy, the Almoravid period had meant a severe regression for the prosperous culture of Andalusia, and many scholars followed him in this dismissive judgment. In 1917, for example, the Finnish Orientalist Knut Tallqvist described Almoravid rule in Andalusia thus:
The Berber rule was a serious setback for the Arab culture of Islamic Spain. Compared to the sophisticated Arabs of Spain, the African Berbers were half-barbrians, and though they had adopted Islam, they felt no sympathy towards their Arab coreligionists. It was, therefore, natural that the Arabo-Spanish civilization was not favoured and supported by the Almoravids.Taking this stance, it was more than reasonable to suppose that the Almoravid influence had been equally disastrous on the southern edge of the desert, too, just as de Slane's translation of Kitab al-Ibar had suggested.
Despite these less than flattering turns for the Almoravid image in European writings of the 19th and early 20th century, there was no let up on the racist typecasting of the people of western Sudan by Europeans, as it continued to serve their colonial designs in Africa. Hence, it is no wonder that what emerges during this period, are conflicting views of the conquest hypothesis; for instance:
On the other hand, the position of Saharan nomads was elevated by the increasingly popular idea of racial hierarchy in European thought. After the elaboration of the Hamitic hypothesis at the turn of the century, the Sahran nomads were counted among those advanced African peoples who had traces of civilizing "white" blood in their veins, being thus superior to the blacks. According to Le Chatelier, for example, the blacks of the Western Sudan owed their progress to contacts with the neighboring Berber race, "more elevated in the normal order of the development of humanity." The Almoravid conquest of Ghana fit well into this picture, according to which all cultural progress in sub-Saharan African had taken place after waves of conquest and cultural influence from the north: by Egyptians, Phoenicians, Greeks, Romans, Berbers, Arabs, and finally by Europeans. It is hardly sheer coincidence that the more destructive and complete the Almoravid conquest of Ghana became in western literature, the more fantastic the ideas the same writers had on the origins of Ghana. According to Delafosse, for example, Ghana was founded by Jews who had escaped from Roman revenge in Cyrenaica after their unsuccessful revolt in 116 AD.
Writers like Mungo Park and Rene Caillie spoke about "Tuaregs" striking fear in the "Negroes of their neighborhood", but Masonen and Fisher note that:
Besides European travel literature, positive evidence for nomadic superiority was gained from the Arabic sources which stressed the warlike nature of the nomadic peoples. Evidence of the opposite imbalance, with nomads dependent on, or subordinate to, their settled neighbours, was not emphasized by early western authors, but it was certainly not absent, surfacing from time to time.
Furthermore, again despite holding negative perceptions, European writers sought to also give Islam a positive spin to the extent that in the end, it will lend moral justification to European colonial designs overseas:
Nevertheless, later writers went even further in stressing this confrontation. Rene Basset, for example, saw the entire history of Western Sudan as a continuous struggle between the Muslim "white" pastoralists and pagan "black" sedendaries. This view was shared by other French writers. Historiographically this idea meant that the Sudanese empires had been equally helpless against the Muslim invaders from the north, as the Almoravid conquest of Ghana in 1076 (in imagination), and the Moroccan attack on Songhay in 1591 (in reality), proved. Furthermore, emphasizing the historical and cultural passivity of the black Africans gave Europeans a moral justification for their own colonial conquests.
There! The keywords here are: "emphasizing the historical and cultural passivity of the black Africans gave Europeans a moral justification for their own colonial conquests."
Henceforth, recalling the conflicting perceptions of the role of Islam in the conquest hypothesis:
On the one hand Islam, and especially what appeared as Islamic fanaticism, was seen as a barbarous and backward force preventing all modern development—often tantamount to Europeanization—in Asia and Africa. Such a view seemed demonstrated by experiences in European colonies, like the so-called Indian mutiny (as the British called it) in 1857-58 which was attributed to Muslim conspiracy, the revolts in Algeria, and the strengthening in the Sahara of the Sanusiyya brotherhood which was believed to be extremely hostile to westerners. In Western Africa Islamic fanaticism was associated with the contemporary jihad movements which the French believed were opposed especially to their advance in Senegambia and Upper Niger.
From this point of view the conquest (and destruction) of Ghana by cruel Almoravids could be seen as an historical example of the negative impact of Islamic fanaticism, justifying European "protection" in sub-Saharan Africa. The French believed that part of their mission in Western Africa was to save the local black population from Muslim slavery and oppression: for instance, on the Upper Niger they deliberately sought the assistance of the animist Bambara in their fight against Ahmadu of Segu and Samory. We should also notice that historiography had an important role in the late nineteenth-century France in raising the national spirit, and the enemies of France, whether they were fanatic toucouleurs or bloodthirsty boches, could not expect to receive much sympathy from the pens of French writers.
On the other hand Islam was seen also as a positive force in African history. In "darkest" Africa Islam was believed to work as a kind of kindergarten training blacks to receive the blessings of European civilisation. This idea, which strengthened especially in the early twentieth century, after the active colonial conquest was over in Western Africa, was logical, for Islam is, after all, more understandable in European eyes than what passed for African animism. Thus conversion to Islam meant a step up on the ladder of progress: from oracy to literacy, from superstition to monotheism. In this context, the Almoravid conquest of Ghana could be seen as a civilizing act, painful but necessary, giving birth to the sophisticated Islamic civilization in Western Sudan which was admired by men like Delafosse and many other French colonial administrators.
And that "sophisticated Islamic civilization in Western Sudan" was supposed to have been what? Ancient Mali, perhaps? After all, it is the next major political power in Western Sudan, after the decline of Ghana, and one wherein Islam was embraced. That said, the last paragraph, right above, pretty much sums up the ideological framework of one arm of Arab diffusion theory dogmatists. In the European ideological framework on the other hand, in that it served the conquest hypothesis which was by now accommodated by racial hierarchy in European thought, it fictitiously gave European colonial designs a principled footing—this can't be emphasized enough!
A curious feature of Masonen's and Fisher's article though, is their own mention of "domination of whites over blacks" and "whites" in western Africa, when keeping in mind that the main subjects of the conquest hypothesis happens to be the Almoravids and ancient Ghana, even though much of what they cite in relation to the referenced writers does not explicitly put matters in those terms; for example in one instance, they write that the following about Cooley's questionable interpretation of al-Bakri:
For our purpose here, however, al-Bakri is a strange witness indeed, for he nowhere mentioned the "conquest" of Ghana by the Almoravids in 269/1076-77, nor could he, since he was writing in about 460/1067-68. Nevertheless, Cooley apparently believed that there was after all an account of the conquest of Ghana in al-Bakri.
The key is Awdaghust. An important trading terminum on the southern side of the Sahara, Awdaghust is elaborately described by al-Bakri. Inhabited by Arabs and Berbers, it was clearly in al-Bakri's time a white town, with some blacks among its slaves. But Awdaghust had recognized the authority of the black ruler of Ghana, and this, according to al-Bakri, was the reason why the Almoravids conquered the town in 446/1054-55, treating its inhabitants with considerable severity.
When Masonen and Fisher write that Awdaghust was "clearly in al-Bakri's time a white town, with some blacks among its slaves", on the account that it was "inhabited by Arabs and Berbers", were they making that estimation themselves for that very reason—the mention of Arabs and Berbers, or were they simply alluding to the mindset of Cooley?...for the few excerpts that they directly cite Cooley on, nowhere does he mention anything about "whites" in western Africa? Certainly, even to this day, there is hardly such a thing as Sahel or southern Saharan "white" nomads or local communities. Or else could that description have been used by al-Bakri; if so, does that sound like something that al-Bakri would write out explicitly? They make yet another reference to these "white" southern Saharans here, even though in the very quote that they are citing Ibn Abi Zar, he makes no mention of "white" southern Saharans:
The second was a Portuguese translation of Ibn Abi Zar's Rawd al-Qirtas. Ibn Abi Zar nowhere mentioned Ghana, but he presented a marvelously vivid canvas for the southern Sahara of white triumphalism over blacks and of swashbuckling Islamic adventurers, including the following information about the death of Almoravid amir Abu Bakr b 'Umar:
concluida esta exhortacao, despediu-se Abu-Bacar, e marchou para Sahara, na qual se conservou fazendo a guerra aos cafres de Ethiopia, aonde foi martyrizado em huma das suas gazuas, traspassado de huma seta hervada, de que morreu no mez ce Xaahan do anno 480 (1078), depois de haver subjucato ao seu Imperio o paiz de Sahara ate Iabaledahb (monte de ouro), paiz da Ethiopia, cujos estados revertao depois para Iussof, filho e Taxefin.
Then he [Abu Bakr] bade him [Yusuf] farewell and left for the desert. There he remained for some time waging Holy War on the unbelievers from among the Sudan until on one of his expeditions he was struck by a poisoned arrow and met martyrdom. This was in the month of Sha'ban 480/November 1087 after all the land of the desert as far as Jabal al-Dhahab (Mountains of Gold) in the land of the Sudan had come under his sway. After his death authority became vested exclusively in Yusuf b. Tashfin.
Note that above, "Ethiopia" had been translated into "Sudan" in English.
What's more, is that even Masonen and Fisher themselves tell us later in their article this, recalling a citation provided above:
On the other hand, the position of Saharan nomads was elevated by the increasingly popular idea of racial hierarchy in European thought. After the elaboration of the Hamitic hypothesis at the turn of the century, the Saharan nomads were counted among those advanced African peoples who had traces of civilizing "white" blood in their veins, being thus superior to the blacks.
Certainly, that description by way of implication, is presenting the likes of Almoravids as anything but "white", since the 19th century European writers were equating these nomads with Almoravids, as demonstrated just several posts ago. That being the case, what then to make of that reference to a "white town" in the Sahel? Perhaps, the following may provide answers to these questions, again from a citation already posted above:
Leo himself is more reliable as an indicator of the common negative attitude of Berbers and Arabs towards black Africans, than as a precise historical chronicler. In any case, it is not so much with regard to an explicit conquest hypothesis that the seeds were being sown, but rather in setting a scene of whites over blacks, northerners over southerners, a scene within which the southward penetration of Islam did take place and where such events as conquest might well be imagined.
From this piece, so it appears, that Masonen and Fisher may well be referring to the mindset of later European writers, in trying to portray the conquest hypothesis surrounding the Almoravids and ancient Ghana as a matter of "whites' domination over blacks" and "northerners over southerners", so as to adhere to the "racial hierarchy in European thought", and to justify later European expansionism into Africa. Be that as it may, it is not entirely certain what the authors' intentions may have been.
And of course, the authors go onto demonstrate how Cooley's interpretations of al-Bakri's work must have been off from their original contexts, and even then, they make note of the distinction between the Almoravids and Arabs; see:
Already, inconsistencies between Cooley's equation of al-Bakri's "Arab entry into Ghana" by way of Awdaghust to an "Almoravid attack on Ghana" and taking "possession of their territory" thereof, are surfacing. As we shall see, al-Bakri's supposed Arabs could not have been Almoravids, as chronological details will reveal:
Perhaps, that long ago, Awdaghust had indeed been the capital of Ghana. But Cooley, repeatedly and clearly, implies that the Almoravid conquest of Awdaghust was in fact the conquest of the capital of Ghana. This must have been simply carelessness on Cooley's part, for al-Bakri gives us a date for the sack of Awdaghust (1054/55), and he tells us more than once when he himself was writing (1067/68), and both these dates are well before the date traditionally proposed for the fall of Ghana in the "conquest hypothesis," which is the same date (1076/77) that Cooley assigned to the alleged event. Not only are the dates askew, but the entry of the Arabs into Ghana is most unlikely to refer to the Almoravid conquest of Awdaghust, as the Almoravids are nowhere, to the best of our knowledge, referred to as Arabs, in spite of the belief in their Himyaritic origin.
This, the first misunderstanding, is Cooley's own: if his readers followed him in it.
From the above, even a supposed Arab entry to Awdaghust would have predated the supposed sack of Awdaghust in 1054/67, as it would have been traced back to the 8th or 9th century as noted—which is when the Ghanaian ruler would have had residency there, if we are to go by al-Bakri, our only available witness to this, and that 1054/67 event in turn could not have been associated with an Almoravid attack on Awdaghust under Ghanaian rule either, as it conflicts with the forced conversion of Ghana in 1076/77. It makes no sense for an Almoravid attack on Ghanaian capital to take place in 1054/67, cease its territory, and yet not finish the job of conquering, as Ghana continued to be around well into its supposed conquest and forced conversion to Islam in 1076/77 according to Cooley. To top this, Cooley also speaks of the final demise of Ghana by an attack from their western Sudanese neighbors, the Susu, which reportedly should have taken place some time after 1200 AD! Nor should it be forgotten, the fact that the Almoravids were not viewed as Arabs even as far back to their (Almoravid's) era. It is no wonder then, Masonen and Fisher refer to Ghana's fate, going by Cooley's interpretations of affairs, as Ghana's subjection to a "double whammy":
Yet the problem here is that the rulers of Ghana seem to be subject to a double whammy: first the Almoravids assail them, yet they seem to survive for a further century and more before finally succumbing to the Susu, customarily dated soon after 1200 AD. Probably influenced by Ibn Khaldun, Cooley frequently applied dramatic terms to the final demise of Ghana:
"...what were the revolutions, it may be asked, which caused Ghanah to disappear?" (43), "the extinction of Ghanah" (61), and so on. Such doomladen remarks, however, often refer more to the Susu conquest, than to the Almoravid conquest over a century earlier. Cooley himself clearly distinguished between these two events—the religious conquest by the Almoravids and the more political by the Susu--in his summary table...
Indeed, for Cooley was cited on writing this, reportedly through his own reading of Ibn Khaldun's work:
The second flaw concerns the interpretation of Ibn Khaldun's notoriously brief and vague mention of these events, written centuries afterwards—and here the blame may rest more with Cooley'sreaders than with him.
A modern English translation of the relevant passage for instance, is this:
Later the authority of the people of Ghana waned and their prestige declined as that of the veiled people, their neighbors on the north next to the land of Berbers, grew (as we have related). These extended their domination over the Sudan, and pillaged, imposed tribute (itawat) and poll-tax (jizya), and converted many of them to Islam. Then the authority of Ghana dwindled away and they were overcome by the Susu, a neighboring people of the Sudan, who subjugated and absorbed them.
Cooley’s own rendering of the same passage keeps the attention of the veiled people fixed more specifically on Ghana:
The people of Ghana declined in course of time, being overwhelmed or absorbed by the Molaththemun (or muffled people-that is, the Morabites), who, adjoining them on the north towards the Berber country, attacked them, and, taking possession of their territory, compelled them to embrace the Mohammedan religion. The people of Ghana, being invaded at a later period by the Susu, a nation of the Blacks in their neighbourhood, were exterminated, or mixed with other Black nations.
Masonen and Fisher proceed onto illustrate how the period of decolonization in Africa brought in new elements to the conquest hypothesis. It therefore seems that the conquest hypothesis was continuously shaped and modified by new developments and turn of events that filtered into the discourse of politics and philosophy in Europe. Whereas in the periods prior to moves towards relinquishing direct European colonial presence overseas, during which the conquest hypothesis had a firm footing without questioning or any serious challenge directed at it, in the 1960s a new attitude towards the same hypothesis starts to take shape, and it is one that is concerned with challenging the conventional wisdom of the conquest hypothesis, while not initially marginalizing this conventional wisdom in any considerable way. It is only when one gets into the 70s through to the 80s and 90s, does one begin to see challenges posed to the conventional wisdom that have the effect of making a dent in it, and hence, contributing to its marginalization in a serious way. By the mid-90s, the conventional wisdom had been effectively marginalized to a fringe status, but as Masonen and Fisher note, this is not merely attributable to change in the ideological and political climate that writers found themselves; see:
...the gradual and hidden infiltration of the various ideological elements—the identification of Almoravids with Tuaregs, the belief in nomadic superiority, racism, and the ambivalent image of Islam—into the body of research was possible because of the methodological decline of African historiography during the colonial period. The widely-accepted concept that Africa had no history of its own did not mean that interest in the African past completely ceased; it meant that African historiography was dominated, not by academic scholars (such as Cooley and Barth), but by ethnographers, self-taught amateurs, and colonial officers who often worked without any training for proper historical research and were thus more open to the ideological tendencies of their own age, and whose purpose was, after all, to serve the interests of colonial rule.
..But the early 1960s also meant great ideological changes in African historiography in general, as decolonization forced Europeans to change their attitudes towards Africans. The old undervaluation was no longer acceptable, nor was the idea that all progress and change in the African past had been caused by northern invaders. And, finally, we should not forget contemporary methodological development, as African historiography became a respected academic discipline not only in the former metropolitan countries, but also in the former colonies, which were eager to create for themselves a historical identity.
And in closing here with citing Masonen and Fisher, we have:
..It is, we confess, very hard to accept that the changed perception, in the specific cases with which we are concerned (was there an Almoravid conquest of Ghana? and if not, where did the notion come from?), is merely a result of evolving ideology. We believe rather that it is an expression of the methodological progress which has greatly accelerated in the historiography of Africa from the early 1960s, and which is now leading to a new situation in African historical research, with emancipation from the burden of colonial tradition. What is needed is to re-examine early West African history from the very beginning, not by picking out only such evidence as corresponds with the beliefs we have inherited from earlier researchers and which we consider justified as such since it has been repeated for a century, or as corresponds with the attitudes of our time towards the African past; but by using all the sources we have available to us now, textual and otherwise, and by interpreting them without any fixed presuppositions. In this task, we must, if necessary, dare to challenge all the previous hypothesis, even if they have been sanctified by time and repetition.
Yes, change in ideological atmosphere was accommodated by change in research methodology; methodological progress was possible, as the authors above put it, by the release of earlier constraints put on it by "colonial tradition". Furthermore, research is now largely conducted by personalities who have the appropriate credentials, and not left to just ideological sects, amateurs, or mouth pieces of colonial expansionism who are more prone to the "ideological tendencies of their own age".
So this is the bottom line:
...there is no direct evidence for any conquest, still less a violent and destructive conquest, of Ghana by the Almoravids. The conquest hypothesis is a European creation.
Why was this elaborate citation and analysis necessary, surrounding the conquest hypothesis of Ghana? Firstly, Masonen and Fisher's work was well placed for this task, because it provided a rather comprehensive look at a good deal of earlier researchers who contributed to and supported the conquest hypothesis, along with later ones who raised doubts and/or challenged the once held conventional wisdom in European historiographical discourse of Africa. This was done with extensive references and analysis thereof. As we have learned through excerpts of this work, by ignoring the events surrounding the Ghanaian complex and the conquest hypothesis that plagued it for years, one is setting up oneself to being prone to the sort of ideological tendencies that have been ascribed to the Arabicentric and Eurocentric ideological concerns, which by extension taint the origins and the creative legacy of ancient Mali, as we've seen with several examples already. For instance, elements of the mentioned ideologues are predisposed to asking why ancient Malian residents adopted Islam and wrote in Arabic scripture, when they could very well have simply stuck to their very own home-grown counterparts. This sort of question is one that can of course be avoided, if the history of when and how Islam gained footing in Western Sudan took place in the first place, which apparently predates the emergence of the Malian complex in the region. Against this backdrop, it would have been understood that ancient Mali was serving as an outgrowth of the events that were taking place prior to its prominence in the region. Had the issues surrounding when and how acculturation in Ghana towards adopting Islam took off were sufficiently understood by them (ideologues), it would have occurred to elements of the aforementioned ideologues that the adoption of Islam does not herald the beginning of "civilization" in the region by any stretch of the imagination, and all the essential characteristics that are generally associated with the term. Ancient Ghana was politically prominent in the region as a centralized polity considerably long before any embrace of Islam gained ground, let alone the use of Arabic as a lingua franca, and it was wealthy even by the accounts of foreign witnesses. Ghana owed its wealth and growth to the preexisting gold trade with their coastal north African partners, which north African converts to Islam (rather than Arabian peninsula Arabs themselves) would later take advantage of, in addition to intra-western Sudanese trade. This sort of thing does not come about in some unorganized social setting, unbounded by law and order. The Ghanaians were apparently skillful in trade and geopolitical dealings with their rivals and business partners, and had the necessary checks and balances in place to keep internal order within the complex tributary system that made up the kingdom, as well as to secure national sovereignty, all of which in the end is what got them the political prominence that they enjoyed for years upon years before they declined. With such a complex tributary system united by a central administration, surely common sense elicits that there would have been necessary measures to keep an official tab on or record-keeping of productivity in each local, along with the slice of that which had to be turned over to the central administration. As a reminder, Ghana is itself preceded by a number of social organizations in the region; but from listening to Arab dogmatists speak of how ancient Malian adoption of Arabic as a regional lingua franca signals how much the complex owes its greatness—if not creation—to Arabs, one gets the impression that such a development was necessarily preceded by lack of order, social organization, commerce or trade, or urbanization, let alone political consolidation. It elicits the idea that without the Arab role as "goodwill teachers" sent out to teach a bunch of helpless primitive and disorganized "Negroes" of al-Sudan, about the trade of nation-building, a feat like ancient Mali could not have been pulled off by the "Negroes" of western Sudan on their own. Yet all facets of evidence points no role whatsoever on the part of "Arabs", let alone presence, in the lead up to the Mande-oriented Malian movement assuming power and gaining regional prominence, and subsequently onto earning international recognition; it was, quite simply, entirely the handy work from within, of those very "Negroes" just mentioned. It was the culmination of the power struggle that ensued, after the final demise of Ghana by a group that the contemporary texts of the time referred to as the Susu. The Arab ideologues mentioned here, however, want intelligent people to abandon reasoning and dismiss all this, and simply hand them the credit—"them" here, being a reference to "Arabs" as essentially a caste. Henceforth, Arab ideological cultism is no less damaging than the European colonial examples covered here. In fact, if one were to take an earlier citation here, and modify it a little bit, one would be able to sum up their ideological mindset, which quite frankly, is virtually indistinguishable from European colonial mindset:
Here is an earlier excerpt...
Thus conversion to Islam meant a step up on the ladder of progress: from oracy to literacy, from superstition to monotheism. In this context, the Almoravid conquest of Ghana could be seen as a civilizing act, painful but necessary, giving birth to the sophisticated Islamic civilization in Western Sudan which was admired by men like Delafosse and many other French colonial administrators.
Merely replace "Almoravid" above with "Arab", and there, we get the gist of the Arab diffusion ideological mindset!
In summing up this segment of the topic, here is the deal: Available pointers suggest that in the 11th century Ghana was on the decline; conversely, the newly emerged Almoravid movement of staunchly devout Muslim-followers was beginning to consolidate its influence in the region In its heyday, it would have been a considerable undertaking to bring that complex (Ghana) to its knees. But even in the periods during which the Almoravid (al-Murabitun) movement was just fomenting its political consolidation in the Maghreb (from al-Maghribi, general Arabic reference to Western Africa, of which bilad al-Sudan and bilad al-Barbar were sub-regional entities), only certain segments of Ghanaian society embraced the religion. Eager to not let the advantages of the trans-Saharan trade network slip by and in the face of Almoravid expansions gaining momentum, it only seemed natural for several Sudanic rulers [elements of which could have had a tributary relationship to the Ghanaian capital or seat of rule at some point or another] to expediently embrace Islam, and forge strong political relationships with this rising Muslim element in the region through the sectarian acculturation. This process had already been set into motion by the time ancient Mali came to prominence in the region, thereby eclipsing whatever remained of ancient Ghana. Therefore, it is no mystery as to why ancient Malian ruling elites embraced Islam from the very onset. Arabic in this period, was to be the lingua franca that facilitated trade and geopolitical ties between the Sudanic complexes and the coastal Maghrebian ones, and also as an anchor for inter-ethnic cohesion internally within the Malian complex. Internal stability is as much a prescription to political success, as is accumulation of wealth through trade. The Malian rulers had a handle on both, giving way to regional political consolidation and prosperity. This prosperity went along with a the growth of its intelligentsia base, as it happens in any other place of the world where economic and political growth is experienced. It is against this backdrop that Timbuktu, being well placed in the trade routes, blossomed into a cosmopolitan learning center.
The use of Arabic as a lingua franca in ancient Mali is of happenstance, for had their coastal north African trade partners not used that language, and instead used another form, then ancient Malians would more than likely not have used it as well. It was a matter of political expediency, that Arabic was adopted, not to replace indigenous languages of course, but for official purposes for reasons already stated above. The complexities of world dealings and what political expediency means are apparently matters that Arab diffusionist ideologues, like almost any cult group, are oblivious to.
With that said, we come to another school of Arabic diffusionist dogma; one that revolves around Islamic and other legends of African societies, cloaked with certain degree of mythology. This will be continued in the 3rd segment of this topic. Go here.
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