Crania: Behind the "Generalized Modern human pattern" ...

Within 'Medi-centrist' circles, ideologues have sought psychological refuge in this anthropological catchword, in relation to cranial morphology; however, what is this term really a code word for? Well, let's examine from the language of a few anthropological publications, what this really boils down to...

The reactionary and outdated anthropological work of Colin Groves naturally comes to mind immediately:

...The implications of the Herto find for modern human origins are clear. Here were H. sapiens, more primitive than anyone now living but recognizably members of our own species, living in north-eastern Africa at a time when the Neanderthal people were in sole occupation of Europe. Even later than Herto, the only people for whom we have evidence were still non-modern - an enigmatic Neanderthal-like skull from Maba in China, and late H. erectus in Java. Just as predicted by the Out-of-Africa model, modern humans appear in Africa long before they are known from anywhere else.

There are implications for the origins of modern races, too. Herto (and Jebel Irhoud) are H. sapiens, but with primitive features. They are not, racially speaking, Africans. The later Omo and Klasies remains are more modern, but they too are archaic, and certainly show no traces of the features that characterize any modern races. Only Qafzeh and Skhul seem to lack these primitive features, and rate as “generalised modern humans”.

Our species seems to have existed as an entity long, long before it began to spread outside Africa or the Middle East, let alone split into geographic races.

When, then, did H. sapiens begin to split into races? The evidence indicates that modern racial features developed only gradually in each geographic area. The earliest H. sapiens specimen outside the Africa/Levant region is from Liujiang in China, whose dating was recently confirmed at 67,000 BP by a group led by Guanjun Shen of Nanjing Normal University. Like Qafzeh and Skhul, Liujiang is a “generalized modern”; it has no Mongoloid features.

The East Asian fossil record is not good enough to show when Mongoloid features began to develop. All we can say is that they must have developed before the end of the Pleistocene (12,000 BP) because this is when people began to cross what is now the Bering Strait (which was then a land-bridge); and Native Americans are Mongoloid.

H. sapiens began to enter Europe about 40,000 BP, but it is only at 28,000 BP that we get a fossil that shows any Caucasoid features - the Old Man from Cro-Magnon, in France.

Within the African homeland, the appearance of Negroid features is debatable. The skull from Border Cave, on the South Africa/Swaziland border, may be 60,000 years old and may show Negroid features, but both claims have been challenged.

And Australia? The earliest widely accepted dates for human occupation are of the order of 60,000 BP, not more, according to Bert Roberts of La Trobe University and the late Rhys Jones of the Australian National University. The claim that the Mungo Man skeleton is 62,000 BP has recently been challenged. According to a recent study led by Jim Bowler of Melbourne University, both Mungo Man and Mungo Woman may be only 40,000 years old (AS, April 2003, pp.18-21), but they are still the earliest skeletal remains we have from Australia. Are they Australoid?

Of all “major races”, Australoids have evidently changed least from the generalized modern human pattern, but the flat, receding forehead and angular skull vault that characterise many full-blooded Aboriginal people today are somewhat different to the Qafzeh/Skhul pattern. A 1999 study by Susan Antón and Karen Weinstein of the University of Florida, in the process of confirming that some of the Australian fossils (including most of the famous Kow Swamp series) had undergone artificial head deformation in infancy, found unexpectedly that most of the Pleistocene fossil Australian crania are rounder-skulled than modern ones. So racial features developed late in this part of the world, too.

In summary, the new discovery at Herto does not shatter any myths, but it extends the dataset, shifts the weight of evidence yet more decisively in favour of the Out-of-Africa model of modern human evolution, and helps to place modern racial variation very firmly into context.

Colin Groves is professor of archaeology and anthropology at the Australian National University.

© Control Publications 2003

Let's see what Groves says is not the "generalized modern human pattern":

— primitive features

...which Grove observes, is a feature of the Herto, the Omo and Klasies specimens; and to drive this point, Grove tells us that: The later Omo and Klasies remains are more modern, but they too are archaic, and certainly show no traces of the features that characterize any modern races.

Apparently, bespeaking of the outdatedness of his viewpoint, the Omo specimens that Grove deems more modern, are actually much older than the Herto specimen — that is, outside the fallacy of "human races".

What else is not generalized modern, according to Groves?

— Mongoloid features

...on which we are clued in, here: Like Qafzeh and Skhul, Liujiang is a “generalized modern”; it has no Mongoloid features.

What else?

— Caucasoid features

And we know this, because Groves tells us that: it is only at 28,000 BP that we get a fossil that shows any Caucasoid features - the Old Man from Cro-Magnon, in France.

Mind you, this would be the same "Caucasoid" Cro-Magnons that Chris Stringer tells us: more like present-day Australians or Africans, judged by objective anatomical categorizations, as is the case with some early modern skulls from the Upper Cave at Zhoukoudian in China

And with regards to which, Brace says: oft-repeated European feeling that the Cro-Magnons are “us” (46) is more a product of anthropological folklore than the result of the metric data available from the skeletal remains

We are also clued in that generalized modern isn't exactly....

— modern racial features...either!

Yeap, you probably guessed it; he implies this to us, right here: When, then, did H. sapiens begin to split into races? The evidence indicates that modern racial features developed only gradually in each geographic area.

Yet even by Groves' own rationale, although he turns around and simply says that it has been challenged, the so-called 'Negroid' trait preceded the so-called Caucasoid:

Within the African homeland, the appearance of Negroid features is debatable. The skull from Border Cave, on the South Africa/Swaziland border, may be 60,000 years old and may show Negroid features, but both claims have been challenged.

For if the said 'Negroid' features are attested to 60 ky ago, then that would apparently predate the questionable appearance of the so-called 'Caucasoid' features at ca. 28 Ky ago among the discredited "Caucasoid Cro-Magnons" , wouldn't it?!

But perhaps the most instructive piece of Groves' racialist discourse, is this:

Of all “major races”, Australoids have evidently changed least from the generalized modern human pattern, but the flat, receding forehead and angular skull vault that characterise many full-blooded Aboriginal people today are somewhat different to the Qafzeh/Skhul pattern.

It doesn't take much of a stretch of the imagination to see that Australian aborigines are tropically-derived peoples, with considerable skin eumelanin, placing them well within the range of skin pigmentations found across 'sub-Saharan' Africans. In popular language, we all know the latter are known as "blacks". Indeed, Groves' ability to see closer phenotypic link between Australian aborigines and Upper Paleolithic "Eurasian" specimens of Qafzeh/Skhul and Australia, is consistent with the aforementioned Chris Stringer et al.'s assessment:

"Nor does the picture get any clearer when we move on to the Cro-Magnons, the presumed ancestors of Modern Europeans. Some were more like present-day Australians or Africans, judged by objective anatomical categorizations, as is the case with some early modern skulls from the Upper Cave at Zhoukoudian in China

Source: African Exodus: The Origins of Modern Humanity by Christopher Stringer and Robin McKie, Page 162

Stringer et al.'s observation is yet consistent with that of Neves et al. 2005:

"Increasing skeletal evidence from the U.S.A., Mexico, Colombia, and Brazil strongly suggests that the first settlers in the Americas had a cranial morphology distinct from that displayed by most late and modern Native Americans. The Paleoamerican morphological pattern is more generalized and can be seen **today** among **Africans, Australians, and Melanesians.**

Here, we present the results of a comparative morphological assessment of a late Paleoindian/early archaic specimen from Capelinha Burial II, southern Brazil. The Capelinha skull was compared with samples of four Paleoindian groups from South and Central America and worldwide modern groups from W.W. Howells' studies.

In **both analyses** performed (classical morphometrics and geometric morphometrics), the results show a clear association between Capelinha Burial II and the Paleoindians, as well as Australians, Melanesians, and Africans, confirming its Paleoamerican status."

Reminiscent of Groves' distancing of the generalized cranial morphology from the so-called 'Mongoloid pattern', Neves et al. tells us:

The increasing evidence that all late Pleistocene/ early Holocene human groups from South America are characteristically non-Mongoloid has major implications for the colonization of the Americas, as argued by one of us (WAN) since the end of the 1980s. Even if few studies with large samples from single sites have been carried out so far with Paleoindians (see Neves et al., 2003, 2004, as examples of these studies), it is evident by now that South America Central America and possibly North America, were populated by human groups with a more generalized cranial morphology before the arrival of the Mongoloids.

Like Stringer, they too see the generalized pattern as that akin to that seen in cranial morphology of tropical adapted groups like Australians, Melanesians and Africans:

— Since this more generalized morphology (‘‘Australo-Melanesian- like’’) was also present in East Asia at the end of the Pleistocene, transoceanic migrations are not necessary to explain our findings.

— As presented in detail elsewhere (Neves et al., 2003) the arrival of an ‘‘Australo-Melanesian-like’’ population in the Americas is easily accommodated under what is presently known about the place of origin and the routes taken by modern humans in their first long-distance dispersions (Lahr and Foley, 1998).

What Neves et al. tells us next, pretty much sums up why Upper Paleolithic African specimens show affinities with Upper Paleolithic 'Eurasians', as well as Paleo-Indians:

1) Accordingly, a population that began to expand from Africa around 70 ka reached southeast Asia by the middle of the late Pleistocene, carrying with it a cranial morphology characterized by long, narrow neurocrania and narrow, projecting faces.

2) We postulate that after reaching southeast Asia, this stem population gave rise to at least two different dispersions.

— 50 Ky ago
One took a southward direction and arrived at Australia around 50 Ka.

— Between 50 and 20 Ky ago
Sometime between 50 and 20 Ka a second branch dispersed towards the north, and arrived in the Americas by the end of the Pleistocene, bringing with it the same cranial morphology that characterized the first modern humans.

Neves et al.'s observations are apparently valid, and appears to be the consensus scientific finding, but even they fall victim to "idealized" typological constructs [as indicated by the need to refer to the term "Mongoloid" at all] — although to a much lesser degree than Groves — and it serves one to understand that when they speak of stronger phenotypic associations between Paleo-Indians and Paleo-Eurasians and contemporary dark-skinned tropically-adapted/derived groups like aboriginal Australians, Melanesians and Africans than other contemporary groups, that with regards to Africans, the comparison is being made with view to only a snapshot of African diversity. Take for instance, the following Neves et al. characterizations of the Paleo-Indian source populations:

Recap — Accordingly, a population that began to expand from Africa around 70 ka reached southeast Asia by the middle of the late Pleistocene, carrying with it a cranial morphology characterized by long, narrow neurocrania and narrow, projecting faces.

And then this — When the classical Mongoloid cranial morphology appeared in northeastern Asia, either as a local response to extreme environmental conditions, or as the product of a migration from northern Europe, a new expansion of northern Asians reached the New World, bringing with it a cranial morphology characterized by short, wide neurocrania and broad, retracted faces.

Although local microevolutionary processes in the Americas can not be precluded to explain the transition from a generalized to a very specialized cranial morphology (Powell and Neves, 1999), a model based on the entrance of two different morphological patterns from the Old World is much more parsimonious.

The two patterns are further described as follows...

The three different quantitative analyses undertaken in this study demonstrate that the first South Americans exhibit a cranial morphology that is:

1 — very different from late and modern Northeastern Asians and Amerindians (short and wide neurocrania; high, orthognatic faces; and relatively high and narrow orbits and noses)

2 — but very similar to present Australians/Melanesians and Africans, especially with the former (narrow and long neurocrania; prognatic, low faces; and relatively low and broad orbits and noses).

Source: Neves et al. 2005; Cranial morphology of early Americans from Lagoa Santa, Brazil: Implications for the settlement of the New World.

Clearly, the cranial patterns described in association with the Australian/Melanesian and African groups is only a snapshot of the actual overall diversity of Africans; the combination of traits described above is often invoked in what one might refer to as 'stereotypical Negro" — or as it has been referred to elsewhere — as "forest Negro". Certainly, these traits do not cover the full range of cranio-facial patterns observed across sub-Saharan Africans and Africans as a whole; they are just subsets of the said variation.

Revisiting that last 2nd point: 2 — but very similar to present Australians/Melanesians and Africans, especially with the former (narrow and long neurocrania; prognatic, low faces; and relatively low and broad orbits and noses).

It should be obvious from the above, that showing stronger phenotypic affinities with the above mentioned groups — Australians, Melanesians, and Africans, that this doesn't mean the said three groups show no inter-group differences; apparently, there are discernible phenotypic manifestations between them, with contemporary Australians and Melanesians perhaps showing somewhat stronger links to the aforementioned Paleolithic specimens than contemporary Africans, but relatively smaller distances between the three contemporaries and the Paleolithic specimens, than the case may be with other groups; this brings us to the:

Conclusion: Stronger phenotypic associations are observed between the modern tropically-adapted/derived groups like Australians, Melanesians and Africans and Paleolithic groups of Africa, Eurasia and America, because original modern humans were tropically-adapted Africans, who sported considerable skin pigmentation — that is to say, "blacks". Therefore, the 'generalized modern' is nothing more than a code word or just another euphemism for a variant(s) of the [naturally, dark-skinned] tropical African, otherwise also called "black African". This applies to their tropically-adapted Paleolithic descendant populations in the Levant, SouthAsia, Europe, and the Americas. The generalized moderns represent part of the then existing overall variation of tropical Africans, just as the "stereotyped" or "idealized" sub-Saharan African archetype constitutes just a part of overall phenotypic diversity of Saharo-Sub-Saharan Africa.

Ps — Some Eurocentric ideologues, as exemplified in Groves' work, unable to psychologically come to grips with their ultimate derivation from dark-skinned [tropical] African ancestors, conjure up pseudo-scientific "racialist" or typological discourse wherein they seek to mystify the fact by hiding behind code terms like "generalized modern", even if it means contradicting themselves in the process — again as Groves did — and overlooking it. For instance, from Groves, one almost gets the sense that he tries too hard to make a case that the generalized modern is a type which is spared so-called archaic features, yet distinctive from 'contemporary' populations which he divides and classifies into rigid types, while at the same time, acknowledging a relatively stronger association with the contemporary likes of aboriginal Australians. It doesn't take a genius to figure out that aboriginal Australians are considerably dark skinned peoples, whom like other tropical-affiliated groups like Melanesians, are in certain ways reminiscent of their dark skinned African brethren, not to mention sporting strong morphological affinities with both Paleo-'Eurasians' and Paleo-Africans, because they all emanate from autochthonous dark skin ancestral populations of tropical Africa — a fact which is relayed through cephalo-morphometric study, as just examined, and molecular genetics — wherein relatively deeper monophyletic units or markers are attested to in these groups [especially Africans] than those observed in their counterparts elsewhere!
____________________________________________________
*References:

— Colin Groves 2003

—Neves et al. 2005; A new early Holocene human skeleton from Brazil: implications for the settlement of the New World.

—Neves et al. 2005; Cranial morphology of early Americans from Lagoa Santa, Brazil: Implications for the settlement of the New World.

—Christopher Stringer and Robin McKie, African Exodus: The Origins of Modern Humanity.

— Brace et al. 2005, The questionable contribution of the Neolithic and the Bronze Age to European craniofacial form. Neat little link (clickable) to a discussion on the draft of the this paper before it went into publication!

Urbanization in the African Horn was the outcome of autochthonous social processes, or was it?

Though a minority clique, there are a few who attribute the Aksumite complex and urbanization in the African Horn to migrants from the Arabian peninsula, rather than a long history of social processes leading to development of distinctive urban centers at different time frames, influenced by both local processes and prevailing environmental and/or external socio-political pressures or influences. Is this so? Researcher Fattovich is quite clear enough by himself, in his layout of urbanization development in the African Horn, in what would eventually become part of the territorial sphere of the modern state of Ethiopia, and so, the present author simply allow the man speak for himself, and then draw the conclusion from the chronological layout:

A relatively elaborate layout from Pre-Aksumite to the Aksumite phases - starting with the Pre-Aksumite phase:

c. 1000–800/700 BC

The Early pre-Aksumite Phase (c. 1000–800/700 BC). In this phase, the pre-Aksumite cultural area was apparently divided into two regions: (a) central Eritrea and northern Tigray and (b) western Tigray. They probably reflected a cultural division of the plateau going back to late prehistoric times (see Fattovich 1988). It is possible that chiefdoms already existe (Schneider 1976), but no safe archaeological evidence of them is yet available. The people of western Tigray who were definitely in contact with the southern Arabians worked iron, as we can infer from slag found at Gobedra rock shelter near Aksum (see Phillipson 1977; Fattovich 1980; Fattovich 1990c). The late ‘Jebel Mokram Group’ people in the lowlands were in contact with those of western Tigray (Fig. 5).

c. 700/600–300 BC

The Middle pre-Aksumite Phase (c. 700/600–300 BC). The kingdom of Da’amat appeared in this phase. Its territory stretched from western Tigray to central Eritrea. Most likely, the capital was located at Yeha (western Tigray) and monumental and epigraphical evidence stresses a direct link with the kingdom of Saba in southern Arabia. Some rock inscriptions recorded in Eritrea point to contacts with other south Arabian peoples and there were also contacts with the Nubian kingdom of Kush, the Achemenian Empire, and the Greek world. The nomads living in the Atbara and Gash alluvial plains were included in the area of Ethiopian influence (Fig. 6; Drewes 1962; de Contenson 1981; Anfray 1990; Fattovich1990c).

c. 300 BC–100 BC/AD 100

The Late pre-Aksumite Phase (c. 300 BC–100 BC/AD 100). In this phase, the kingdom of Da’amat collapsed, but petty kingdoms probably survived on the plateau. The pre-Aksumite cultural area was again divided into two main regions as in the early phase, and the northern plateau (Rore region) was included in the eastern cultural area. The southern Arabian influence practically disappeared and local traditions emerged again in this phase (Fig. 7;Conti Rossini 1928; Anfray 1968; Fattovich 1979; Anfray 1990; Fattovich 1990c).

c. AD 400–700

The Middle Aksumite Phase (c. AD 400–700). This phase corresponds to the period of major expansion of the kingdom. The western and eastern plateau shared the same material culture, except for some slight differences in the pottery. Coinage was widely used. Churches were widely scattered over the territory of the kingdom. Syrian influences can be recognized in the architecture of this period (Anfray 1972; Anfray 1974; Anfray 1981; Anfray 1990).

c. 700–900 AD

The Late Aksumite Phase (c. 700–900 AD). This phase corresponds to the decline of the kingdom. Coinage was probably no more in use and some important towns, such as Matara and Adulis, were apparently abandoned. Aksum was quite reduced in size (Anfray 1974;Anfray 1990; Michels 1990; Munro-Hay 1991).


The development of urbanism up to medieval times in the northern Horn of Africa can be divided into three main stages. They correspond to different phases of state formation in the region: 

Fattovich continues...

• The proto-Urban Stage (third–second millennia BC), represented by the ‘Gash Group’ in the lowlands and perhaps the ‘Ona Group A’ on the eastern plateau. It corresponds to the rise of chiefdoms in the region.
  

• The Early Urban Stage (first millennium BC), represented by the pre-Aksumite culture in Eritrea and Tigray. It corresponds to the development of the Sabean-like kingdom of Da’amat on the plateau.
  

• The Mature Urban Stage (first millennium AD), represented by the Aksumite culture on the plateau. It corresponds to the development of the kingdom of Aksum.
  

-----

Any interpretation of the development of urbanism in the northern Horn of Africa is still speculative. In my opinion, however, some factors affecting this process can be identified. The main factor was probably the progressive inclusion of the region in the interchange circuit between the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean countries. This gave rise to chiefdoms and states since the mid-third millennium BC. In particular, the south Arabian expansion in the late second to early first millennia BC, stimulated the emergence of a state on the plateau. In turn, large residential settlements arose in strategic positions to control the local resources and traderoutes. Eventually, they were the major markets in the local exchange network, as well. On the contrary, the Arab political and commercial activity in northeast Africa at the end of the first millennium AD, caused the progressive isolation of the plateau. This probably affected the collapse of urbanism in late Aksumite times.

The development of complex societies and states improved the agricultural production to sustain more nucleated populations and specialized activities. This possibly caused the selection of more fertile areas as a location for the larger settlements within the range of areas suitable to control the local resources.

The improvement of agricultural production probably caused an increase in the ‘Gash Group’ population in the lowlands, and in the pre-Aksumite and Aksumite ones on the plateau. This increase could have generated a dispersal of the single populations to exploit other areas suitable for cultivation and grazing. In such a way new large settlements arose as markets and administrative centres in the peripheral regions. Political factors surely affected this process. The need to control the local resources and trade routes most likely stimulated the territorial expansion of the pre-Aksumite and Aksumite states. This might have caused the disappearance of some residential settlements with political functions and the establishment of new administrative centres. Moreover, ideological factors connected with the legitimation of the elite might have affected the ceremonial function of the main settlements (e.g. Mahal Teglinos, Yeha, Aksum).

Environmental factors were less significant than the economic and cultural ones. The moister climate of the region in the mid first millennium BC to the mid first millennium AD probably facilitated the establishment of the ‘plough and cereal complex’ on the plateau. It is possible that the generally reduced rainfall in the seventh to tenth centuries AD, together with the progressive exhaustion of the soils and deforestation by human activity in Aksumite times, caused droughts and famines with consequent epidemics. They might have affected the progressive depopulation of the plateau, pushing the population to move southwards. Moreover, the sudden abandonment of Adulis and Matara in the eighth century AD might point to a catastrophic event.On the basis of the above, the following tentative explanation of the development of urbanism in the northern Horn can be suggested:

c.4000 BC

The inclusion of the ‘Butana Group’ people in an interchange circuit with predynastic Egyptian the fourth millennium BC, gave rise to a hierarchical society at the confluence of the Gash and the Atbara river. In turn, this stimulated the transition to cattle-breeding and cultivation of cereals, and the founding of large sedentary settlements.

c. late 4000 BC to early 3000 BC

In the late fourth to early third millennia BC, the Gash progressively shifted from the original confluence with the Atbara river into the present bed (see Sadr 1991). This opened a more direct route from the Nile valley to the Horn of Africa than the Atbara valley. The descendants of the ‘Butana Group’ people followed the shift of the river and settled in the present southern delta. In such a way they occupied a strategic position to control the land route to Nubia and Egypt. At the same time, they were able to exploit better the resources ofthe western lowlands during the seasonal movements from the Gash to the plateau (seeFattovich 1990d).

In the mid-third millennium BC, the ‘Gash Group’ people played a crucial role as intermediaries between Nubia and the regions of the Horn of Africa and southern Arabia. They were directly in contact with the kingdom of Kerma. This stressed the transition from a hierarchical society to a chiefdom and increased agricultural production. Mahal Teglinos was the residential centre of the elite and a crucial node in the trade network from Egypt and Nubia to the Horn and southern Arabia, becoming a proto-urban settlement.

In the early second millennium BC, the ‘Gash Group’ people spread through the western lowlands, as far as the Red Sea coast. Residential villages appeared in the middle Barka valley, along the way from Kassala to the plateau.

In the second half of the second millennium BC, the Red Sea become the main trade route from Egypt to the Horn and southern Arabia. This isolated the lowlands from the circuit, with a regression in social complexity and proto-urban settlements. An Afro-Arabian coastal interchange circuit arose. A port, possibly frequented by the Egyptians, appeared at Adulis. At the same time, the southern Arabians started their commercial activity northwards, along the land routes of western Arabia.

In the same period, the ‘Ona Group A’ people living on the plateau along the route from Kassala to Adulis become the intermediaries between the hinterland and the coast. It is possible that they also were in direct contact with Egypt. A complex society perhaps arose in the eastern plateau and a quite large settlement appeared at Sembel Cuscet.

By the late second millennium BC, the Egyptian trade with the southern regions was interrupted. This facilitated the south Arabian commercial expansion, with the rise of kingdoms in the region. The eastern Tigrean plateau was probably included in the Arab area of commercial activity. A residential settlement appeared at Matara.

In the early first millennium BC, the southern Arabians penetrated in the western Tigrean plateau, most likely to get a direct access to the resources of the western lowlands, particularly ivory. Quite soon the region was included in the area of political and commercial influence of the kingdom of Saba. The contacts with the Sabeans gave rise to the local kingdom of Da’amat. An urban society, reflecting the south Arabian pattern, appeared on the plateau. Yeha become a very important ceremonial centre and the possible residence of the kings. The agricultural production to sustain the new state was improved by the use of plough. The need to control the routes to the Red Sea caused the eastwards territorial expansion of the kingdom. Kaskasè become another important ceremonial centre. An urban settlement arose at Matara.

In the late first millennium BC, after the decline of the kingdom of Saba in southern Arabia, the kingdom of Da’amat collapsed. The plateau was probably divided into petty kingdoms, including Aksum. Towns seem to disappear in the western plateau. Yeha remained an important ceremonial centre, but much reduced in size. The eastern plateau was progressively included in the Greek-Roman trade circuit along the Red Sea. This probably enabled the local populations to maintain a form of urban society.

By the first century BC, the western Tigray was included, as well, in the Roman trade circuit. **Aksum** probably become a gateway in the trade with the hinterland. An urban settlement arose at this site since the first century AD. Initially, it was a ceremonial centre connected with the funerary cult of the elite ancestors.

In the second to third centuries AD, with the progressive conquest of the other petty kingdoms, Aksum become the dominant state on the plateau. The kingdom was at this time the main African commercial partner of the Roman empire along the Red Sea route. An urban society, reflecting a local pattern, arose again on the plateau and agricultural production was surely improved.

In the mid-first millennium AD, after the introduction of Christianity, the kingdom reached its maxim expansion. It was an important political and commercial partner of the Byzantine empire. The population increased remarkably and urbanism reached its peak.

By late first millennium AD

The increase in population and agricultural production probably caused the exhaustion of the soils and the deforestation. Rainfall also reduced, which might have caused droughts and famines, and the depopulation of the plateau in the late first millennium AD. At the same time, the Arab political and commercial expansion through northeast Africa and along the Red Sea isolated the kingdom from the main interchange circuits. The Christian kingdom survived, but its centre shifted southwards.

In the first half of the second millennium AD, towns apparently no longer existed on the Tigrean plateau, but a few Islamic ports, connected with the Arab commercial activity along the Red Sea, occurred along the coast. - ends - by Fattovich

In relation to the above,...

"researchers have been confronted with archeological indicators which suggest that its [D'mt's] relationship with the Sabean complex across the red sea, which was experiencing its golden age then, allowed the Sabean complex's good fortunes to spill over to D'mt. It has to be kept in mind that "having influenced" is not the same thing as "being responsible for the origins" of an entire cultural complex. Both regions on either side of the Red sea have influenced the other side at some point or another over the course of history." - by Mystery Solver

Conclusion - Present author's input: Urbanization processes, as relayed in the layout above, are largely the product of in situ social processes at different time frames, each impacted by the prevailing environmental and external socio-political influences or pressures specific to the times in question. Thus, social complexes like Da'amat, for example, should be viewed within the context of ongoing in situ urbanization in the area, impacted by the then existing trade-network environments of each development phase.

On different note, interesting, is the Aksumite architecture of the Stelae:

Between ~ 3rd & 4th century:

The stelae were carved mainly from solid blocks of nepheline syenite, a weather-resistant rock similar in appearance to granite, and are believed to have come from the quarries of Wuchate Golo several miles to the west of Aksum. After being cut from the rock walls there, they would have been dragged by organized manpower to the site of their installation, where finer carving awaited a few of the stelae. The impetus for this organizational effort appears to have been commemorative: there are many burials in this area and elaborate tombs are situated near the foremost group of the largest stelae. The wide variation in size and carving sophistication is most likely due to the varying degrees of social status and wealth of the deceased. Although the identities of the persons who sponsored them are not known, the tallest stelae probably commemorated royalty while smaller works were most likely commissioned by local elite. - Courtesy Metmuseum.org

An ancient African tradition; and possible ties to ancient "Sudanese" architectural traditions; from Stuart Munro-Hay:

Aksumite Domestic Architecture

...It is possible that the original inspiration for the design of the decorated stelae came from the South Arabian mud-brick multi-storey palaces familiar to the Aksumites from their involvements in that country, rather than from Ethiopian examples. On some of the Aksumite podia there could conceivably have been erected high tower-like structures of mud-brick around a wooden frame, such as that found at Mashgha in the Hadhramawt (Breton et al. 1980: pls. VIII, X) looking rather like the great stelae. But no evidence for such Yemeni-style buildings actually survives in Ethiopia, nor is there any archaeological indication there for mud-brick architecture. Alternatively, and more probably, the stelae could have been exaggerated designs based on the Aksumite palaces; and here there is archaeological support, since the structure called the `IW Building' partly cleared by the excavations of Neville Chittick (Munro-Hay 1989), included just such wood-reinforced walls.

…The origins of the stelae are very difficult to disentangle. Attributions of stelae in Ethiopia to the pre-Aksumite period, though customarily accepted (Munro-Hay 1989: 150), are not necessarily correct (Fattovich 1987: 47-8). A stele tradition appears nevertheless to have existed in the Sudanese-Ethiopian borderlands, and in parts of northern Ethiopia and Eritrea in pre-Aksumite times. Fattovich suggests, plausibly enough, that stelae belong to an ancient African tradition. In the case of the stelae at Kassala and at Aksum — despite the difference in time and the difference in the societies which erected them — he sees a similarity in several features. These include the suggestion that `the monoliths are not directly connected with specific burials' (Fattovich 1987: 63). However, this is questionable as far as the Aksum stelae are concerned, now that it has been possible to analyse the results of Chittick's work. Though it is not yet easy to identify tombs for all the stelae, it does seem that, at the Aksum cemeteries, wherever archaeological investigations have been possible there is a case for suggesting that stelae and tombs are directly associated. - S. Munro-Hay

Setting the record straight? With regards to Munro-Hay's reference to Fattovich, pertaining to the association of Aksumite Stelae with burials, the said attribution of the former to the latter had been contested elsewhere, and this is how it was followed up:

"The Aksumite culture emerged from local traditions, including partly the pre-Aksumite one. A typical feature of this culture was the large funerary stelae, up to 33 m high, probably deriving from the stelae marking the ‘Gash Group’ burial grounds, suggesting a cultural link with the late prehistorical chiefdoms of the lowlands (Fattovich 1987b; Fattovich 1988)." - R. Fattovich, 2002.

The present author's reaction to the above was: It is interesting that Fattovich should mention the above, in his publication of The development of urbanism in the northern Horn of Africa in ancient and medieval times, 2002, when Mr. Munro Hay has this to say about his work from 1987:

"Fattovich suggests, plausibly enough, that stelae belong to an ancient African tradition. In the case of the stelae at Kassala and at Aksum — despite the difference in time and the difference in the societies which erected them — he sees a similarity in several features. These include the suggestion that `the monoliths are not directly connected with specific burials' (Fattovich 1987: 63)..." - S. Munro-Hay, 1991.

Mr. Munro Hay does mention the date and page of the particular source he is supposedly referencing from, though unfortunately, the title of the particular Fattovich work had not been provided to the extent to which the present author is able to access the work [of Mr. Munro Hay]...which, seems to be a reasonable portion of the work in question (Aksum: An African Civilisation of Late Antiquity), i.e., as far one's understanding of the message being communicated goes. This aforementioned Munro Hay publication came out back in 1991. The 1987 Fattovich publications that Munro Hay's reference could possibly be taken from, are the following:

R. Fattovich: Remarks on the peopling of the northern Ethiopian-Sudanese borderland in ancient historical times, 1987a

R. Fattovich: Some Remarks on the Origins of the Aksumite Stelae’, 1987b

So Munro Hay's reference, if they were taken from either of the above mentioned publications, then those are the only two 1987 publications the present author was able to come across. So, the p63 of either work, might contain R. Fattovichs claim on "monoliths".

In any case, R. Fattovich has made his viewpoint clear in the aforementioned publication of the title, The development of urbanism in the northern Horn of Africa in ancient and medieval times, as of 2002! — Follow up ends.

Cranio-morphological Variation

Cranio-facial variation is perhaps the most overrated phenotypic aspect of human body in societies, aside from skin tone. Not surprising, considering that it is the most regularly exposed part of the body that noticeably sports considerable variation, and goes without saying, forms a biological basis around which an individual's unique identity is established. Socio-ethnic identification is secondary to individual identity in society. Such is the obviousness of cranio-facial variation that images of certain archetypes or "idealized" types have been implanted or socially conditioned in the minds of folks, as socio-ethnic identifiers; this took a particularly notorious turn from ca. 19th century within European bio-anthropological circles, wherein human populations were grouped into narrow rigid "idealized" types, which were usually also identified with major geographical locations. These were presented as non-overlapping types, as though the so-grouped human populations didn't sport intra-group and intra-population variation, and by extension, variation manifestation that is shared with groups outside a reference point group. Howells types rely on such typological groups, and which Forensic science has embraced via Fordisc 2.0. Recent studies have shown that such approach is considerably limited in its ability to account for intra-group variation, and hence, fails the test of classifying individuals of a given population to the correct population of origin, because an 'unknown' or a 'known' specimen may well cluster with individuals in not one but multiple populations. A study on Spanish cranial series ended up having the said specimens cluster all over the map, with individuals in the series clustering with a multitude of groups spanning continents.

"Variation in racial classification represents the lack of a Spanish sample within the FORDISC 2.0 database as well as the human variation inherent within them. Individual crania were classified according to the best fit with the existing samples of the database, but the samples clearly were inadequate to elucidate the specific geographical origin of the overall Spanish sample…some crania were classified into groups with no clear geographic or ancestral relationship with the Spanish sample…

The authors also agree that additional and more complete samples from different geographical regions and groups are needed to augment the existing databases."

"race classification of all individuals in this sample using the Forensic Data Bank option. Of the 95 individuals, 42 (44 percent) were classified as white, 35 percent as black, 9 percent as Hispanic, 4 percent as Japanese, 4 percent as American Indian, and the remaining three individuals as Chinese and Vietnamese" - Ubelaker et al., Application of Forensic Discriminant Functions to a Spanish Cranial Sample, 2002.

Williams et al. 2005 provided another example of this, when their examination of Meroitic cranial series showed that the series couldn't be classified into a single homogeneous entity, but rather, produced clusters with multiple series from distinct geographical regions. They say:

The Howells series. Fordisc 2.0 could not effectively classify ten of the crania, and of the remainder, eight were identified as Late Period Dynastic Egyptian, six as Zalavar, four as Easter Islander, three as Lake Alexandrina Tribes, and three as Norse (Medieval Norway). Eight were not significantly different from eight separate populations: Teita, Andaman Islands, Zulu, Arikara, Santa Cruz Island, Ainu, Hokkaido, and Atayal.

"The Howells series. Fordisc 2.0 could not effectively classify ten of the crania, and of the remainder, eight were identified as Late Period Dynastic Egyptian, six as Zalavar, four as Easter Islander, three as Lake Alexandrina Tribes, and three as Norse (Medieval Norway). Eight were not significantly different from eight separate populations: Teita, Andaman Islands, Zulu, Arikara, Santa Cruz Island, Ainu, Hokkaido, and Atayal."

“Fordisc 2.0 classified the Nubian crania with populations over an enormous geopraphic range, including North and Central Europe, Easter Island, the Andaman Islands, Japan, Taiwan, South Africa, Australia, and North America. “

“If Fordisc 2.0 is revealing genetic admixture of Late Period Dynastic Egypt and Meroitic Nubia, then one must also consider these ancient Meroitic Nubians to be part of Hungarian, part Easter Islander, part Norse, and part Australian Aborigine, with smaller contributions from the Ainu, Teita, Zulu, Santa Cruz, Andaman Islands, Arikara, Ayatal, and Hokkaido populations. In fact, all human groups are essentially heterogeneous, including samples within Fordisc 2.0. Using Fst heritability tests, Relethford (1994) demonstrated that Howells’s cranial samples exhibit far more variation within than between skeletal series. There is no reason to assume that the heterogeneity of the Late Period Dynastic Egyptian population exceeds that characterizing our Nubian sample. This heterogeneity may also characterize the populations in the Forensic Data Bank; Fordisc 2.0 classified the Meroitic Nubians not as either all black or all white but as black, white, Hispanic, Chinese, Japanese, and Native American.”

“We suggest that skeletal specimens or samples cannot be accurately classified by geography or by racial affinity because of (1) the wide variation in crania of the known series that crosscuts geographic populations (polymorphism), (2) the clinal pattern of human variation, and (3) cultural and environmental factors. Even a presumably homogeneous population such as the Meroitic Nubians shows extensive variation that preclude its classification as a geographic group.”

Apparently multiple variables go into shaping variations in human crano-facial development. Williams et al. put this simply, when they say:

“Finally, the assumption that cranial form is an immutable “racial” character is very likely to be false, given the diversity of studies of immigrants and the known effects of food preparation and masticatory stress upon cranial form. Cranial form, like other aspects of the body, is a phenotype partly determined by heredity but also strongly influenced by the conditions of life.”

As far as the "conditions of life" is concerned, "acclimatization" is one notable factor. Michael A. Little and Jere D. Haas summarize it, when they say:

“there is a recognition of the importance of the process of acclimatization. Acclimatization is defined as a biological response to repeated exposure to a climatic stressor (Prosser 1964). It is an expression of the genetic plasticity of the population, and with acclimatization, it is assumed that an adaptive response can occur without genetic change. Three forms of physiological acclimatization have been recognized: (1) simple, reversible acclimatization-a physiological response to a stressful environment that gradually disappears at the cessation of the stress; (2)irreversible acclimatization—acquired as a result of climatic stress but remaining after the stress is removed; and (3) developmental acclimatization— much like irreversible acclimatization except that the exposure must occur at a particular time during the growth process. Until the process of acclimatization was appreciated and its varieties identified much inter-operation variation was attributed to genetic difference. Attempting to define the limits of acclimatization has become as important as defining the underlying genetic basis of adaptation. Indeed it is only after acclimatization is accounted for that genetic adaptations can be identified.

A third manner by which contemporary studies of climatic adaptation differ from earlier efforts is through an appreciation of the role of culture (Baker 1960). Anthropologists since the time of Darwin have played lip service to cultural factors using such generalities as “sexual selection” and “cultural selection.” But it is only with recent empirical studies that cultural mechanisms are being identified and quantified. These have shown that culture is a buffer that modifies rather than eliminates climatic exposure (Wulson 1949, Planalp 1971, Little and Hanna 1978).” - Courtesy of Michael A. Little and Jere D. Haas—Human Population Biology: A Transdisciplinary Science, 1989.

From the genetic standpoint, it is generally known that when only a small segment of a larger population diverges and then locates elsewhere to assume the role as a founder group, the likelihood of loss of diversity is a strong possibility that goes along with it. Hence, pronounced reduction of diversity characterizing the newly-divergent offshoot group allows the distribution of certain traits to figure more prominently than the case would be in the parent population, and alternatively, other traits die out more dramatically. The result of such development, has been invoked in marked departure of offshoot founder groups from their ancestral population. As Little & Haas note, cultural behavior patterns chime in to "modify" these variations. Hence, putting acclimatization effects aside [not to leave out natural selection in the complex mix of factors], on one hand, certain variations brought upon by genetic mutation can be quite dramatic secondary to random genetic drift, wherein certain variations are magnified while others not so much; on another hand, cultural behavior patterns, which can be exemplified in "sexual selection" tendencies, factor in and contribute further to the sustenance and prevalence of certain elements of the overall variation over other elements, and hence, lending hand in certain intra-population morphological tendencies.

*Subject to modification upon new information without notice.
________________________________________________________
*References

—Ubelaker et al., Application of Forensic Discriminant Functions to a Spanish Cranial Sample, 2002

—Williams et al. 2005, Forensic Misclassification of Ancient Nubian Crania: Implications for Assumptions about Human Variation.

—Michael A. Little and Jere D. Haas—Human Population Biology: A Transdisciplinary Science, 1989.

—Discussion link: Nile Valley discussion board.

U6: A standalone clade?

It is a lineage that spans west and east Africa, and spilling over to portions of southern Europe and "southwest Asia".

In looking at the following diagram...


For those with inadequate screen size, view the above image in full with: here

...it is apparent that at the least, U5 and U6 diverge into respective branches independent from that of the rest of U macro-haplogroup. Similar observation has been made about U1, which too, seems to have an independent branch from the rest of the U haplogroup. In other words, these three—either U1, U5 or U6—don't appear to have an ancestral clade within the main haplogroup U branch which is defined by the nucleotide transition at 1811 or vice versa. This is how it goes, courtesy of Maca-Meyer et al. 2003:

U6 is defined by two motifs represented by positions in the coding and HVR respectively: 3348 and 16172.

U5 is defined by the transitions at: 3197, 9477, 13617 and 16270.

And the rest of the U haplgroup [sans U1], defined by the mutation designated by position: 1811.

Maca-Meyer et al. add that:

U presents the following mutations with respect to rCRS: 73, 263, 311i, 750, 1438, 2706, 4769, 7028, 8860, 11467, 11719, 12308, 12372, 14766 and 15326. - Maca-Meyer et al. 2003

N macrohaplogroup is removed from the root of L3 by about 5 mutations, we are told. This is relevant, in that U haplogroup is often posited as having split from R, which derives from Haplogroup N. Speaking of haplogroup U splitting from R, we are told that this is the case via three mutations represented by: 11467, 12308 and 12372

Hence, the family association has been made between U6 [as is for U1 & U5] and the rest of the U haplogroup, primarily thanks to sharing of the above mentioned transition trio; if it weren't for these basic transitions, U6 would have likely just been considered as just another separate sub-branch of haplogroup R. Perhaps, if a clade was located—sharing the same transition trio but devoid of any known downstream coding or HVR mutations in either U6, U1 or U5 and the rest of haplogroup U, it could provide us with a possible candidate as the proto-U ancestor that gave rise to the divergent U branches in question. However, to date, no such lineage has come to light.

In their publication "The mtDNA Legacy of the Levantine Early Upper Palaeolithic in Africa" - 2006, Anna Olivieri et al.'s argument, like that of Gonzalez et al., depends on the idea that U6 entered Africa in a parallel dispersal with M1, which the present author has demonstrated elsewhere to be a weak hypothesis [see: Mitochondrial DNA M1 haplogroup: A Response To Ana M. Gonzalez et al. 2007]. M1 basal coding markers emerge from that of an African background, and the "missing-link" lineage of the M Macrohaplogroup was found in a sub-Saharan sample [specifically in a Senegalese sample].

Furthermore, Olivieri et al. 2006 themselves acknowledge:

An ancient arrival of M1 in Africa (or in its close proximity) is supported by the fact that none of the numerous M haplogroups in Asia (20, 21) harbors any of the distinguishing M1 root mutations, and by the lack of Asian-specific clades within M1 (and U6), as might be expected in the case of a more recent arrival. The arrival of M1 and U6 in Africa 40 to 45 ka would temporally overlap with the event(s) that led to the peopling of Europe by modern humans.

Not to mention...

Indeed, M1 and U6 in Africa are mostly restricted to Afro-Asiatic–speaking areas.

Why is that? Where did the Afrisan super language phylum emerge? Answer: East Africa.

And they say...

The hypothesis of a back-migration from Asia to Africa is also strongly supported by the current phylogeography of the Y chromosome variation, because haplogroup K2 and paragroup R1b*, both belonging to the otherwise Asiatic macrohaplogroup K, have been observed at high frequencies only in Africa (15, 16). However, because of the relatively low molecular resolution of the Y chromosome phylogeny as compared to that of the mtDNA, it was impossible to come to a firm conclusion about the precise timing of this dispersal (15, 16).

To which, elsewhere [see: R1*-M173 bearing chromosomes in Cameroon], I commented:

By the way, previous genetic research work made very enthusiastic attempts to correlate the likes of U6 and possible "Eurasian"-tagged mtDNA with R1*-M173, supposedly as an attempt to buttress a possible back-migration into Africa; all but failed, with results showing considerable African mtDNA gene pool instead, for populations bearing these chromosomes.

Not only is there lack of apparent parallelism between R1* paragroup distribution and those markers, as the authors seem to be so desperately yearning for, but also the paragroup is essentially absent in all Afrasan speaking groups but those in the Northeast African corner. The marker is even rarer in so-called Southwest Asia than it is in Africa.

Thus, the re-examination point:

— U6 with respect to U5 , or U6 with respect to U1, and U6 with respect to the rest of haplogroup U, doesn't share defining motifs, outside of the basic transitions, particularly at the aforementioned position trio.

— In relation to the above, U6 doesn't have a common recent ancestor that is a U5 sub-lineage or vice versa, U6 doesn't have a common recent ancestor that is a U1 sub-lineage or vice versa, nor does U6 have a common recent ancestor that is a U*(xU1, U5) sub-lineage or vice versa.

...brings us to the question of:

Could U6 then be a standalone clade, in that, short of the aforementioned basic mutations by which the U-designated lineages diverge from macro-haplogroup R — particularly at 11467, 12308 and 12372, it is essentially mutually-independent of the other U-designated lineages?

Simply put...

The relationship of U6 with other U haplogroups is only inferred from non-U subclade-specific basal markers.

U6 is a branch on its own, independent from other U groups, and proto-U6 has not been located to date.

Time will tell, as to whether much more improved resolution of mtDNA will bear out the possible candidate of the elusive proto-U6 ancestor, but until then, it would appear that the proto-U6 bearing population was quite small in size, such that proto-U6 itself would eventually be overwhelmed and essentially be erased by expansion of descendant U6 carriers and possibly, incursions from other populations. It is uncertain whether a proto-U6 ancestor would have been the very same ancestor that begot U1, U5 and U*(xU6,U1,U5) respectively elsewhere, or whether it would have been a single step or a few steps genetic-neighbor to those which begot the latter U groups, but it appears that the latter respective ancestors too were modestly represented 'population-wise', such that they too would have been overwhelmed by subsequent demographic expansions that gave rise to descendant populations and incoming groups from elsewhere. Whatever may be said about a proto-U6 ancestor's origin, one thing is clear: U6 itself is an autochthonous African marker, which would eventually spill over to parts of Europe, particularly those hugging the Mediterranean sea, and parts of "southwest Asia". It too, like M1 (clickable), has been implicated in the expansion of proto-Afrasan (aka proto-Afro-Asiatic) and/or Afrasan speakers outside of mainland Africa.
__________________________________________________________
*References:

— Maca-Meyer et al. 2003, Mitochondrial DNA transit between West Asia and North Africa inferred from U6 phylogeography.

Social Democracy for Africa? Part 4

Carried on from Part 3; also see: Part 1 and Part 2

Today, “Cold War-like” proxy battlegrounds are being prepared in Africa against emerging opportunistic bourgeois rivals from the East, notably China, to the big business interests of the major capitalist colonial economies. Earlier elsewhere (clickable), the present author said:

“With the growth of local industry through "protectionism" [and fueled by the Slave Trade, in the case of capitalist colonial economic powers], as was the case in the capitalist colonial economic powers, nations were able to develop sufficiently large home markets for their local industry, and only when they became large enough to compete globally, did governments relax "protectionism", but all the while doing everything possible to deter fledgling industries of the economically less advantaged nations from flourishing, by telling the governments of those nations to not resort to "protectionism" for the sake of "fair trade". The capitalist jargon for that concept is, “free-market trade”, wherein capitalist economic powers proceed to sell manufactured goods at competitive prices—facing virtually no trade barriers with the lifting of tariffs in the destination economies—and thereby crushing fledgling local industries therein, which are overwhelmed by unfettered stiff competition from bigger foreign corporations, while at the same time, buying cheap or free colonial-allocated land and exploiting abundant pool of “cheap” labor at what ultimately amounts to slave-labor wages. Variably, governments of those "less advantaged nations" of course cooperated accordingly, to the peril of their own economies—this seems to be the case for many economies in Africa.

Part of the reason [of the spineless compromise by ruling bourgeois African layers] had to do with military pressure from the capitalist colonial economic powers, and part of it had to do with debt-regime leveraging by those same colonial economic powers. When many of the formerly colonized regions of Africa got their so-called "independence", many of them also inherited debts incurred by their local colonial regimes. Moreover, as many sections of their societies were devastated by lack of social spending under colonial occupation, many of the "newly independent" African regimes had to borrow money, in many cases from the very same colonial regimes that they sought to free themselves from, for social reconstruction programs. As a result, many ended up incurring hefty debts, which former colonial regimes sought to exploit and use as economic leverage to place dictates on the "newly independent" and usually weak economies. The vehicles used to utilize debt-regimes as leverage, are the likes of IMF and World Bank. Political leverage was continued through the setting up of institutions like the United Nations, and the undemocratic and "permanent" membership of certain "wealthy" nations therein.”

Additionally, with respect to those debts, it is necessary to revisit how capitalist colonial economic powers begrudgingly gave out loans, and so-called financial assistance; In light of the Cold War, Ann Talbot spells it out:

“In this situation [Cold War environment] they realised that they must rely on the Pan-African movement to control the growing protests. The [British] Foreign Office pointed out that “Pan-Africanism, in itself, is not necessarily a force that we need regard with suspicion and fear. On the contrary, if we can avoid alienating it and guide it on lines generally sympathetic to the free world, it may well prove in the longer term a strong, *indigenous barrier to the penetration of Africa by the Soviet Union.*”

A necessary part of this perspective was to provide the independent African regimes with aid. “If Africa is to remain loyal to the Western cause, its economic interests must coincide with, and reinforce, its political sympathies; and one of the major problems of the relationship between the West and Africa will be to ensure an adequate flow of economic assistance, and particularly capital, through various channels to the newly emerging States. On any reckoning the amounts required will be considerable; and, if the Western Powers are unreasonably insensitive to the economic aspirations of independent Africa, the Governments of the new states may be compelled to turn to the Soviet Union for the assistance that they will certainly need...”

As already noted above, the capitalist colonial economic powers knew very well that governments of the “newly independent” states “certainly needed” financial assistance, given that they [the colonial regimes] were the ones responsible for total economic devastation in those states. So, it was up to them to jump in quickly to fill up the role that would have otherwise been open to the Soviet Union, given the colonial legacy of capitalist colonial economic powers. Today, China and others from the East seek to fill up the vacancy created by the demise of the Soviet Union in exploiting gaps in the capitalist colonial economic powers’ ever diminishing financial assistance to bourgeois regimes in Africa. The “free world” mentioned in the British Foreign Office’s statement is capitalist jargon for “free-market”, which entails privatization and deregulation of big business spanning the entire industrial sector and the agricultural sector, and even to social sectors, thereby “making the government as small as possible”— capitalist jargon for effectively reducing, if not eliminating, the role of government in consolidation of the aforementioned sectors via nationalization and spending on social welfare. As one might recall, the Soviets were relatively late in building up military bases in Africa, and started out largely with exploiting calls for assistance in the then emerging so-called “newly independent” African states. So, there is talk of the need for resurgent effort by the capitalist colonial economic powers to consolidate their role and presence in Africa. In the US for instance, presidential-hopeful Barack Obama says this:

“The Chinese are everywhere throughout Africa. They are building roads...bridges...government buildings...hospitals...We’re not doing that because we don’t think it is important and, over time, that’s going to have an enormous impact on us”

But in all this, one aspect should not allowed to be lost; the opportunistic embracing of Pan-African nationalism by the capitalist colonial economic powers.

With regards to military pressure on bourgeois regimes in less economically advantaged economies, this has particularly increased since the demise of the Soviet Union; the US has particularly become more ruthlessly reckless in its foreign policy, upon assuming the role of “sole superpower”. With respect to uncooperative bourgeois regimes of minor economies, the approach usually goes like this:

*First economic isolation and [double-standard] propaganda against the regime, to energize local dissident political elements [usually by propping up "western"-friendly bourgeoisie elements] and instill popular uprising which would collapse the regime; if that doesn’t work, then:

* paramilitary action via covert coup or assassination attempts; and if that doesn’t work, then:

*full blown military action to toss out the regime.

These steps can be seen in the example of the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein, a former “Western stooge”, when he was compelled to make the “wrong decision” in attaining more capital. One or the other of these steps now seem to be under play or is under way in Zimbabwe, in attempts to root out another former unwavering “Western stooge” turned “anti-western“ tyrant: Robert Mugabe, who also made the wrong “decisions” in an attempt to attain capital for his crumbling economy, brought about by his resolute subservience to IMF and World Bank instructions.

On this point, again Talbot chimes in:

“While relations were often tense between the new Pan-Africanist leaders and the West, there was a general recognition that their apparently socialist policies, particularly the provision of welfare measures, were the price to be paid for preventing a further upsurge of popular protest and strikes.

Pan-Africanist leaders were able to maintain a certain ability to maneuver because of the Cold War, which allowed them to extract more concessions from the West than would otherwise have been possible. But if they overstepped a fine line they could find themselves victim of a Western backed coup, as did Nkrumah, or even of assassination. The Belgian, British and US governments all concluded that Patrice Lumumba had to be murdered when he called on the Soviet Union to send troops to support his government in the Congo. Others such as Nyerere survived because they proved their usefulness to the West in the Cold War. Whatever befell them later does not alter the fact that these “African Socialists” were put in power by the colonial regimes because of their ability to prevent a genuine socialist movement developing in Africa.

The power-aspiring bourgeois figures who joined popular anti-colonial uprisings by self-appointing themselves as the articulators of popular dissent, were able “to prevent a genuine socialist movement”, precisely because they sought to draw phenomenal personal wealth within the framework of the socio-economic order set up by local colonial regimes by way of shallow populist rhetoric of Pan-African tinged “nationalism”; they didn't seek doing away with the said socio-economic order. It is no wonder then, colonial drawn political boundaries have virtually been left untouched by bourgeois regimes in “newly independent” African states; this even as they speak of “Pan-Africanism” and “African Union”. So, in this day and age, when one sees ruling African bourgeois give unfettered access to big business interests of capitalist colonial economic powers, it must be understood that they do so, with the understanding that a thin layer of the African bourgeois also benefits from this, at the expense of the African proletariat. This brings us to the importance of mass popular anti-colonial uprising in compelling local colonial regimes to issue symbolic “independence”:

“With the end of the Cold War the West has been emboldened to pull the plug on the policies that its aid has financed in Africa. Yet there remains a certain anxiety in Lancaster's mind. She implicitly recognizes that it was the growth of strikes and social movements that obliged the colonial powers to grant independence. The “African socialists” [Lancaster’s jargon for the African bourgeois] she condemns played a vital role in containing this development within the framework of nationalism. She expresses the concern that in dispensing with Pan-Africanism, the West may have replaced “an economically unsustainable development model with one that could eventually prove to be politically unsustainable if the pace of economic progress failed to accelerate.” With an instinct for the interests of the ruling class, she is aware that the real threat to corporate profits came not from the Pan-Africanists, but from the African working class and impoverished masses—and can do so again.” - Ann Talbot

A swell summarization; Pan-African “nationalism”, as has other forms of nationalism, has ended up disarming the African masses while leaving the socio-economic order set up by local colonial regimes intact. With its promises of a revolutionary development for the African proletariat, it actually ended up being counterrevolutionary. Notwithstanding its all-inclusive catchphrase, “Pan-Africanism” in Africa has largely taken the shape of nationalism at state level as opposed to continental-wide level; that is to say, ‘nationalism in one country’. This can be readily seen from the fact that colonial-drawn political boundaries have virtually been left untouched, since the so-called “independence” of African states. This was also a sure sign, that Pan-Africanist led regimes could be counted on in maintaining colonial hold on the territories without overt colonial military presence. What colonialism did, was that it ‘proletarianised’ African masses into the modern working class within the capitalist framework. This unintended outcome of capitalist colonialism was to also become its major threat; the African working classes expanded in the aftermath of the World War, as opposed to the vice versa, and the rural areas were bridged with the urban centers even more so. The result was that, with evermore repressive exploitation by local capitalist colonial regimes, the African proletariat grew more and more radicalized, leading to growing mass anti-colonial uprisings, not unlike other mass uprisings seen across Europe and elsewhere at beginning of the 20th century, in the aftermath of the first World War.

Today, some fervent capitalist apologists claim that the problem with Africa, is that Europeans didn’t colonize it long enough, and interestingly enough, the capitalist colonial regimes actually intended to remain there much longer, if not indefinitely, but it was the tenacity of the African working class to be free that earned them “independence”, which turned out to be “token independence” thanks to the high-jacking of popular anti-colonial movements by bourgeois “Pan-Africanists”. So, the main problem with Africa, is precisely that it was colonized and raped by European capitalist colonial economies and that bourgeois “Pan-Africanists” derailed mass African movements, by high-jacking them and subordinating them to colonial socio-economic order, and in doing so, helping Europeans to continue raping and exploiting Africa; the problem is not, as colonial apologists like Lancaster say, i.e. due to “African socialism” —a capitalist jargon for bourgeois “Pan-Africanism”—or innate inability of Africans to govern by themselves. The problem was and remains that the bourgeois “Pan-Africanists” rescued European colonialism from genuine social revolution of the African proletariat. So, capitalism has definitely been a disaster for Africans. We’ve also gone through in great length, how the revolutionary social democracy plan put in place in the October Russian revolution aftermath had digressed into a counterrevolutionary form—that is, Stalin’s ‘socialism in one country’ [the anti-thesis of Marxist thought] bureaucratic apparatus, ultimately brought about by the defeat of the European working classes, who were just weakened by the Great War and deteriorating economic situation. The Stalin bureaucratic apparatus’ relative isolation compelled it to turn to more opportunistic and counterrevolutionary antics both in Russia and abroad, thereby discrediting the communist apparatus to broad masses, including those in Africa. So, obviously Stalin’s brand of socialism proved to be a disaster as well, and this brings us right back to the question posed: what about “social democracy” based on Marxist thought, which means ultimately doing away with statehood/nation-state, and political dictatorship of the working proletariat?

When asked for a viable alternative solution for the cause of the working proletariat, opponents of social democracy are hard pressed to come up with one that precludes well, either capitalism or social democracy. Human social evolution culminated into consolidation of hierarchical society under centralized ruling system, and interestingly enough, the earliest attested hierarchical-structured complex—spanning a large territory—brought under central-governing to be deemed a true nation state, took place on the northeast corner of the continent. But human social evolution is ongoing, and has not stunted or reached its final course upon attaining the modern industrial social structure, as capitalist apologists like to rationalize. The industrial revolution which was fueled by the Slave Trade and led to colonialism, created the modern industrial working class out of the working masses of both feudal or semi-feudal social structures and other pre-existing forms of socio-economic order.

With the rise of the modern working proletariat, and with the ever acute social contradictions of bourgeois socio-economic apparatus—dominated by capitalism in the global network, a new workers’ mass movement had emerged by the turn of 19th century, and especially in the aftermaths of the first and second World Wars. On and off stabilization of capitalism and Stalin's betrayal of socialism have in some ways delayed successful workers’ revolution towards a social democracy path, but as globalization progresses—which at the moment serves to do away with national political boundaries only for big business—working classes across the globe get more and more alert to their common socio-economic hardships. The communications revolution only speeds up this process. This coupled with globalization, as the system develops, will facilitate faster-paced and wider ranging spread of organization-effort campaigns for the working class, for thus far—as history has shown time and again—working class organization in a single country often leads to unionism, which doesn’t have enough clout, is susceptible to bourgeois infiltration and is quickly brought under bourgeois handle...because of both the proletariat's insufficient understanding of the precise nature of the complex socio-economic apparatus of which the waged worker is a small part, and lack of genuine workers’ political party. Be as it may, from the African working proletariat [as with any other] standpoint, the only way to find out the benefits of a social democracy governed from a purely materialistic standpoint [as opposed to idealism which breeds reaction through sectarianism; government should be separated from religion, just as science has], is to give it a shot, allow it to blossom and ultimately do away with the concept of statehood, which almost always guarantees counterrevolution!
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—Quotes, courtesy of wsws.org